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COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW

RACE AS A LEGAL CONCEPT
JUSTIN DESAUTELS-STEIN*
Race is a /el

cocpangie

a/Il corncepts, it is a matrix of rules. Althouh tb eglcneto

of race has shifted over time, up from slavey and to the present, one element in the matrix has remained
the same: the background rules of race have alwajs taken a view of racialidentio as a naturalaspect of
human biology. To be sure, caracteridationsof the rule have oftentimes kept pace with developments in
race science, and the original invention of race as a rationalefor the subordination of certain human
populations is now a rationale witi little currengy. The departurefrom this "classic liberal" conception of
race, and its attendant and disturbing view of thefunction of race, did not, however, departfrom the idea
that race is a natural and organic part of being a human being. As this Article argues, this seminal
background rule that race isnatural,neutral, and necessaqa-is deepl problematic and a substantial
obstacle in the fight against the Supreme Court's ascending anticlassificationjurisprudence. Not to
mention, it is alsofalse. In an effort to make some headway against the idea that race is a naturalidea,
as opposed to a legal concept, the Article attacks the background rules of race via the unlikely field of
Conflict of Laws. Taking the Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 as a bench6mark, the discussion first suggests an earjy
functionalist view of voluntay school integration by way of an analogy to the earjy twentieth)-centugy
transformations occurring in Conflicts of Laws. Second, and in the alternative, the discussion then
situates the facts of Parents Involved as literaly aproblem of Conflict of Laws. In both instances, the
hope is to focus legal discourse on the background rules of race so as to empower a new and emancipatoiy
anti-subordinationjurisprudence.

Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. I received helpful comments from Kristen
Carpenter, Ming Chen, Neil Gotanda, Matthew Hughey, Sarah Krakoff, Ralf Michaels, Helen Norton, and participants
at "ClassCrits IV: Criminalizing Inequality" held at Washington College of Law at American University. Jena Akin and
Shannon Avery Rollert provided excellent research assistance. Special thanks to Adrienne Davis, Dwight Mullen, and Ed
Katz.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a biological construction of race was created as a way
of justifying the oppression of non-Europeans. 2 Not only was the notion of the "human races" a lie, it
was an imperialist fiction intended to rationalize a system of domination and subordination.3 American

courts have failed to account for the deeply transformed connections between biology and imperialism,
despite the fact that these connections have been well-developed in the social sciences and critical race
theory. 4 Since its birth, our legal system has constructed race through the use of biology5 -a
use

1 RiCHARD KING, RACE, CULTURE, AND THE INTELLECTUALS, 1940-1970 1 (2004).

2 "Though it would be foolish to suggest that evil, brutality, and terror commence with the arrival of scientific
racism toward the end of the eighteenth century, it would also be wrong to overlook the significance of that moment as
a break point in the development of modern thinking about humanity and its nature." PAUL GILROY, BETWEEN CAMPS
31 (2004). See also ANTONIA DARDER & RODOLFO D. TORRES, AFTER RA(:E (2004).
3 HOWARD WINANT, THE WORLD IS A GHETTO: RACE AND DEMO(;RA(Y SINCE WORLD WAR II 22-23 (2001);
GILROY, supra note 2. For discussion of the so-called "racial realists" who do not see it this way,and the view that racial
domination is a relic, see MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RA(CE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY
1-33 (2004).

4 For a sample of the literature on critical race theory, see DERRICK BELL, RACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMLANENCE

OF RACISM (1993); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE K EY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE

MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Celebrating Critical Race Theo0 at 20, 94

IOWA L. REv. 1497 (2009); Ian F. Haney L6pez, 'A Nation of linorities" Race, Ethnicit, and Reactionao Colorblindnes; 59
STAN. L. REv. 985 (2007); Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development, and Future Directions of CriticalRace Theog and Related
Scholarship, 84 DEN\V. U. L. REv.329 (2006).
See, e.g., Akins v. State of Tex., 325 U.S. 398, 404 (1945) ("Defendants under our criminal statutes are not
entitled to demand representatives of their ra,'ialinheritance upon juries before whom they are tried.") (emphasis added);
Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1308 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Title VII groups discrimination on grounds of race with
discrimination on grounds of color; although Indians are Caucasians, they are generally of darker skin color than 'white'
Americans."); Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 209 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (concluding that a white citizen has
no standing to represent a class of black citizens in challenging employment practices discriminatory only towards black
citizens); United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D.S.D. 1991) (holding that the evidence was insufficient to
show that the individual was an Indian because he only had 7/32 Indian blood and did not receive assistance based on
Indian blood in his childhood); Saad v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 1978) (discussing that
race equated to skin color and that a plaintiff of Arabian descent is allowed to bring a Section 1981 complaint as long as
alleged discrimination is on the basis of race or color). For a discussion of courts' reliance on a concept of race requiring
objective characteristics, see Ortiz v. Bank of Am., 547 F. Supp. 550, 560-63 (E.D. Cal. 1982) ("It has been suggested..
• the plaintiff must meet the burden of proving 'racial animus' [for the purposes of a Section 1981 claim] as the
motivating factor of the discrimination or of some 'objective' display of the plaintiffs "racial background.") (emphasis
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informed by what David Hollinger calls the "ethno-racial pentagon." 6 According to this very old and
completely fabricated view, there are five primordial human races, and a person's belonging to one of
these races is natural and unavoidable. 7 Race is ancestry, blood, and genes. 8
There are two ideas here, and they are linked. The first idea is political: the very notion of a
biological thing called "race" was initially developed as a way for some people to justify the
subordination of other people. The second idea is legal: this new invention was imported into the
American legal system as a "background rule," 9 meaning that the very idea of race as a legal concept was
constituted by a view of human biology. Taken together, we can understand the confluence of these two
ideas as resulting in a legal concept that functioned to assist in the sustained oppression of the newly
minted, disfavored races. This is a classic liberalstyle of framing race as a legal concept.'()
In traditional accounts of our racial jurisprudence, the blatant racism of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries gradually gave way to a more enlightened view of race-a view of race that was to
triumph after World War II, Brown v. Board of Education, and the civil rights movement in the United
States. 11 A pivotal shift involved an insight about biology, namely, that it was immoral to make
judgments any longer about the worth of a person on the basis of his or her race. 12 Where in classic

added). See also Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep't of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1271-78 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (canvassing the
treatment of discrimination claims in courts, variously relying on skin color, genetic makeup, biological descent, and
general physical characteristics).
6 DAVID

A. HOLLINGER,

POSTETHNI( AMERI(A: BEYOND MULTI(CULTURALISM (1995).

7 The pentagon includes: Euro-American
Indigenous. Id. at 23.
8

(White), Asian-American, African-American, Hispanic, and

See Colorine, inj)a note 68.

9 This Article takes notice of but does not move deeply into the literature on constitutive and regulative rules.
For example, the market's background rules of propert and contract may ver well be "constitutive" in the sense used
by writers like John Ruggie. Following John Searle, Ruggie explains that regulative rules are rules that take as a given the
existence of some prior activity and seek to control that activity. Traffic rules are examples of regulative rules insofar as
the decision to force drivers on to the right side of the road has little to do with the existence of the prior and predicate
activity of driving. In contrast, the rules of chess are constitutive in that we cannot know the game of chess-there is no
antecedent activity-without first knowing the rules of the game. As Ruggie says, "[C]onstitutive rules define the set of
practices that make up any particular consciously organized social activity-that is to say, they specify what counts as that
activity." JOHN GERARD RU(G(GIE, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALIZATION 22 (1998). In this light, property and contract rules do appear to be constitutive in Ruggie's

sense, since we cannot know the nature of liberalism's market game without property and contract rules. In contrast,
antitrust laws cannot be constitutive, since they do, as a matter of definition, respond to an antecedent activity, namely,
the competitive market. For discussion of constitutive and regulative rules, see JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION
OF SO(CIXL REAXLITY (1995); Christopher Cher 5 , Regulative Rules and Constitutive Rule; 23 PHIL. Q. 301 (1973); John Rawls,
Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3 (1955).
11The classic liberal style is discussed inJraSection I\.A.

11See genera/l' HUGH DAVis GRAHA M, THE CnIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DE VELOPMENT OF NATIONAL
POLICY, 1960-1972 (1990); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. Moss, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF
NEGRO AMERICANS (1988).
12 See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) ("One of the principal reasons race is treated as a
forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or
her own merit and essential qualities."). Justice Scalia provided a good statement of the idea in 0y of Richmond P. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-21 (1989): "The difficulty of overcoming the effects of past discrimination is nothing
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liberalism it was desirable to arrange social relationships on the basis of biological categories (e.g. slavery,
"separate but equal"), the new view was "colorblind."'1 3 As Justice Harlan famously argued in his
dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, "Our constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the
peer of the most powerful."'1 4 The colorblind approach to racial justice was therefore initially situated as
a progressive attack on the old racism, denouncing any efforts to deduce a person's value from their race.
Colorblindness did not, as a consequence, eliminate the old background rules of race; racial identity
continued to be seen as natural, objective, and rooted in human biology. Rather, it reduced the
importance and altered the nature of the background rules. In other words, while at one time a legal
dispute could be resolved merely by identifying a person with a particular racial identity (i.e. if you are
negro, you can be enslaved; if you are white, you can attend a certain school), in this later period the
background rules of race as a legal concept were retained but hollowed out (i.e. if you are negro, we
cannot make any deductive judgments about your place in the social order simply on the basis of your
15
race). This is a modern liberal style of framing race as a legal concept.
Race law in the United States bore witness to a third phase, during which we are apparently now
living. Once again, civil rights law would retain the background rules of race, first articulated as a
justification for systemic subordination. Like in the enlightened phase of modern liberalism, this third
phase also adopted a colorblind approach to the background rules. Thus, the true nature of racial identity
continued to be understood as a natural and objective matter of human biology, but now a biology free
of any discernable political content.
What distinguished this phase from its predecessor was its approach to what can be termed the
"foreground rules" of race. Foreground rules are those rules believed to be responsive to a pre-existing
activity; they regulate, manage, and control. The suite of civil rights statutes that developed in the second
half of the twentieth century is a good example of the kind of foregrounded regulation embraced in
modern liberalism. In contrast, this current phase is notoriously hostile to the use of foreground rules,
claiming that racial dynamics in the United States have progressed to the point where much of equal
protection jurisprudence is actually fostering racial discrimination instead of remedying it. It is in this

compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those effects, which is the tendency-fatal to
a nation such as ours-to classify and judge men and women on the basis of their countn of origin or the color of their
skin. A solution to the first problem that aggravates the second is no solution at all."
13 The

critique of colorblindness is fundamental in the literature on critical race theor. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda,

A Critique of 'Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 2 (1991) ("Though aspects of color-blind constitutionalism
can be traced to pre-Civil War debates, the modern concept developed after the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments, and it matured in 1955, in Brown P. Board of Education. A color-blind interpretation of the
Constitution legitimates and thereby maintains the social, economic, and political advantages that whites hold over other
Americans."); Gary Peller, Race Consiousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 760 (1990) ("I want to explore the ideological roots of
this particular moment in which the repudiation of race consciousness defines conventional civil rights thinking ....
My argument, in summar form, is that the boundaries of today's dominant rhetoric about race were set in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, in the context of an intense cultural clash between black nationalists on one side, and integrationists
(white and black) on the other. Current mainstream race reform discourse reflects the resolution of that conflict through
a tacit, enlightened consensus that integrationism-understood as the replacement of prejudice and discrimination with
reason and neutralitx-is the proper way to conceive racial justice, and that the price of the national commitment to
suppress white supremacists would be the rejection of race-consciousness among African Americans.").
14 Plessy

v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).

11 The modern liberal style is discussed infra Section IV.B.
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sense that this most recent phase is post-racial.16 This also indicates a shift in what it means to be in favor
of colorblindness: while it used to be a tactic to be deployed in favor of a disadvantaged group, any use
of racial classifications is now to be seen as a threat to the background rules of race. Because the legal
conception of race continues to be constructed out of an idea about human biology, the post-racial view
of colorblindness makes the claim that because race is a natural, pre-political sphere of human identity, it
is wrong for the state to make regulations on the basis of racial identity. 17 At the same time, courts have
not wished to appear oblivious to debates over identity politics and group difference, and what emerged
was an allowable recognition of "difference" when the word "culture"' 8 or "ethnicity"' 19 replaced
"race. "2(J Thus, where "racial balance" is understood today by the Supreme Court as a very dangerous

16

See, e.g, Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L.REv. 1589 (2009).

17 This is a framing familiar to the context of liberal political theory.
y discussion of liberalism follows a
conventional breakdown into a classic, modern, and neoliberal periodization. Classic liberalism was especially popular
during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, and Modern Liberalism ascended the throne around World War

II. For discussion, see ERIc HOBSBAWM, THE ACE OF EMPIRE, 1875-1914 (1987); ERic HOBSBAWM, THE ACE OF
ExTREMEs: THE SHORT TWENTIETH CENTURY, 1914-1991 (1994). For a discussion of neoliberalism, see DANIEL
YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE CO\MANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY (2002);
DAVID HARVEY,A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2007). This treatment of liberalism does not, however, track

the manner in which liberalism is sometimes discussed in the context of race. For example, one textbook on
discrimination law in the United States describes "classical-liberal thinking on civil rights as: 'highly normative and rightsbased in nature but cautiously incremental in scope and ambition [which] criticizes Supreme Court opinions, decries our
recent inattention to the plight of women and persons of color, and urges a renewed commitment to racial injustice. It
accepts the dominant paradigm of civil rights scholarship and activism, and urges that we work harder litigate more
furiously, press for new legislation, exhort each other more fervently than before within that paradigm."' Roy L.
BROOKS, GILBERT PAUL CARRASCO & MICHAEL SELI, THE LAW OF DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND PERSPE(CTIVES 11

(2011) (quoting Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallelsin Recent Writing About Race, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1547, 1547-48 (1991)). In terms of my usage, this is much more akin to modern liberalism than classic liberalism. See
Justin Desautels-Stein, The Market as a Legal Concept, 60 BUFF. L. REv.(forthcoming 2012).
18 As Stephen Steinberg wrote more than thirty years ago, the problem with multiculturalism is that the basic
idea is "built upon systematic inequalities that constituted an untenable basis for long-term ethnic preservation. This was
the pitfall-the fatal flaw-that robbed ethnic pluralism of its cultural innocence .... In short, a pluralism based on
systematic inequalities is inherently unstable because ethnic groups at or near the bottom of the social ladder have little

reason to endorse the ethnic status quo." STEPHEN STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH: RAcE, ETHNICITY, AND CLASS IN
AI\JERI( A 254-56 (3d ed. 2001). Paul Gilroy has similarly argued: "An even blend of those deceptively bland terms

'ethnicity' and 'culture' has emerged as the main element in the discourse of differentiation that is struggling to supersede
crude appeals to 'race' by asserting the power of tribal affiliations. These timely notions circulate in more specialized
language, but any sense that they bring greater precision into the task of social division is misleading. The cultural
approach still runs the risk of naturalizing and normalizing hatred and brutality by presenting them as inevitable
consequences of illegitimate groups that wiser, worldlier, more authentically colonial government would have kept apart
or left to meet only in the marketplace." GILROY, supra note 2, at 27. For defenses of multiculturalism, see CHARLES
TAYLOR, MULTI(,ULTURALISM AND "THE POLITICS OF REcOGNITION": AN ESSAY (2d. ed. 1992) and THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES (Will Kymicka ed., 1995); Stephen May, Multicultura/ism, in A COMPANION TO RACIAL AND
ETHNIC STUDIES 124 (David Theo Goldberg & John Solomos eds., 2002).
19

For discussions on the relationship between the terms race and ethnicity, see Werner Sollors, Foreward:

Theories of'American Ethninit, in THEORIES OF ETHNICTrY: A CLASSICAL READER (1996); MUCAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORiL TR)N IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990s (2d ed. 1994). A famous
example of the idea that ethnicities are cultural groupings and therefore distinguishable from the immutable character of
racial groupings is found in PIERRE L.AN DEN BERGHE, RACE AND RACISM: A COMPARATIVTE PERSPECTINE 9_11
(1967).
20i

In legal theor, see L6pez, supra note 4, at 990 ("Placing developments in equal protection law in the larger

context of evolving racial ideas, my primary aim in this Article is to demonstrate that race-as-ethnicity provided the first
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concept, "cultural diversity" is one of the only meaningful interests the Court has stamped with its
imprimatur in the context of affirmative action cases (along with remedying past intentional
22
discrimination). 21 This is a neoliberalstyle of framing race as a legal concept.
The legal conception of race that emerged in the context of American slavery, the legal
conception of race that developed in the early twentieth century as a reaction against the classic racism of
Jim Crow, and the legal conception of race that has taken shape in the debates over post-racialism and
cultural diversity at the turn of the twenty-first century, all share a commitment to a view of race as an
aspect of human biology. Consequently, all three legal conceptions-the classic, modern, and
neoliberal have a constitutive background rule in common. All three legal conceptions are buoyed by
an attachment to a biological concept of race-a concept that may be seen as one of modern science's
23
very first weapons of mass destruction.

The aim of the Article is to offer some practical suggestions for how to move civil rights law
away from the biological foundations upon which the Court's post-racialism and cultural pluralism
depend, and it uses ParentsInvolved in Communiy Sch ools v. Seattle School DistrictNo. 124 as an illustration-a
case that the late Derrick Bell has described as "the latest, and perhaps most devastating, obstacle in the
25
two-century struggle of African Americans to obtain effective public schooling for their children." Of
course, there is good reason to be pessimistic about the likelihood of such a shift away from the
background rules of biological identity upon which the legal conception of race has for so long been

coherent intellectual justification for reactionary colorblindness."). In social theory, see ttienne Balibar, Is There a Neoracism?, iii RACE, NATION, CLASS 17 (Etienne Balibar & Immanuel Wallerstein eds., 1991); MARTIN BAK-ER, THE NEW
RACISM (1981); MILEs & BROWN, supra note 20.
21

Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 721-22 (2007) ("[I]t suffices to

note that our prior cases, in evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school context, have recognized two
interests that qualify as compelling. The first is the compelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination .... The second government interest we have recognized as compelling for purposes of strict scrutiny is
the interest in diversity in higher education .... "). In a recent article, Reva Siegel has argued that the old divide between
anti-classification and anti-subordination, or in other words, the divide between proponents of a conservative colorblind
approach and proponents of a liberal, race-conscious approach, does not adequately capture the facts. For Siegel, an
analytically distinct principle can be found in the work of moderates like Justice Kennedy, and it involves a concern with
social cohesion. Referring to the idea as an anti-balkanization principle, Seigel suggests that social cohesion is a concept
that avoids the split between individual and group dynamics. To the extent this can be understood as an argument for
racial arguments that elide the liberal framework that I am using here, I remain skeptical, but I admittedly do not directly
deal with the question. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antiba/kanation:An Emerging Ground of Denision in Race
Equalt Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011).
22

The neoliberal style is discussed injia Section IV.C.

23 Today, scientists agree that while the old race science was surely wrong, there appear on the horizon glimpses

of a re-emerging racial biologism. More than a decade ago, Paul Gilroy was already calling for a move beyond neoracism,
pointing to a "rebirth of biologism" where "social and cultural differences are being coded according to the rules of
biological discourse, but it cannot be emphasized enough that this latest raciological regime differs from its
predecessors." GILROY, supra note 2, at 34. See also Alex M. Johnson Jr., The Re-Emergence of Race As A Biological Categoy:
The SocietalImp/ications-Reaffirmationof Race, 94 IOWA L. REv. 1547, 1582 (2009).
24 ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 701.

2 DERRICK BELL, RAcE, RAISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 81-82 (2008). Of course, Bell wrote this before the
Supreme Court's decision in Ricci v. Destefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009), which may have now taken the cake. For a
discussion of Ri'ci, see Michelle Adams, Is Integraton A Disciminator3 Purpose?, 96 IOWA L. REv. 837 (2011).
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defined. How can it be imagined that the Court is ready to make such an ideological about-face? Perhaps
even worse, is it even practical to imagine race as a legal concept that isn't biologically founded? 26 How
could standing for racial discrimination claims work, for example, if a court was prohibited from making
assumptions about the viability of "Blackness"? 27 If race were no longer conceived in terms of ancestry,
how would the court know when a claimant had been discriminated against on the basis of his or her
race, which wasn't actually a matter of their genes after all? 28 As Donna Young has put it: "[T]he U.S.
model [of anti- discrimination law] has been built upon a foundation that on the one hand requires racial
categories in order to determine citizenship rights .. .but on the other, cannot define these categories
29
without resorting to methods that reinforce racial hierarchy."
To be sure, these are tough questions, and instead of trying to answer them, the strategy here is to
reject them. After all, each of these questions is premised on a very common but very wrong assumption
about the pre-legal nature of racial identity. As this Article argues, race is, at best, "relatively
autonomous '3° from law, and in no way should race be seen as existing independently of law. This view

26 For discussion of the tactics that courts have used to get around the often murky territory of phenoypical
assessments of racial idenity, see ARIELA J.GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON'T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN
AMERiCA (2008).
27For a discussion of how racial identity came to be associated with standing, see, e.g., E.Christi Cunningham,

The Rise of Identit PoliticsI: The Mth of the ProtectedClass inTitle VII DiparateTreatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REv.441 (1998).
28 For a relatively recent example of the sorts of judicial gymnastics that are involved, see Malone v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 646 N.E. 2d 150 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995). The Malones, who were twin brothers,applied for firefighter positions
with the Boston Fire Department (BFD) in 1975. In their initial application, they submitted "white" as their racial
classification, but failed to get hired. Two years later, the Malones reapplied again after the BFD instituted a courtordered affirmative action program. On their second try, however, the Malone brothers stated in their applications that
they were black, and successfully got the jobs. In 1987, the Malones sought promotion, and in the process, a supervisor
noticed that these apparently white guys had stated in their applications that they were black. The Malones were
subsequently fired by the Department of Personnel Administration for having lied on their applications, but the brothers
fought back. Taking the Fire Department to Court, the Malones argued that their employers had no business inquiring
into the validity of their own self-identified racial identities. In order to figure out the racial identity of the Malones, the
Supreme Judicial Court accepted the three-part test used by the Department of Personnel Administration: "(1) by visual
observation of their features; (2) by appropriate documentar evidence, such as birth certificates, establishing Black
ancestry; or (3) by evidence that they or their families hold themselves out to be Black and are considered to be Black in
the community." Due to the fact that the Malones satisfied none of these tests, i.e. they had fair hair and skin, and
ostensibly Caucasian features, had documentan evidence of three generations of Malones identifying themselves as
whites, and no community evidence whatsoever, the court opted for a strategy that held out race to be, in part, a
biological categor subject to objective assessments, and more particularly, that the Malones belonged to something
called the white race. The Appeals Court further rejected any possibility of appealing the case.
29 Donna Young, Defining Race Through Law: Enfring the Soia/Norms of Power and Priviege, 72 ALB. L. RnV. 1041,

1041-42 (2009).
The debate over the autonomy of the legal order has a long pedigree. After Marx, a serious effort to
understand the social nature of law was attempted by Weber, who believed that a unique quality of classic liberalism was
its ability to develop a legal mode of thought that was autonomous from other forms of social thought. The autonomy
of the legal system served economic needs, since autonomy brought with it a sense of predictability. MAX WEBER,
311

ECONOMY AND SOciETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETINE SOCIOLOGY 941-54 (2d ed. 1968). Legal autonomy also

served political needs, as Locke had also argued: in order for government to be legitimate, executive and judicial
authority needed to exist independently of individual caprice. For an excellent discussion, see David Trubek, Complex@ij
and Contradiction inthe Legal Orden Balbus and the Challenge of CriticalSocial Thought About Law, 11 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 529
(1977); Isaac Balbus, Commodit Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the 'Relative Autonom9" of Law, 11 LAw & SoC'Y RET.
571 (1977).
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of the constitutive relation between race and law is alien to liberalism, including the neoliberal style of
race jurisprudence. From the neoliberal point of view, human races, like economic markets, are pre-legal
and have the best chance of flourishing when free of regulation altogether. As Chief Justice Roberts
stated in ParentsInvolved, "The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race." 31 It is in this light that foreground rules-the rules that wrought the shift from classic
liberalism to modern liberalism-actually become discriminatory.
The strategy of this Article is to reject this perspective on the relationship between law and
race-a perspective that holds that law is merely a means for regulating a pre-legal entity-and assert
that race is itself a legal concept.32 On this view, law does not only regulate race; it constitutes race. 33
Looking to race as a legal concept highlights how the traditional view cloaks notions of race in a
naturalized and objectified set of assumptions about the limits of legal reform. After all, if race were a
natural thing, then one would naturally assume that certain decisions about the legal treatment of race
would be more or less consistent with the natural parameters of racial identity. However, if we let go of
the notion that there is anything "natural" about racial identity at all, jurists are empowered with a great
deal of discretion to use the tools of legal discourse-the plurality of legal reasoning-in whatever way
they like. Once we are forced to confront the legality of those spaces previously thought natural and
neutral, we also receive, as Duncan Kennedy has explained, the "taking back of alienated powers that can
be used [in service of] . . .equality, community, and wild risky play. But they are powers whose ethical
exercise starts from accepting the existential dilemmas of undecidability that legal discourse has ...
staunchly denied. ' 34 As all lawyers know, we are often handed a conclusion and assigned the task of
marshaling the best argument on behalf of that conclusion. Indeed, the conclusions hardly matter: it is a
matter of course to find ourselves on opposite sides of a question, and a clear indication of a successful
lawyer is that she can, at will, provide dazzling arguments both in favor of and against a given legal
conclusion (that is not clearly subject to precedent or rule). Consequently, once attention is drawn to race
as a legal concept (a set of legal arguments), 35 and away from a racial concept that is naturalized and

31ParentsI1nvolved, 551 U.S. at 748.
32

This follows the analytical framework established in The Market as a Legal Concept. See Desautels -Stein, supra

note 17.
33If law not only regulates race but constitutes it as well, we can see how easily Justice Roberts' thinking about
racial discrimination dissolves into nonsense. As an example, imagine saying that the best way to further tort reform was
to simply stop regulating torts, just as Justice Roberts suggests that the way to stop racial discrimination is to stop using
law as a means for classifying people on the basis of race. In such a view, the reformer would have us believe that "torts"
are just a part of the world, a part of modern life, and if we just stopped regulating them, liabilities, compensation
awards, and attorney's fees would eventually sort themselves out. Notice, however, that the argument here is not to
abolish the legal concept of a tort; it is rather to de-regulate torts. But, of course, the ver notion of de-regulating torts is
incoherent, since we all know that torts do not somehow exist independently of the legal system, as if they could
somehow be de-regulated or "self-regulating." Torts are constituted through law, and because a tort is a legal concept,
the central choice in tort reform is not about whether to regulate or not, it's about which sorts of legal rules we prefer
over other legal rules. In exactly the same way,race is also constituted through law, and as a consequence, it makes no
sense to understand the basic problem of civil rights law as a determination of the proper scope of state regulation. The
very notion of racial identity is always already legalized; racial identity is a set of rules, just like a tort or a contract.
34 Duncan Kennedy,

Two Globa/iZations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36

SUFFOLK

(2003).
31See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics oJLega/Agument, 42 SYmx;USE L. RV.T75 (1991).
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objectified (a set of conclusions), 36 it becomes rather natural to analyze that concept in a fashion that is
3
at once subversive and also consistent with the richest of traditions in American legal thought.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, a great number of private law concepts
transitioned away from objective, formal, natural foundations and towards an emerging realism and
sociological jurisprudence. 38 Whatever we ultimately think of the outcome of this period in our
jurisprudence, a "functionalist" perspective on legal concepts became commonplace. 39 It is in this light
that this Article argues for a similar rethinking of race as a legal concept-a concept that might
substantially benefit from a deliverance from its biological beginnings and an encounter with early
twentieth-century realist jurisprudence.
In order to focus on race as a legal concept in the way that I am suggesting, and distance our
jurisprudence from a notion of race as a natural and immutable quality of human identity, there are
several analogues in the private law with which to work. In the present discussion, I have chosen the
field of Conflict of Laws. 40 Conflicts is a good candidate because it experienced precisely the type of
transition that I am suggesting here for race. At the hands of legal realists like Walter Wheeler Cook,
Conflict of Laws went through the intellectual grinder, ripped out of its formalistic foundations and
pushed through a newly minted functionalist jurisprudence-a jurisprudence which taught judges to ask

36See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 CARDOZO L. RUV. 1147 (2001).
37For a sample of legal realist works and secondar discussions, see Robert L. Hale, Coerion and Distribution ini a
Supposedy Non-coercive State, 38 POL. SCL Q. 470 (1923); Morris Cohen, Propeij and Sovereignt, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 27
(1927); Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1933). For discussions of Hale and Cohen, see
BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE (1998); Neil Duxbu5, Robert Hale and the Econom9 of
Legal Force, 53 MODERN L. REv.421 (1990); Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now: 1927-1960, 76 CL.L. RE. 465 (1988);

Warren Samuels, The Econom9 as a Sstem of Power and Its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robedi Lee Hale, 27 U. MiA i\ L.
RE. 261 (1973). Some of Hale's particularly well-known other writings include FREEDOM THROUGH LAW (1952);

Bargainig, Duress, and Economic Liberyt, 43 COLUM. L. RE . 603 (1943); Force and the State: A Comparison of 'Political"and
'Tconomic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV.149 (1935).
38 See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. RE
MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATON OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860

. 809 (1935);

(1977); THE CANON OF AMER(CAN

LEG AL THOUGHT (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006). As for sociological jurisprudence, classic works
include Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HAR'\. L. RE. 591 (1911), and Hans
Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, andInternationalLaw, 34 A\J. J. INT'L L. 260 (1940).
39To take a rather random example, consider the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491 (2008), dealing with the relation between the United States judiciary and the International Court of Justice's Aena
decision, as well as a subsequent executive order from President George W. Bush seeking to implement that decision. In
making an argument that might be called Jnctionalist,Justice Stephen Breyer suggested that in contrast to Justice Roberts'
chimerical focus on formal rules, Breyer's claim was that the "case . . .law suggests practical, context- specific criteria"
that should be used to help a court decide whether a treaty was self-executing. Id. at 548. Breyer's approach demanded
answers to a series of fact-based questions, such as the purpose of the treaty, its historical and political context, and
whether the treaty seemed more or less focused on judicial application or not. Breyer recognized that these sorts of
questions did not yield "a simple test, let alone a magical formula." Id. at 550. But given the actual and realistic
unavailability of a meaningful textual approach like Roberts', Breyer argued that a judicial focus on the function of the
treaty, as opposed to its form, is all a court can really ever hope to do.
4()
For a recent survey of the field, see Colloquy, Transdisciplinao Conflict of Laws, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(2008).
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what social needs and governmental interests would be served when deciding to allocate jurisdictional
41
authority to one location or another.
In the effort to make practical suggestions for affecting a de-naturalized race jurisprudence, this
Article pushes on Conflict of Laws in two ways: (1) by analogizing race to Conflict of Laws, and (2) by
analyzing race as literally a problem of Conflict of Laws. On the one hand, this Article will reimagine the
Supreme Court's decision in ParentsInvolved in light of early twentieth-century functionalism. Race will be
analyzed as a legal concept that has been the object of a long-standing social purpose, the legitimation of
the subordination of certain groups of human beings at the expense of other groups. Instead of serving
that purpose, a progressive functionalism might interpret race as a legal concept that might undermine
rather than entrench that subordination. In making this argument, the discussion establishes Conflict of
Laws as a useful analogy for understanding how a term like "jurisdiction" transitioned out of a
naturalized jurisprudence and into a functionalist one. On the other hand, this Article will also give
Parents Involved a very preliminary treatment as a Conflict of Laws problem, in a literal as opposed to an
analogical sense. This will involve thinking about the dispute in the case as a dispute between cultural
communities, and a conflict of various legal regimes-local government law, property law, tort law, and
more. The purpose of the analysis is not, however, to argue that ParentsInvolved is best understood as a
private law dispute rather than one sounding in public law. It is instead to highlight the creative
possibilities for an effective anti- subordination jurisprudence in a context where the Court is not
shackled by a presumption about which kinds of social needs, like diversity, are the trumps.
So there's the argument. Here's the roadmap. Part II introduces Charles Mills' theory of the
Racial Contract. The Racial Contract is a useful intellectual construct for anchoring the important fact
that human civilization since the beginnings of classic liberal political philosophy has been racially
structured. Part III provides an abridged intellectual history of race science. The reason for having this
history in mind is this: if the Racial Contract exposes a structure of racial domination, an acquaintance
with race science instructs us to understand the scientific creation of race as an attempt to satisfy a dire
social need, namely, the need to understand (in the context of an emerging Enlightenment) why it was
acceptable for certain groups of people to oppress other groups of people. The invention of the idea of
race helped answer this question, since it was increasingly (and wrongly) apparent that some peoples
were objectively and scientifically superior to other peoples. This could be determined by methodological
examination of the new "human races." Part IV shifts from race as a biological concept to race as a legal
concept, and brings focus to how courts adopted the scientific development of "race" as a background
rule for race as a legal concept. The discussion shows how in classic liberalism, modern liberalism, and
neoliberalism, courts have always retained a biologically anchored background rule for structuring race as
a legal concept. Part V begins the crucial work of trying to think of race as a legal concept that is not
constituted by a biological background rule. It does so by introducing Conflict of Laws as a vehicle for
re-thinking Parents Involved in a way that takes seriously the Racial Contract and its pseudo- scientific
rationales. The decision is approached from two angles, and in the first Conflicts is used analogically

41 At

the same time, Conflicts seems like an awful place to look for guidance in bringing attention to race as a
legal concept. As is famous within the field itself, Conflict of Laws is a self-identified mess of intellectual postures and
purposes. Despite this mess, or rather, perhaps because of it, some scholars have begun to wonder whether what
appears to be so messy is actually a sign of something quite important. In a recent article looking at how Conflict of
Laws might provide insights as to how to break the current deadlock in the debate over feminism and multiculturalism,
Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels, and Annelise Riles argue that hidden in the apparently disparate and highly technical threads
of conflicts jurisprudence are remarkably useful tools for dealing with cultural disputes. Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels &
Annelise Riles, After Multiculturalism:Feminism, Culture, and the SurprisingAttraction of a Conflict ojLaws Approach, 64 STAN. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2012). For a wonderful discussion of Walter Wheeler Cook and his critique of Conflict of Laws, see
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN Lu(,l
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through a recollection of the legal realist critique of Joseph Beale in the early twentieth century. In this
first rethink, Parents Involved is pushed through the sort of progressive functionalism that at the time
dominated conflicts and so many other fields of private law. In the second rethink, instead of using
Conflicts as an analogy, the dispute in ParentsInvolved is situated literally as a problem of Conflict of Laws.

II.

FROM CLASSIC LIBERALISM TO RACIAL LIBERALISM
A. The Racial Contract

Classic liberal political theory has instructed its listeners for close to half a millennium on the
paramount place of equality and freedom in the construction of the state. 42 In one of the most famous
versions of this teaching, we were told to imagine a world in which life was so horrible that it was
necessary for its inhabitants to leave that world, renouncing the natural freedoms they enjoyed there in
order to gain an artificial freedom in political society. 4 3 In choosing to exit that natural world and enter a
political one, these people engaged in a sort of contract whereby they agreed to constrain their natural
rights in exchange for a political authority capable of maintaining order. 44 The question that has plagued
this theory of the "Social Contract" from the very beginning has been: Who were and are the parties to
this contract? After all, the contract's imagined terms were clear: all subjects of the new political
authority were regarded as morally autonomous, free and equal, rights-bearing human beings. But, who
45
was realjy in, and who was out?
Strangely, the answer has at once always seemed very clear and very murky. On the one hand,
the answer has been: "Everyone is in! All members in the political community share these rights, and
46
even further, classic liberal ideas should be understood as supporting a basic theory of human rights!"
According to this view, if society failed to provide all of its members with the benefits of the Social
Contract, it was due to weakness and derivation. On the other hand, there is the long-standing view that
full political membership was always already restricted, from the beginning, and that weakness and
derivation had little to do with it. Referring to seventeenth-century British North America, the historian

42 The literature on liberalism is massive. For illustrative texts, see PIERRE MANENT, AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY OF LIBERALISM (1996); ROBERTO \LNG ABEIRA UNGER,IKNOWLEDGE AND POLITICs (1975).
43See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVTIATHAN (1651). For an interesting discussion of Leviathan as an origin story,
see JOANNE WRIGHT, ORIGIN STORIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT (2004).
44 In addition to Hobbes, among the most famous examples are JOHN Loc E, A SECOND TREATISE ON
GOVTERNMENT (1689); Immanuel Kant, Theory and Practice, iii PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (1793); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OFJUSTICE (1971).
41 On the topic of the proper bounds of political community from a liberal perspective, see WILL KMLLIcIA,
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1990); Arash Abizadeh, Does Liberal Democrag' Presuppose a Cultural Nation?
Four Arguments, 96 AM. POLL. Sci. R. 495 (2002). For philosophical accounts with a focus on race, see THOMAS
MCCARTH, RA(E, EMPIRE, AND THE IDEA OF HUI\LNN DE IELOPMENT
(2009); Charles Mills, Multiculturalismas/and/or
Anti-Raaism?, in MULTICULTURALISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 89 (Anthony Simon Laden & David Owen eds., 2007);
Lucius T. Outlaw Jr., On Race and Philosophy, in RACISM AND PHILOSOPHY 50 (Susan E. Babbitt & Sue Campbell eds.,
1999).
46 As housed, for example, in the DE CLRATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN (D6claration
des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen) (Fr. 1789), available at http://avalon.laxv.vale.edu/18th-century/rightsof.asp. For
theories of rights, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997).
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Barbara Fields has said, "Whatever truths may have appeared to have been self-evident in those days,
neither an inalienable right to life and liberty nor the founding of government on the consent of the
governed was among them." 47 Similarly, the philosopher Charles Mills has suggested that the genocidal
terrors of the last 500 years cannot be conceived as a string of deviant exceptions to social contract
theory. 48 According to Mills, the Social Contract has always been a contract intended to benefit one
49
group at the expense of another group.
Enter Mills' theory of the "Racial Contract. '5° Unlike the Social Contract, Mills suggests that the
Racial Contract was far more "real" than its more popular alter ego, though to be clear, he does not
believe the Racial Contract to have ever been a literal thing. 51 Indeed, just as it is rare to think about the
Social Contract as an actual event, there is no need to think about the Racial Contract in that respect
either. Nevertheless, in terms of the reality of the Racial Contract, it is real to the extent that it serves as
an illumination of the social realities of mass oppression obscured by the apparent egalitarianism of the
Social Contract. 52
Mills theorizes the Racial Contract as an abstraction capable of making sense of the classic liberal
conundrum of being an imperialist ideology of equal rights. Comprised of a set of agreements among
European persons (males), enjoying "personhood" in the classic liberal sense described above, the Racial
Contract constructed non-Europeans as inferior and subordinate to full persons (Europeans)-those
persons that lived under the auspices of the Social Contract in political society and endowed with
constitutional rights. Different sets of rules were therefore understood to govern relations between full
members of society as well as relations between the full members and the subordinated membersmoral, political, legal, social, and economic. "[T]he general purpose of the Contract is always the
differential privileging of [Europeans] as a group with respect to the [non-Europeans] as a group, the
exploitation of their bodies, land, and resources, and the denial of socioeconomic opportunities to them.
All [Europeans] are beneficiaries of the Contract, though some . . .are not signatories to it." 53 Unlike the
Social Contract, in which consent is understood as a critical element in the transition from natural to

47Barbara Fields, Slavety, Race, andldeolog iithe United States ofAmerica, 1 NEW LEFT RV. 95, 102 (1990).
48 CHARLES WADE MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 81-89 (1997) [hereinafter RAC1AL CONTRACT]. For more

samples of Mills' work, see CHARLES WADE MILLS, FROM CLASS TO RACE (2003) [hereinafter FROM CLASS TO RA(CE];
CHARLES W. MILLS & CAROLE PATEM AN,CONTRACT AND DOMINNATION (2007).

49I do not mean to imply that there was any single group of Europeans at issue here. As the history of race
science itself demonstrates, divisions between European groups were just as common as divisions between Europeans
and others. As Charles Gallagher has rightly said: "Missing from the common-sense understanding of white is how an
amalgamation of diverse and warring populations from what is now Europe came to see themselves and their own selfinterests as whites, place themselves at the top of this hierarchy, and impose a system of racial stratification on rest of
the world." Charles Gallagher, White, iniHANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLO(GY OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 9, 10
(Hernn Vera & Joe R. Feagin eds., 2007).
10 For discussion, see RACIAL LIBERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF URBAN AMERI(A (Curtis Stokes & Theresa

Mel6ndez eds., 2003).
'RA1AL CONTRACT,

supranote 48, at 9-11.

2 FRO\J CLASS TO RACE, supra note 48, at 219-28.
3 RA1AL CONTRACT, supra note 48, at 11.

RACE AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

Vol. 2:1

political society, the Racial Contract could not depend on the consent of its subordinated objects. This
54
Contract was expressly coercive.
Coupling the Racial Contract with the Social Contract adds further color to classic liberal
abstractions about the shift from "natural person" to "citizen." First, modern political society turns out
to be far less egalitarian that we'd like to think-in fact, it is classically hierarchical. At the top are
society's full members and the rules fit for rights-bearing individuals. Below them, still physically present
in this new political world, are the subordinated members. This stratification of membership may exist at
the level of the city, state, or globe, because, unlike the received wisdom that the Social Contract only
works in the context of the sovereign state (i.e., political society ends at the boundaries of the Leviathan's
territorial authority), the Racial Contract is worldwide: its terms govern the relation between the
colonizing center and the subjugated colony, and ultimately, the rest of the "uncivilized" world. 55 In
other words, where the Social Contract suggested the wholesale transition of all members from one kind
of society to another, the Racial Contract clarifies that the essential demarcation was not the one drawn
between a political and pre-political sphere, but rather the very real one drawn between certain humans
capable of entering the political, and consequently becoming rights-bearing citizens, and those humans
still in the state of nature, and therefore not rights-bearing citizens. Crucially, however, these
subordinated non-Europeans do not retain natural rights, either; they enjoy neither the sovereign right of
self-determination common to the natural state, nor the newly-minted public power of political society.
56
The Racial Contract robs them of both.
If we look to Locke in particular, we find a classic liberal argument for the moral justification of
the Social Contract, and a second way in which the Racial Contract underwrites the plausibility of the
classic liberal model. For Locke, humans in the natural condition enjoyed a larger specificity of rights
than they did in Hobbes' version of the state of nature, which was essentially limited to an all-powerful
right of survival. 57 Before politics, Locke believed, human beings enjoyed property rights, freedom of
contract, the creation of currency, and participated in commercial transactions.5 8 These rights, and the
use of these rights in the context of a market system, were reflections of an ultimate and objective
morality. Of course, Locke continued to extend the liberal attack on Aristotelian teleology: human beings
did not have particular functions, but instead had the completely free and equal right to decide for
themselves what they might become. Nevertheless, the moral content of these rights gave clear
instructions for how to enter political society: constitutional government was necessary to enable and
guarantee the effective enjoyment of individual rights. 59 This was a moral task, and to the extent

4 Id. at 11-12.

- Id. at 12-13.
_'

Id. at 13.

Lo KE, supra
supra note 42.

r See, e.g.,
MANENT,

8 LOCI E,

note 44; BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (1967);

supranote 44, at 18-30.

9 See, e.g., CRAWFORD BROUGH MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVTE INDIV IDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LoCI-RE 210 (1964): "Locke can assume that neither money nor contracts owe their validity to the state; they
are an emanation of the natural purposes of men and owe their validity to man's natural reason. It is, on this view, the
postulated moral reasonableness of men by nature, not the authority of government, that establishes the conventional
value of money and the obligation of commercial contracts. . . . But although the institutions of property that are
established in the state of nature by the first kind of consent are morally valid, they are practically difficult to enforce in
the state of nature. This difficulty of enforcement is the main reason Locke finds for men... entering civil society."
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government did not protect individual property rights, it was no government at all. The moral
dimensions of the natural condition shape the normative contours of the political.
Again, the Racial Contract adds depth to the image. The moral duty of constitutional
government to protect individual rights only extended to the beneficiaries of the Racial Contract, not to
its subordinated objects. As Anthony Farley has suggested in this context, "Whose who want to possess
must mark the others for dispossession. The haves must come together as one, as Leviathan, because no
one can rule another alone. 6 '° Thus, the appropriate interpretation of Locke's classic liberalism is to
situate it as an application to only Europeans, or in some instances, only to certain kinds of Europeans.
Importantly, Locke's articulation of a moral foundation, however, spread through both contracts; the
61
Racial Contract had the sanction of providence in precisely the same fashion as the Social Contract.
A third way in which the Racial Contract explains the lived experience of the Social Contract is
epistemological. 62 In the texts of its famous authors, there is the apparent sense that the terms of the
Social Contract were universal. That is, one can read Hobbes, Locke and others and come away easily
believing that classic liberalism was applicable to Europeans and non-Europeans alike, and that all
human beings enjoyed natural rights and were essentially equal. According to Mills, this is exactly what
Social Contract theory is intended to convey; when Europeans look at the world, they are meant to
envision a political landscape of free and equal citizens in accordance with the natural rights everyone
enjoyed in the natural condition. 63 No doubt, however, Europeans experienced a great deal of cognitive
dissonance, since what they saw around them was certainly not the realization of a universalized and
equally effective set of rights. The descriptive claim of equality was in stark tension with the descriptive
counter-claim of inequality. Thus, in light of the Racial Contract's prescription that Europeans could
only recognize other Europeans as "persons," one has an agreement to miinterpret the world. One had
to learn to see the world wrongly, but with the assurance that this set of mistaken perceptions would be
64
validated by [European] epistemic authority, whether religious or secular.
Thus in effect, on matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes for its
signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern
of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially
functional), producing the ironic outcome that [Europeans] will in general be unable to
understand the world they themselves have made . . . To a significant extent, then,
[European] signatories will live in an invented delusional world, a racial fantasyland, a
'consensual hallucination.' . . . There will be white mythologies, invented Orients,
invented Africas . . . with a correspondingly fabricated population, countries that never
were-Calibans and Tontos, Man Fridays and Sambos-but who attain a virtual reality
through their existence in travelers' tales, folk myth, popular and highbrow fiction,

6( Anthony Paul Farley, The Color/ine as CapitalistAccmulation, 56

Colorline].
61RAC1AL CONTRACT, supra note 48, at 16-17.
62 Id. at 17-19.
63 Id.
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colonial reports, scholarly theory, Hollywood cinema, living in the [European]
65
imagination and determinedly imposed on their alarmed real-life counterparts.
Classic liberalism systemically produced a bizarre dislocation between the manner in which
certain humans came to understand their world, and the hierarchical world in which they actually lived.
Mills suggests that the Racial Contract guaranteed this real world of inequality, but it is important to
recognize that the Racial Contract itself went nowhere in resolving the discrepancy between (1) the
notion of free and equal human beings, and (2) the notion that some humans were superior to other
humans. Like any contract, it simply set out the terms of this inequality; it did not attempt to justify those
terms.
B. The Invention of Race as a Justification for Subordination
The Racial Contract is an elegant intellectual construct for dealing with the contradictory manner
in which classic liberalism so murderously played itself out in contexts like colonialism and slavery. What
it does not do, however, is assist us in thinking about a psychological dilemma imminent in the
confluence of these two imaginaries: why was it that when liberal texts referred to all members of the
human species as free and equally autonomous persons, this was systemically interpreted as only
referring to certain members? Or even worse, some might have wondered, might this interpretation have
been wrong, or evil, and the conception of European superiority a mirage? Could the Racial Contract
have been a delusional hallucination, a fantasyland? If it is clear that the Racial Contract taught its parties
to view the world in a certain way, it does not explain how they were able to do so. The problem was
that the widespread slaughter and subjugation of different peoples by European populations needed to
be rationalized.6 6 Not only was this a period in which religious justifications were increasingly under
6'
assault, it was also a time when liberalism was ascending-the new creed of equality and freedom. If all
people were equal, and deserved to be free, what justified the harsh inequalities of the Racial Contract?
As Anthony Farley has suggested, the original moment of departure from the natural world was
also a moment in which the members of the new society who would be ruled were distinguished from
those who would rule it.68 If an answer was needed to justify the Racial Contract, in other words, if the
human mind desired a rationale for just why it was that all human beings were not "full persons" after
all, then the mark was the answer. Those who were marked could not be parties to the Contract,
members of the new society. "The masters come together as one through the mark .... After the mark,
we are white-over-black." 6 9 The mark would soon be named: race.
Between the late seventeenth century and the middle of the twentieth, the task of justifying the
terms of the Racial Contract from the newly-minted perspective of the scientific method fell to the

6
_

Id. at 18-19.

(6 VINANT,
67 See,

supra note 3,at 38-50.

e.g., MANENT,supra note 42; ALISDAIR IMA(INTIRE,

AFTER VIRTUE (1981). Though science became a
predominant means for "racing" European domination, it would be a mistake to think that religion was out of the
picture entirely. See, e.g., COLIN KIDD, THE FORGING OF RAcEs (2006) (discussing the relationship between race and
scripture in Protestant Europe).
68 Colorine, supranote 60, at 953.
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emerging disciplines of anthropology, ethnology, and later biology.7° The solution was the creation of
"Human Races." With this novel concept of human races in hand, an incredibly powerful and apparently
objective justification for the conflict between the Social Contract and Racial Contract emerged:
domination was legitimate, because certain "races" were superior to other "races." The slaveholder, the
capitalist, the colonialist, the classic liberal-they no longer needed to look for precarious support in
religious texts or raw self-interest for discrimination. It could now be justified on a scientific basis, even
71
in the midst of an emerging theory of human rights.
The claim here is therefore that the idea of race was invented to satisfy a critical social need on
the part of the oppressor class. 72 As Farley states, "The mark shows who is to own and who is to be
owned."' 73 Europeans were increasingly violating liberal principles even as these principles were gaining
acceptance, and the idea of race made that paradox not only palatable, but a prescription for better
living. As Fields suggested, "Racial ideology supplied the means of explaining slavery to people whose
terrain was a republic founded on radical doctrines of liberty and natural rights .. . Race explained why
some people could rightly be denied what others took for granted: namely, liberty, supposedly a selfevident gift of nature's God."' 74 Sociologically, the oppressor class required a decent explanation for
slaughter, and the scientific invention of the human races worked really well. 7s It worked until the
twentieth century, anyway.

III. THE FUNCTION OF THE HUMAN RACES: AN ABRIDGED INTELLECTUAL HISTORY IN THE
SCIENCE OF RACE

This Part introduces a "functionalist" orientation for thinking about the concept of race, and
relies on a very general view of functionalism as a perspective that seeks to give meaning to a particular

7o The account in this Article is drawn primarily from MILES & BROWN, supra note 20, at 39-50; NANCY
STEPAN, THE IDEA OF RA(CE IN SCIENCE (1982); IVAN HANNAFORD, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN THE WEST
(1996); PETER BAUM,THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CAUCASIAN RAcE (2006); NELL IRVIN PAINTER, THE HISTORY OF
WHITE PEOPLE (2010); GEORGE FREDRICKSON, RACIsM: A SHORT HISTORY (2002); Brendan O'Flahtery & Jill S.
Shapiro, Apes,Essence; and Races: What NaturalScientists Believed About Human Variation, 1700-1900, in R E, LIBERALISM,
AND ECONOMI(Cs 21 (David Colander, Robert E. Prasch & Falguni A. Sheth eds., 2009); AUDREY SMEDLEY, RACE IN
NORTH AMERI(A (3d ed. 2007).
71 See FREDERICKSON, supra note 70, at 56 ("The scientific thought of the Enlightenment was a precondition
for the growth of a modern racism based on physical typology."). See a/so MILES & BROWN, supra note 20, at 39-44.
72E. Christi Cunningham defines race "as a system that was designed to define and enforce artificial differences
in order to justify the unequal distribution of societal energy, resources, spirit, and entitlement." Exit StrategQfor the Race
Paradigm, 50 How. L.J. 755, 760 (2007). See a/so DENISE DA SiLvA, TOWARD A GLOBAL IDEA OF RACE 94 (2007). For
discussion of the active use of "racing," see John A. Powell, The Rating oJAmerican Sotiet': Race Functioning as a Verb Belbre
Signifing a Noun, 15 LAW & INEQUALITY 99 (1997).
73Color/ine, supranote 60, at 954.
74 Fields, supra note 47, at 114. Though Fields understood that the scientific construction of race was entirely
wrong, as elaborated ifra, she maintained that through "the ritual repetition of social behavior," racial ideology was
entirely "real." Id. at 113.
71 For a discussion of concepts of race that precede this period, see THE ORIGINS OF RACE IN THE WEST
(Miriam Eliav-Feldon et al. eds., 2009).
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concept through an analysis of the social and political needs served by that concept. 76 In contrast, one
might consider a "formalist" perspective, which instructs one to understand a concept's meaning in
terms of what the concept actually is, in the abstract, rather than in light of the purposes that it might
serve. Thus, a functionalist perspective on race attempts to understand what social needs the invention
of race was intended to satisfy. As outlined in the discussion below, the answer was bitter: the idea of
race was invented as a way of easing the psychological burden of an oppressor class.
One purpose for situating race in a functionalist perspective is to prepare the way for the legal
discussion in Parts IV and V. As will be argued, the biological concept of race advanced by the sciences
has turned out to be a fiction. A formalistic jurisprudence wedded to such a biological concept is in
trouble, since there is no immutable, genetically determinable thing as "race" to analyze formally. While
constitutional law often suffers from precisely this sort of defect, 77 other fields of law have been
comfortable with functionalist approaches for close to a century. As is explained in Part V, Conflict of
Laws is among them.
A. Monogenism, 1680-1850
Thirty years after the arrival of Hobbes' Leviathan and just five years before Locke wrote his
Second Treatise, Francois Bernier published in 1684 the first of many attempts to classify people in terms
of their physical differences. 78 Of course, thinkers since Aristotle had suggested ways to typologize
human beings. What distinguished Bernier's set of classifications was its focus on physically observable
characteristics, rather than a concentration on function and social purpose-of the dichotomies of vice
and virtue, Christian and Heathen. 79 Bernier initially suggested that there were four basic varieties of

76 i\1y use of "functionalist" is of a ver generic sort. By the term I mean to reference those juridical techniques
that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, wherein jurists sought to interpret statutes and resolve
gaps in legal materials through a purposive, instrumental, and "functional" perspective on social needs. Conventionally,
we think of functionalist techniques as representing the efforts of those that had been persuaded by the critiques of legal
realism, and sought to build out of those critiques a program for moving forward. For a description of functionalism in
the context of legal consciousness, see Duncan Kennedy, Three Globa/iZations of Law and Legal Thought. 1850-2000, in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DE'VELOPMENT 44-45 (David T\1. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2005). For a discussion of
formalism, see Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REv. 195 (2010).
77 Goodwin Liu has discussed the connection between formalism and civil rights jurisprudence in ' Fistoo Will
Be Heard": An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville Decision, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REn. 53, 53-54 (2008) ("[O]ur history
teaches that legal formalism (eventually) loses its authority when it strays too far from social reality. [Parents Involved]
comes close to taking us down that troubled path again.").
78 HANNAFORD, supra note 70, at 191.
79 This article does not mean to imply, however, that this new style of human classification was either
necessitated by classic liberalism or its cause. Instead, notably, in the second half of the seventeenth century, at exactly
the same time that classic liberalism was in its infancy, science became preoccupied with human diversity and physical
explanations for cultural phenomena. The projects of liberalism and what would later be called "race science" were
conducted in tandem-of that we can be certain. As for questions of causation and correlation, these may be left for
elsewhere. See generally ETIENNE BALIBAR & IMMALNUEL WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION, CLAss (1991); THE RACIAL
CONTRACT, supra note 48; FROM CLASS TO RACE, supra note 48; MILES & BROWN, supra note 20; Theodore Koditschek,
Capitalism, Race, and Evolution in Imperial Britain, 1850-1900, in RAcE STRUGGLES 48 (Theodore Koditschek, Sundiata
Keita Cha-Jua & Helen A. Neville eds., 2009); RACIAL LIBERALISM, supra note 50; Maria Grahn-Farley, Race and Class:
More than a Liberal Paradox, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 935 (2008); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATIoN IN
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994).
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human being (the term "race" had yet to arrive), and that these varieties were distinguished on the basis
of geography and physical appearance. 8°
More influential in this first phase of classification writing was the Comte de Buffon. 81 Buffon,
writing in 1749, suggested that the classifications of humans could be explained by the theory that at a
point far in the past, one original human species spread over the globe and was gradually exposed to
climactic differences, foods, and diseases. As this process continued, humans took on various
complexions, sizes, and temperaments. The critical feature of his theory was that these varieties of
people were subject to change-they were not fixed-and that the fact of a single variety did not
necessarily mean anything other than that a single class of people had been subjected to a particular set
of external conditions. Buffon still made value judgments about these varieties, specifically, European
varieties were the best and the African ones were the worst. However, with time, Buffon believed that
these effects would be modified, and even reversed.
It was with writers like these in mind that Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, later known as the
father of anthropology, 82 published a series of editions of his immensely influential On the Natural Varie
83
of Man in the midst of the American and French Revolutions. Coining the term "Caucasian,"
Blumenbach believed that these types were hierarchically arranged with Caucasians positioned as the
most beautiful and intelligent. The least desirable types of human were the Ethiopians and Mongolians;
84
those people living in the Americas occupied the middle range of development.
Blumenbach followed his predecessors in arguing that the physical differences between humans
were mostly a matter of environmental pressures. In his view, all human beings fundamentally were of
one single species. This view was known as monogenism, which in Latin means "one species" or "one
people. ' 85 Blumenbach also denied that humans belonged to the animal kingdom, rejecting the notion
that all natural creatures existed on a natural scale of transitional differentiations. In this posture
Blumenbach left behind the old notion of the Great Chain of Being, reminiscent of Aristotle's natural
scale. Blumenbach's thinking was that human beings consisted of one single species, and that it was a
mistake to view the wide variety of human beings as alien to one another. The theory of the Great Chain

"I These

groups were: (1) Europeans, South Asians, North Africans, and Americans, all of which shared in

similar climates and complexons; (2) Africans (central and south); (3) Asians (central and north); and (4) Lapps, "people
who were ugly, squat, small, and animal-like." About fifty years later, Carolus Linnaeus offered a fifth group: (1) homo
Jerus (savage); (2) europaeus a/bus (light-skinned, intelligent, law-abiding); (3) americanss rubescus (tanned, happy-go-lucky,
custom-abiding); (4) asiathus luridus (yellow-skinned and sad); (5) ajer mger (dark-skinned, lazy, "governed by the arbitrary
will of the master"). HANNAFORD, supra note 70, at 204.
81HANNAFORD, supra note 70, at 203-14.
82

HANNAFORD, supra note 70, at 206. Blumenbach explained that human beings were of several types:

Caucasians, Mongolians, Ethiopians, Americans, and Malays.
83 PAINTER,

supra note 70, at 79. Blumenbach offered a helpful explanation as to why this variety of human

being would be identified with the Caucuses: "I have taken the name of this variety from Mount Caucasus, both because
of its neighborhood, and especially its southern slope, produces the most beautiful race of men, I mean the Georgian."
Id. at 81.
84

Id. at 88 ("The Tartar-Caucasian was first and foremost the beautiful race. The Mongolian was the ugly race,

'weak in body and spirit, bad, and lacking in virtue' ....

).

8 HANNAFORD, supra note 70, at 211 ("For Blumenbach all varieties and differences overlapped and merged
into one another and had to be viewed according to the species, which was one and the same-a unity.").
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supported the view that there were several species of humans, linked in a hierarchically arranged system
86
with monsters on one end and European men on the other, followed by primates and other creatures.
Despite Blumenbach's belief in the common brotherhood of all mankind, and thus the existence of one
single human species, his typology of human classifications nevertheless set the stage for the use of a
racial idea to assist in making sense of the apparent fact that some people were a lot better than other
8
people. 7
The monogenist ideas of Blumenbach and others like Johann Gottfied von Herder dominated
race science until the 1850's, but their power diminished well before then. 88 Vying for consideration were
the minority positions of scientists like Charles White and Peter Camper, who argued respectively for the
notion that Africans were the link between Europeans and apes, and that this theory could be proven
through the statistical display of facial angle measurements and skull shapes. 89 In early nineteenthcentury Britain, the argument that Africans comprised a distinct species, linking "real" humans to apes,
was rejected as quackery. 9° Writers like Thomas Winterbottom, James Prichard, and William Lawrence
believed that the evidence overwhelmingly placed humans outside of the animal kingdom, obviating the
need to provide any "link" at all. To be sure, practically all writers agreed that Africans were the least
"developed" of the human varieties, and physically were the least fortunate, but these differences were
not natural but merely the result of environmental factors. As Lawrence argued:
That the Negro is more like a monkey than the European cannot be denied as a general
observation. But why is the Negro always selected for this comparison? The New
Hollander, the Calmuck, the native American, are not superior to the Africans, and are
as much like monkeys. Why then is the Negro alone to be depressed to a level with the
brute? 91
To be clear, the unity of the human species was defended by the likes of Blumenbach, Herder, Prichard,
and Lawrence. The equality of the variety of human beings was not. The step from here to a more
muscular "racism" would not be a difficult one to take.

86 This

was Linnaeus' view. Id. at 203-08.

87 As Ivan Hannaford explained: "During the last forty years of [Blumenbach's] long life controversy raged
over items he had put squarely on the agenda: degeneration, . . . the significance of language and milieu (geography,
climate, relief, soil, land), and perhaps most important of all, the capacity of peoples for progressive physical, moral, and
political development." Id. at 213.
88 STEPAN, supra note 70, at 10. In a similarly holistic view of the human species, Herder published an account

in the last decades of the eighteenth century suggesting that a new idea-ulture-was the real organizing principle for
the different manifestations of human society. For Herder, these cultures were equal in the sense that they were
technically all human cultures, produced through a combination of different linguistic, religious, musical, educational, and
ritualistic practices. Again, equalit was a driver in Herder's thinking, but the very maneuver of classifying difference
enabled much of the race science that would develop in the nineteenth centur. Another important connection
anticipated here is the relationship that would develop between race and culture-if culture was the shaping force of
society, race would come to shape culture.
89

Id. at 9-10.

9o These arguments were made in France as well, for example by Georges Cuvier.
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B. Polygenism, 1815-1860
The shift that occurred in race science around the middle of the nineteenth century involved a
series of moves, all revolving around the rebuttal of environmentalism as a coherent explanation for the
superiority of certain races over others. More and more, anthropologists and ethnologists turned to everadvancing methods of quantifying the many dimensions of the human body, with special emphasis on
the brain and skull. The emerging consensus was that "races" of human beings could be identified on the
basis of skull measurements, and that these differences generated vast gaps in the moral, intellectual, and
cultural capacities of these groups. Critically, these differences were subject to value judgments as they
had always been-the intellect and culture generated by the European skull was of a different order of
magnitude than those found in "other" skulls. Regardless of environmental factors, these intellectual,
moral, and cultural capabilities were seen as being inflexible-innate and woven into the very structure
of race. Whereas early monogenists viewed race, and to be more precise with regard to Blumenbach's
preferred term of "variety," as hardly determinative of anything, race transformed from an incidental
factor into a source of explanation. Thus, a scientific rationale for the Racial Contract was coming into
focus.
In the United States, where polygenism was more popular, the anatomist Samuel George Morton
92
was a leading advocate of the view that human races were distinct species with innate differences.
Writing in the decades preceding the American Civil War, Morton accepted Blumenbach's classification
of five races (Morton swapped the term "race" for "variety"), but argued that instead of these races
having been produced by their environments, every race had particular qualities that were independent of
context and especially adapted to peculiar locations. 93 These qualities were innate and immutable, and
were correlated with the average cranial capacity of each race. 94 Fortuitously for Morton, his measured
averages tracked exactly the cultural and aesthetic rankings of Blumenbach. Each of these five
fundamental races were also broken up into families, anticipating the increasingly dangerous work which
was to come in separating out the superior Caucasian families from the degenerate ones.
Though other race scientists were more influential at the time,95 Count Arthur de Gobineau's
1853 publication of The Inequaliy of Races is more well known today as one of the key motivators for what
would become Nazism. 96 Due to this impact, and to give more of a flavor to the argument, it is worth
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BAUM, supra note 70, at 106.

93 Id.
94 According to Morton's measurements, the Caucasian cranial capacity averaged eighty-seven cubic inches,
Mongolians averaged eighty-three inches, Malays averaged eightyone inches, American Indians averaged eigh5 inches,

and Ethiopians averaged seventy-eight inches. Id. at 107. In 1840, Anders Retzius introduced the "cranial index," which
was notated by the maximum breadth of the head expressed as a percentage of maximum length. He was also the author
of the terms "dolichocephalic" (long-headed skull) and "brachycephalic" (broad-headed skull). BAUM, supra note 70, at
130-31.
91 Back in Britain, the anatomist Robert Knox published The Races of Men in 1850. Knox began with an attack
on Prichard, arguing that there was no evidence for believing in an original human species that had spread throughout
the world, and that the species must be studied with anatomical methods-biologica/, as the term now appeared
consistently in the literature. Id. at 5-32. In tandem with this biological conception of race, Knox pushed forward the
disaggregation of the Caucasian race, emphasizing the purity of the Saxons, and the destiny of that people to conquer the
world. Id. at 32-54. Importantly, this structural purity of racial stock was immune to degradation, just as the Jewish
people could never hope to improve their own. These differences were biological, and therefore unchangeable. The
Revolutions of 1848 were the backdrop here.
96 HANNAFORD, supra note 70, at 265.
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spending a bit longer on Gobineau, the French "Father of Racism." '97 Gobineau divided the human races
into three: white, black, and yellow. As he explained, "I understand by white men the members of those
races which are also called Caucasian, Semetic or Japhetic. By black men I mean the Hamites; byyellow the
Altaic, Mongol, Finnish and Tartar branches. These are the three primitive elements of mankind." 98
Though skin color and the Bible are doing a lot of work here, Gobineau also agreed that bone
structure was highly relevant as well. Gobineau also ranked the races, as well as a shift from bone to
blood: "the peoples who are not of white blood approach beauty, but do not attain it." 99 Gobineau went
on to write, "As the [non-white] races recede from the white type, their features and limbs become
incorrect in form; they acquire defects of proportion which, in the races that are completely foreign to
us, end by producing an extreme ugliness."''1° ° Just what is this white beauty so elusive to the rest of
humanity? Gobineau claims that it can be found in the most obvious of places: in the "...tall and nobly
proportioned figure of Charlemagne, the intelligent regularity of the features of Napoleon, and the
imposing majesty . .. of Louis XIV ...."101l
Gobineau was not suggesting that all whites were equally
attractive-Italians were more beautiful than the Germans, Swiss, French, or Spanish. 1°2 And, just as no
race was as physically strong as the whites, "[i]n strength of fist, the English are superior to all other
European races; while the French and Spanish have a greater power of resisting fatigue and privation, as
'1°3
well as the inclemency of extreme climates.
If skin, bone, and scripture told us a story about the human races, Gobineau explained that racial
differences were far from skin-deep. The black race is stamped at birth with a pelvis of animal character,
a character that "foreshadows his destiny."''1 4 The "Negro" is not an animal, but not much more-"his
mental faculties are dull or even non- existent"-though he does possess senses that are more animal-like
than human. The Negro will eat anything, have sex with anything, kill anything, and do whatever it takes
to satisfy his primal needs. "To these qualities may be added an instability and capriciousness of feeling,
that cannot be tied to any single object, and which, so far as he is concerned, do away with all
distinctions of good and evil." 1°5 As for the yellow race, these people trend towards obesity, have little
physical energy, and lack the "strange excesses so common among negroes.'' 1 6 According to Gobineau,
a person of the yellow race is mediocre in everything, utilitarian, never dreams of greatness, and has as
his "whole desire ... to live in the easiest and most comfortable way possible."''
It is probably a waste

97ARTHUR DE GOBINEAU, THE INEQUALITY OF HUMLAN RA( ES (Adrian Collins trans., 1967).
98 Id. at
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of time to summarize Gobineau's summary of white people-needless to say, he thought they were
amazing. 108
In the following decade, arguments for the innate, anatomical basis of distinct human races, and
the moral, cultural, and intellectual consequences that followed, increasingly dominated Europe. As
Nancy Stepan has argued,
The new racial biology appealed to the general public because it appeared to agree with
the Europeans' sense of themselves in the world, and to be based on a wider set of data,
more sophisticated measurements, and a deeper knowledge of biological processes and
functions than previous work on human races. In short, by the middle of the century, a
new racial science had come into being in which races were indeed, as [Robert] Knox
claimed, 'everything. ' 1 9
C. Evolution and Eugenics, 1860-1945
If writers like Gobineau represented the apogee of polygenist thinking in the first half of the
nineteenth century, the use of race as an explanation for European superiority shifted gears in the second
half. After 1859, no examination of human genesis and variety could proceed without taking note of
Charles Darwin's On the Origin of the Species-a game-changer if there ever was one. 11 From this point
forward, polygenism was no longer a valid belief, as it became universally accepted in the natural sciences
that the human species was not a fixed, unchanging, perfect creation, but one that had been undergoing
constant and continuous change since its beginning."' Darwin's insight into the idea of natural
selection-that competition for survival favored those attributes most advantageous to keeping an
organism alive-seemed to push race science back in the direction of environmentalism. What marked
this new phase of race science was not, however, a return to Blumenbach, and in fact it was something
like the opposite. Despite the initially apparent arguments that evolutionary theory posed against race
science, the idea of evolution turned out to be a far sleeker and more powerful weapon for racist
thinking than anything seen before.

lti8

Gobineau rejected the fairly common view of the time that, though these descriptions are accurate enough,

they are subject to the civilizing mission, and that the lower races can be bettered. Gobineau explained that this is not so,
and that just as humanity at large has failed to progress since ancient time, it is similarly the case that non-whites are
precluded bj their race from acquiring any of the positive traits of the whites. As one of many examples, here is
Gobineau's articulation of the situation of the American Indian: "They know that the strength of their [white] masters is
irresistible. They have no hope whatever of seeing their native land one day delivered from the conqueror; their whole
continent is henceforth, as they all know, the inheritance of the European ....From their purchases of brandy, guns,
and blankets, they know that even their own coarse tastes would be more easily satisfied in the midst of such a society,
which is always inviting them to come in ....It is always refused. They prefer to flee from one lonely spot to another..
•.They will die out, as they know well; but they are kept, by a mysterious feeling of horror, under the yoke of their
unconquerable repulsion from the white race, and although they admire its strength and general superiority, their cnsderne
and their whole nature, in a word, their blood, revolts from the mere thought of having a ything in common with it." GOBINEAU, supra
note 97, at 170-71 (emphasis added). Because this revulsion is in the blood, in the race, it is impossible for whites to
civilize non-whites, and due to this unchanging feature of race relations, Gobineau concludes that it is an understatement
to bar the races from mixing-the true condition is one in which the mixing of races eventually will lead to the
extinction of humanity. Id. at 210-11.
109STEPAN, supranote 70, at 46.
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The articulation of a new science was not the only relevant occurrence. Just as the explanatory
power of the idea of race gained ground in Europe after the Revolutions of 1848, and in the United
States in the run-up to the Civil War, so did it once again build steam in the last several decades of the
nineteenth century. 112 Europe was jarred by the Franco-Prussian war of 1871 and the ensuing
Depression, and the United States limped through Reconstruction, which was noted by some scholars as
the nadir of race relations. In these political contexts, the two new conceptions of social evolution and
eugenics flourished in a sort of perfect storm of political and scientific turbulence.
As far as social evolution goes, probably no other name comes as readily to mind as Herbert
Spencer's. 113 The philosophy of laisse-faire,114 which attracted Spencer's fierce support, instructed social
planners to abide by a theory of natural selection. To the extent government tried to control the more
extreme effects of this competitive process, the government was effectively ensuring the survival of
backward and deviant vestiges. By analogy, Spencer argued for society to be understood as a social
organism, which was subject to the laws of natural selection in exactly the same way as were species. The
conclusion drawn with regard to the human races was apparent. Just as the backward and deviant
attributes of the human species were ultimately extinguished over periods of competitive struggle, so too
would those unworthy elements of society languish and disappear. They would disappear, that is, so long
as competition was allowed to proceed without governmental interference.
How did race science square the view that races were fixed and innate with the notion of
continuous, evolutionary change? Anthropologists agreed that though it may have been the case that in
some primordial past human beings may have had a common, shared identity, racial formation occurred
at a similarly distant point. Instead of the human races evolving, however, the evolution of race had
stopped. The rationale for the idea that there was a pre-human period in which races were formed
through evolutionary processes, only to be followed by stasis, was that once human beings had become
more intelligent, they were able to subvert and deny the forces of natural selection. As a result,
evolutionary struggle would continue to affect humanity, but not individual human beings. The struggle
was from the dawn of modern man a struggle between the races of men, and not between men
115
themselves.
The job of the race scientist was consequently the study of these primordial races and the
identification of their truly natural essences. The trouble, of course, was that scientists were finding that
they couldn't identify racial essences from the study of particular individuals. Individuals were simply too
varied to ever be representative of what were believed to be the standard traits of a race. Thus, individual
people were studied not to help generate a picture of racial identity, since this appeared to be impossible.
Instead, individual differences between people who were apparently meant to belong to a single race
were chalked up as environmentally produced, or mutations from the racial standard. The obvious
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Id. at 120-26.
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See, e.g.,

MIIE HAWKINS, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT 1860-1945, at 82-

103 (1997).
114 The idea here is that just as a species becomes more and more adapted to its environment through the
selection of those attributes that are most competitive, so society also evolves in an identical way. Through the fire of
competition, society is naturally molded towards more and more progressive ends. Though the competitive process will
surely wreak havoc on the weak, it ensures the survival of the fittest, and even more, the success and bettering of the
fittest. For a history of laisse-aire, see JACOB VINER, ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF E/;ONOMI(:S
(Dou(,LAs A. IRWIN, ED. 1991 [1960]).
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problem here was that if racial identity could not be constructed from the study of individual human
beings, where was it coming from?" 6 The notion of race was increasingly looking more and more like an
article of faith, and not of empiricism.
From here it is but a short hop to the new field of eugenics, which did not become fashionable
until the early twentieth century. 117 Around that time, several popular works on race science were lending
more support for the view that there were biologically fixed racial identities and, more specifically, that
the so-called white or Caucasian race was not a unity. Among such works was the American economist
William Z. Ripley's 1899 publication of The Races of Europe, a turning point in U.S. race science. 118 While
Blumenbach's idea of the Caucasian race had gained popularity in the United States, most scientific study
of the idea of a Caucasian race did not get under way until after Ripley." 9 In part, as Bruce Baum
explains, Ripley's work was filling a social need-a need to provide persuasive evidence that midnineteenth-century European-Americans were superior to the new Europeans immigrating in that
century's last decades.

12°

Stepping into this space was Ripley's view that the idea of whiteness was a misnomer, 12 1 and that
there were actually three primary European races. 122 Each racial group was characterized by a single

116 Both

Gobineau and Ripley were of apiece on this point:

"It is not essential to our position, that we should actually be able to isolate any considerable number,
nor even a single one, of our peqct racial types in the life. It matters not to us that never more than a
small majority of any given population possesses even two physical characteristics in their proper
association; that relatively few of these are able to add a third to the combination; and that almost no
individuals show a perfect union of all traits under one head, so to speak, while contradictions and
mixed types are everywhere present."
WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, THE RACES OF EUROPE 108 (1899) (emphasis added).
117 In short, its advocates believed that human beings had short-circuited the evolutionary process through
cunning; if, like other animals, humans had selectively produced in a way that would have maximized adaptive
advantages, the non-white races would have extinguished long ago. But the human mind broke the laws of nature,
choosing instead to keep on procreating, despite the competitive disadvantages of belonging to a non-white race. The
field of eugenics was meant to solve this problem, informing how social policy, in the words of Francis Galton, "may
improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations either physically or mentally." As Nancy Stepan has
explained, Galton's 1869 publication of Hereditag Genius embodied several of the key assumptions of the eugenics
movement. First was the belief that intelligence was discrete and quantifiable, and that intelligence was a matter of
inheritance. A second and related view was that the amount of inherited intelligence was easily identifiable and
measurable through "objective" intelligence tests. Third, intelligence was believed to be entirely a matter of racial
inheritance-in the debate between nature and nurture, nature was all. Fourth, it was critical to turn this science into
policy, and that in order to extinguish the specter of degenerate generations in the future, government had to regulate
the process of selective breeding. The impetus for this was the belief whereas nature eliminated the sick and the stupid in
the rest of the animal kingdom, humanity protected its imbeciles from early death. Man's tinkering with the natural
order, so Galton believed, had to be stopped. See STEPAN, supra note 70.
118BAUM, supra note 70, at 144; see also RIPLEY, supra note 116.
119BAUM, supra note 70, at 144.
120 Id.
121 RiPLEY, supra note 116, at 103.

122 These were: (1) the Teutons from northwestern Europe, with long heads and faces, light hair and eyes, tall,
prominent and thin noses, (2) the Alpines spread through France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Albania, with round heads
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range of cranial shape, 123 but Ripley made it clear that there were very few, if any, actual living individuals
that possessed all the racial traits characteristic of a particular racial group. Despite the apparent fact that
races did not exist in the world of 1900, the idea of race was so crucial that it "exists for us
24
nevertheless."1
If statements like these are bewildering, writers like Houston Stewart Chamberlain, writing at the
same time as Ripley, provide some insight into the feverish need to believe in the existence of a thing
called "race." There was no doubt, Chamberlain conceded, that scientific method was struggling to
establish a firm footing for the idea of race. 125 However, this kind of struggle was necessary and
126
expected, given the constant state of intermingling and cross-breeding that has occurred over the ages.
The true fact was that scientific confusion should never be mistaken for suspicion over whether or not
race is a real thing. To question the existence of race was to question the existence of life itself. Here is
how Chamberlain presents the experience of a pure-blooded member of the Teutonic or Germanic race:
Nothing is so convincing as the consciousness of the possession of Race. The man who
belongs to a distinct, pure race, never loses the sense of it .... Weak and erring like all
that is human, a man of this stamp recognizes himself, as others recognize him, by the
sureness of his character, and by the fact that his actions are marked by a certain simple
and peculiar greatness, which finds its explanation in his distinctly typical and superpersonal qualities. Race lifts a man above himself: it endows him with extraordinary-I
might almost say supernatural-powers, so entirely does it distinguish him from the
individual who springs from the chaotic jumble of peoples drawn from all parts of the
world: and should this man of pure origin be perchance gifted above his fellows, then
the fact of Race strengthens and elevates him on every hand, and he becomes a genius
towering over the rest of mankind, not because he has been thrown upon the earth like a
flaming meteor by a freak of nature, but because he soars heavenward like some strong
and stately tree, nourished by thousands and thousands of roots-no solitary individual,
127
but the living sum of untold souls striving for the same goal.
For Chamberlain, the idea of race was hardly ever in jeopardy of falling into desuetude: it was simply a
128
matter of science catching up with the natural world, with the facts catching up with the theory.

and broad faces, chestnut colored hair and hazel eyes, broad noses, and medium and stocky builds, and (3) the
Mediterraneans come from everywhere south of the Pyrenees, with long heads and faces, dark hair and eyes, very broad
noses, and medium and slender builds. Each racial group was also characterized by a single range of cranial shape. Id. at
37-45.
123 Id.

124 Id. at 112.
12j 1 HOUSTON STEWART CHAMBERLAIN, FOUNDATIONS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (John Lees trans.,

1994).
126 Id. at

271.

127 Id. at

269.

128 Id. at 317 ("[R]ace, and nationalit which renders possible the formation of race, possess a significance
which is not only physical and intellectual but also moral. Here there is before us something which we can characterise as
sacred law, the sacred law in accordance with which we enter upon the rights and duties of manhood .... ). As for how
to move forward, Chamberlain believed he had found several rules for race-formation. The origin of a pure race
necessitated the presence of a strong stock-a material with which to begin to build. Then, the stock needed to be
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Chamberlain suggested that it was clear to a member of the Germanic race, just as it was clear to an
adversary member of the Jewish race. For non-members, however, the trick of identifying the superior
human was really not all that tricky. Too many misconceptions floated around-Germanic peoples were
1 29
It
not required to have light hair, but in fact, "the most genuine sons of this race may be black-haired."'
was correct to believe, however, that members of the German race possess long skulls. The fact that
many, and in some cases the majority of these peoples have round skulls should not be a bother: "That
in these phenomena we see the effects of the infiltration of an un-Germanic race, a race that does not
belong at all to the Indo-European circle, but to the race-less chaos, can scarcely be doubted. ' 13° Again,
Smith concedes the scientific challenges while re-asserting the apparent obviousness of it all:
It frequently happens that children who have no conception of what 'Jew' means, or that
there is any such thing in the world, begin to cry as soon as genuine Jew or Jewess comes
near them! The learned cannot frequently tell a Jew from a non-Jew; the child that
131
scarcely knows how to speak notices the difference. Is not that something?
Besides, if we discard the physical distinctions of race, the decisive greatness of the Germanic race
32
distinguishes itself in its moral and intellectual legacies which is literally everything that is good.
D. Ethnicity vs. Race, 1935-1980
While the eugenics movement steadily accelerated in the United States, it reached a fever pitch in
Germany. After World War II, eugenics took a fall, associated as it was with the Holocaust. But the
return of a more "rational" race science at the mid-twentieth century was not solely a product of the
Nazi defeat, as a minority stream of writers beginning with the likes of Lancelot Hogben and Franz Boas
33
criticized the alliance between evolutionary theory and eugenics.
In the wake of World War I, the lawyers and politicians behind the League of Nations and a
treaty system meant to deal with the European "minorities problem" found themselves grappling with an
emerging international right of "self-determination." If this was a right that ultimately entitled a
particular entity to a degree of political autonomy, if not outright independence, the question was sure to
turn on just what kinds of group would hold the nascent right. Peoples or nationalities? Races?
Simultaneously, the interwar years were also marked with the rise of Nazism and the peak of the

purified over time through the artificial (in contract to "natural") process of sexual selection and inbreeding. In order to
strengthen the racial stock, it then needed to be cross-bred, but only in small doses and in the right quarters. Finally, a
great race will be heated in the fires of nationalism, as it is only in the house of the nation that racial greatness can be
achieved. Id. at 317-20. Smith explained that in the articulation of these pre-conditions he had touched "upon a deep
scientific fact." Id. at 317.
129
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133For a general review of this literature, see BAUM, supra note 70, at 162-92; and
140-96.
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eugenics movement. It is in this context that a new wave of race science struck against the popular idea
that the superiority of European peoples could be defended on "racial" grounds. 134
Illustrative is the work of Ashley Montagu's attack on "race" and his preference for "ethnicity"
in writings such as the first 1942 publication of Man's Most DangerousMyt: The Fallay of Race, his work on
UNESCO's 1951 "Statement on Race," and The Concept of Race published in 1964. Montagu challenged
the whole notion of race science as an enormous amount of talking in circles and question-begging:
For nearly two centuries anthropologists have been directing their attention principally
toward the task of establishing criteria by whose means races of mankind might be
defined. All have taken completely for granted the one thing which required to be
proven, namely, that the concept of race corresponded with a reality which could
actually be measured and verified and descriptively set out so that it could be seen to be
a fact . . . .The process of averaging the characters of a given group, knocking the
individuals together, giving them a good stirring, and the serving the resulting omelet as
a "race" is essentially the anthropological process of race-making. It may be good
cooking but it is not science, since it serves to confuse rather than clarify . . . .The
omelet called "race" has no existence outside the statistical frying-pan in which it has
135
been reduced by the heat of the anthropological imagination.
Like Julian Huxley and A.C. Haddon in their 1936 publication of We Europeans, however, Montagu
admitted that innate differences existed between populations, but that the better way of capturing these
differences was with the label "ethnic group.' 136 The basic reasoning is that while it is true that
populations differ in terms of the frequency of certain genes, to then call this difference "racial" is to
inject into the facts a set of varying beliefs about the cultural and intellectual baggage that must or may

A major intervention was made when Julian Huxley and A.C. Haddon published We Europeans in 1936.
of writers like
Gobineau and Smith, Huxley and Haddon argued that the bulk of race science had been established to support the
political, social, cultural, and economic superiority of some populations over others, and that as real science, the biology
of race was complete nonsense. Id. at 144-64. To be sure, they were not arguing that various populations could not be
separated by innate genetic differences with regard to both physical and psychological traits-this would present an
argument against race that would eventually come later in the century. But, where Huxley and Haddon admitted the
existence of innate genetic differences between groups, they first challenged the non-sequitur that one could deduce
psychological conditions from physical conditions. Id. at 144. That is, there was no real evidence whatsoever that black
skin or a certain cranial capacity could tell a scientist anything at all about "racial" intelligence. Second, they criticized the
idea that one could find average degrees of intelligence based on physiognomy-"there will be in every social class or
ethnic group a great quantitative range and a great qualitative diversity of mental characters, and different groups will
very largely overlap with each other." Id. at 70. Third, Huxley and Haddon suggested that whereas race science had
previously concluded that "race is everything" in the question of nature versus nurture, this was surely wrong. Climate
and culture played an enormous role in the differentiation of human capabilities, and as yet, they concluded, there was
simply no way of quantifying how explanator nurture or nature might be in any given situation. While Huxley and
Haddon agreed that there were innate differences between populations, and therefore kept within the discourse of a
biological idea about the separation of groups of human beings, they believed that "nothing in the nature of 'pure race'
in the biological sense has any real existence." Id. at 14. Looking to Herodotus' use of the term ethnos, Huxley and
Haddon suggested "ethnic group" to provide a superior way of labeling political, cultural, social, and economic
differences between human populations. Id. at 30-31.
134
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follow from these genetic differences. 137 Thus,
user an established connection between mental
"ethnic group" was open and vague enough
"problem to be solved.' 138 In contrast, the

while the term "race" is conclusory, suggesting for the
and physical characters, Montagu believed that the term
to force the user to understand "ethnic group" as a
use of "race" suggests that the problem of human
classification has already been solved. In other words, once the anthropologist identifies differences of
gene frequencies in particular populations as racial, he has answered the question of whether there is a
thing called race. 139 In contrast, the anthropologist using the term "ethnic group" does not presume to
have identified anything at all about human variation other than that certain populations appear to have
diverging gene frequencies.
We may not be persuaded that the use of ethnicity does work of a very different kind than the
use of race. Despite the heavy skepticism of this period regarding the existence of race as a scientific
concept, classifications did continue. Huxley, Haddon, and Montagu all backed the idea that there were
three major groups: mongoloids, negroids, and caucasoids. 14 What is certain of this period, however, is
that there was a concentrated attempt to take the racism out of race, if not to eliminate the idea of race
all together. If human classifications were real, then whatever they were, they could no longer be
connected up with intellectual differences.
Science was therefore in the business of emptying race of its cultural content. 141 As a result,
science was also in the business of excusing itself as a rationale for the Racial Contract. Recall that the
idea of race was constructed as an answer to a particular question: how could the superiority of
Europeans over non-Europeans be justified? If science was divorced from the idea that something called
race had biological connections with cultural and intellectual capacities, the Racial Contract would lose its
scientific rationale.
E. The Biological Foundation of Race is Fiction
In the last decades of the twentieth century and in the beginnings of the twenty-first, advances in
genetics closed the door on the old idea of race as a biological concept. There is evidence, however, that
clusters of gene frequencies exist in discrete populations-populations that track the major geographical
regions of the world: Africa, East Asia, Melanesia, the Americas, and Eurasia. 142 So what does this mean?
Is this actually an argument for the biological existence of race, after all? In the context of how race has
traditionally been used as a means of classifying human beings, the answer is definitely no. The bottom
line is the oft-quoted conclusion that gene variations occur with far more frequency within
subpopulations than between them. This simply means that if one has an interest in isolating genotypes,
the resulting classification will be one that necessarily spans Africa, the Americas, and the rest of the
globe. To be sure, due to sexual selection among certain groups, there is a higher frequency of certain

137Id. at

18-22.

138 Id. at

25.

39
1

Id.at 26-27.

14() Ashley Montagu, On Coon's The Origin of Races, in CONCEPT OF RACE, supra note 135, at 236-38; HUxLEY
& HADDON,
supra note 134,
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http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001282 /128291eo.pdf.
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genes among the members of those groups. But the frequency of those genes is not connected with any
other genetic phenomena. As geneticist Keith Cheng has explained, "such traits [as the African American
susceptibility to heart disease] would be expected, most of the time, to be inherited independently from
skin-color genes, making skin color, and therefore race, an unreliable substitute for knowing the real
1 43
gene variations that correlate with drug responsiveness.'
A way to illuminate this is by way of the contemporary consensus regarding the susceptibility of
particular subpopulations to specific diseases. Common examples include African-Americans with heart
144
failure and European-Americans associated with Ashkenazi Jewish families and Tay-Sachs disease.
Scientists generally agree that these subpopulations carry gene frequencies amenable to specific kinds of
treatment, and are less responsive to others. What is key, however, is that these particular gene variations
are completely independent from the gene variations responsible for such things as hair, skin, blood, and
bone type. Some might be tempted to call these gene frequencies the stuff of "racial classification," but
Montagu's question remains just as alive today as it did seventy years ago: what is the basis for calling
such differences racial differences? They are genetic differences, we know that much. To make any
greater claim is to beg the essential question.

IV.

NEOLIBERALISM AND POST-RACIAL COLORBLINDNESS

The story described above outlined an intellectual history of the idea of race in science. The
argument characterized this history as a series of attempts to use scientifically objective rationales to
justify the Racial Contract. The story ended, however, in the present-day renunciation of a scientific basis
for the idea of race, leaving us with some nagging questions: if "race" began as an idea about how to
justify the superiority of European peoples over other peoples, and the scientific basis for that idea has
finally been proven illusory, what does that mean for law? Does this undermine the validity of race as a
legal concept? As for the first question, it is a history that highlights the impossibility of
"colorblindness," which involves the belief that an ultimate theory of racial justice is predicated on the
elimination of race as a factor in political discourse. 1 45 Regarding the second question, an important point
to remember is that legal concepts are analytically distinct from natural or social concepts. To be sure,
there may be a temptation to eradicate a legal concept if we have determined that the concept's natural
analogues are myths-and in some cases, it may be worth our while to eliminate the concept at once.
The immediate point, however, is this: nothing logically follows from a recognition that human races are
imaginaries, not scientific fact. What we do with this recognition is up to us.

143 Keith Cheng, Demstjiing Skin Color and 'Race",in RAcisM IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 137, at 15. As
Michael Bamshad (geneticist) and Steve Olson (science writer) have recently explained: "Given that people can be sorted
broadly into groups using genetic data, do common notions of race correspond to underlying genetic differences among
populations? . . . Because traits such as skin color have been strongly affected by natural selection, they do not
necessarily reflect the population processes that have shaped the distribution [of real genetic differences]. Therefore,
traits or polymorphisms affected by natural selection may be poor predictors of group membership and may imply
genetic relatedness where, in fact, little exists." Michael Bamshad & Steve Olson, Does Race Exist? SCIENTIFIC
AMERiCAN,Dec. 2003, at 78, 83. See also Masatoshi Nei & Arun Roychoudhury, Genetic Re/ationship andEvo/ution of Human
Races, E\VOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 14 (1983) (reassessing magnitude of genetic differences among three major human
races).
144
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In this Part, the basic argument is that the biological concept of race invented in the sciences
steadily migrated into legal discourse, providing the background or constitutive rules of race as a legal
concept. At various times in U.S. history, these background rules have had more or less purchase on civil
rights disputes and the surface appearance of equal protection jurisprudence. These shifts track the
changes in race science surveyed above-though at all times a biological conception of race has
continued to serve as the background rule of race as a legal concept. 46 In keeping with Duncan
Kennedy's description of various phases of legal consciousness in American Legal Thought, it is useful
147
to characterize these shifts in terms of "liberal legalism."'
For example, in a classic liberal approach to race, background rules are central, which means that
48
a great deal of the work in a legal decision will be performed by a characterization of racial identity.
The reason for this is that once the natural character of race is properly identified, there is apparently
little else for the judge to do, since races are considered unequal and objectively deserving of different
sorts of treatment. In this old and now discredited style, an identification of racial identity was sufficient
for producing a legal decision since racial identity came ready-made with a set of answers about how
human beings were meant to interact with one another. Another way of putting this is to say that a
characterization of race as a legal concept in the classic liberal style is to reject colorblindness. In this
approach, it would be a terrible mistake to avoid race- consciousness, since the races are naturally
unequal, and as a consequence, deserving of very different legal treatment.
In a modern liberal approach, background rules regarding the biological nature of racial identity
recede out of view, though they remain constitutive of race as a legal concept: this is the beginning of the
colorblind approach. That is, the modern liberal is very skeptical about the background rules (i.e. the
biological concept of racial identity), since advancements in the sciences had by this time shown that
there was very little that could be deduced about the cultural or intellectual content of racial identity.
Nevertheless, the modern liberal always retained those background rules as the baseline for her own
attempts at regulation. 149 Thus, what becomes important for the modern liberal is the establishment of

146

Neil Gotanda, Race as Refication (manuscript on file with the author).

147 Kennedy's early work is all framed in terms of a critique of legal liberalism. See Duncan Kennedy, The
Structure of B/ackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv.205 (1979). However, his most recent sketch of a periodization of
legal consciousness avoids the terms and instead roots itself in a sequence from Classical Legal Thought to Social Legal
Thought to Contemporary . Kennedy, supra note 34, at 19. As Kennedy suggested both then and now, there is nothing
that can necessarily be derived from liberal political theory in terms of legal structure. That is, liberalism does not itself
come ready-made with particular constellations of legal arguments. I agree completely with this, and do not mean to
suggest in the present analysis that there is anything about, say, the modern liberal style that determined the course of
mid-twentieth century civil rights law. Nevertheless, we can see that strain of civil rights law as performing in the
modern liberal style, even while there was nothing about the style itself that necessitated the legal particulars. In the
language of Three G/obaiZations, we might say that a focus on liberalism helps us understand why one generation speaks a
particular langue. Liberalism itself tells us nothing aboutparole.

148
For a general discussion of the philosophy of race, see
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149 Contemporary

anti-discrimination law takes as a given that standing for a claim presupposes the right kind
of identity . That is, if you are going to have standing in a claim based on racial classifications, you need to be a member
of the race that has been discriminated against-you need to show a cognizable injur. See, e.g., E. Christi Cunningham,
The Rise of Identiy Politics A The Myth of the Protected Class in Title V11 Disparate Treatment Cases, supra note 27, at 451-52
(difference between protected class and racial minority ) .
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foreground rules, which involve attempts to protect an already existing, pre-legal racial identity through
150
legislation.
In a neoliberal approach to race, background rules remain receded, but foreground rules are
disfavored at the same time, which has the curious effect of making the background rules feel more
pronounced. 151 The result is a jurisprudence that takes a biological view of racial identity as a legal
baseline first established in the classic liberal style, but like in modern liberalism, believes there to be little
that can be gleaned in terms of a guide for legal decision-making from these background rules.
Therefore, neoliberals seek "colorblindness" as modern liberals do. The neoliberal approach is also like
classic liberalism, however, in that it suggests a jurisprudence that is wary of the need for any regulative
framework at all. Justice will be found in the play of the background rules, and not in a sphere of
152
government regulation that is more often than not subject to the arbitrary capture of political interest.
These three conceptions are summarized in the following chart.

11tiThis is basically a description of the major set of moves that emerged after World War II regarding the
scope and matter of civil rights law. See generally WINANT, supra note 3 (comparing post World War II racial dynamics in
four countries); GRAHAI\J, supra note 11 (providing a comprehensive legal history of civil rights).
111 This description of a neoliberal style is a little different from what one might expect. Typically, neoliberals
are very strong on background rules-take Hernando de Soto as an example. After extensive research throughout the
developing world, de Soto was convinced that the problem of development was centered precisely in the issue of
background rules, specifically in this case, property rights. It wasn't that people in the developing world didn't own
enough property, but rather that they did not have their property recorded in legal system. If one's house is not properly
recorded, de Soto explained, that house could not then take on its critical function as a capital asset. And without capital,
development would remain a dream. As de Soto suggested, "In the West, this formal property system begins to process
assets into capital by describing and organizing the most economically and socially useful aspects about assets, preserving
this information in a recording system-as insertions in a written ledger or a blip on a computer disk-and then
embodying them in a title. A set of detailed and precise legal rules governs this entire process.. .They capture and
organize the potential value of an asset and so allow us to control it. Property is the realm where we identify and explore
assets, combine them, and link them to other assets. The formal property system is capital's hydroelectric plant. This is
the place where capital is born." HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN
THE \WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 47 (2000).
Bj2 See, e.g., 2 FRIEDRI/;H HAYEK, LAw, LECISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SO(CIALJUSTI(E (1998).

Hayek firmly believed that liberal law led to the most just kind of society men could feasibly attain, and this justice
flowed from the background rules of property and contract law. Finally abandoning the feudal road, Hayek argued that
the "decisive step" in humanity's progressive evolution was the discover of the bargain. But the ability to consistently
determine what belonged to who, and how to trade one thing for another, depended on the development of property
and contract rules. If this never were to happen, ideas like "ownership" and "bargain" would never had had any real
meaning. Hayek argued that these new rules of conduct were the mechanisms of co-existence, were definitively noncoercive, and had as their central function the creation of a society in which people with different outlooks on life, with
different values for different products, could live together in peace. What was required was a law that told no man what
he ought to do, but could "tell each what he can count upon, what material objects or services he can use for his
purposes, and what is the range of options open to him." Id. at 37. Though Hayek imagined the private law as noncoercive and pre-political in a very strong sense, he nevertheless did, like Locke before him, believe that the market
brought with it more than a sustainable peace (essential as that was), but a just society as well. It was not that either of
them thought that the moral content of property and contract would generate any particular constellation of social
outcomes, but rather that it was the process of the private law that was just. "In this respect what has been correctly said
of John Locke's view on the justice of competition, namely, that 'it is the way in which competition is carried on, not its
results, that count,' is generally true of the liberal conception of justice, and of what justice can achieve in a spontaneous
order." Id. at 38.
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TABLE 1-THREE LEGAL CONCEPTIONS OF RACE

BACKGROUND RULES
CLASSIC
LIBERALISM

Very Strong

FOREGROUND
RULES
Non-existent

The biological nature of the
background rules are self-evident
and come ready-made with answers
about how to arrange society.

MODERN
LIBERALISM

NEOLIBERALISM

Weak

Very Strong

The biological nature of background
rules are retained, but the judge is
instructed to treat racial identity as
having little if anything to say about
the intellectual, cultural, or moral
differences between the races. This
is a view in favor of colorblindness
and cultural pluralism.

Racial discrimination is believed
to be pervasive and powerful,
and the antidote lies in heavy
state regulation, i.e. courtenforced desegregation, civil
rights statutes, constitutional
rights, etc.

Moderate

Weak

The biological nature of background
rules are retained, but the judge is
instructed to treat racial identity as
having little if anything to say about
intellectual, cultural, or moral
differences between the races. This
is a view in favor of colorblindness
and
cultural
pluralism.
The
background rules take on a more
prominent aspect in this style due to
the style's heavy skepticism about

The use of state regulation of
race, or the use of racial
classifications, is presumptively
invalid. It doesn't matter if the
racial classifications are intended
to benefit or harm a minority
group. This is a view in favor of
post-racialism.

foreground rules.

In the discussion that follows, the major argument is that in each stage of the development of
race law in the United States, biology has always been there as a background and constitutive rule of race
as a legal concept. It was there in the law of slavery, and it is there in the most recent decisions of the
Supreme Court. To be sure, these background rules are doing very different work now, but they are
doing work all the same. Thus, it is critical to keep vigilant and avoid distraction from the emergence of
an admittedly fundamental and truly important set of foreground rules: civil rights law, or, in other
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words, the shift from classic liberalism to modern liberalism. It is impossible to deny that race as a legal
concept dramatically changed after Brown and the Civil Rights Act, but that is not the point. The point is
to focus on what has remained the same, the persistent hold that a biological understanding of race
continues to have on the very manner in which race is legalized in the first place.
In Section A, the discussion explores how courts were first inclined to borrow the notion of
"human races" from the sciences and use it as a conceptual means for justifying the enslavement of
Africans. It then skips ahead past the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment, looking again to how
legal discourse was tracking race science. At this stage, background rules were still doing a great deal of
heavy lifting-judges could simply deduce the appropriate scope of legal relations from an identification
of a person's "race." In Section B, the discussion moves past the beginnings of modern liberalism and
Brown and into the formation of the affirmative action debate. In this context, the Supreme Court
demonstrates its commitment to a more progressive understanding of the background rules of racial
identity (biology), but also signals some concerns about being overwhelmed by interventionist
foreground rules (civil rights law). In Section C, the analysis brings the focus to Parents involved as an
example of a neoliberal style of framing race as a legal concept. 153 This style is identifiable for its
retention of an allegedly colorblind set of background rules and a quasi-rejection of the continued
relevance of foreground rules.
A. The Classic Liberal Style: From Slave Law to Jim Crow
Slave law is as good a place as any to begin an analysis of race as a legal concept. Slave law is that
body of property and contract rules governing the transfer and control of certain people in the
possession of others. 154 More particularly, slave law depended on the work of Blumenbach and others,
requiring racial classifications in order to trigger particular sorts of property and contract rules. As
Derrick Bell explained, "[I]n virtually all of the cases, blacks were the subjects and not the parties in the

113

According to Sumi Cho,

The recent Supreme Court decision in the Parents Involved case reveals the newest judicial
mechanisms created to preserve racial hierarchy while rearticulating subordination as equality, and
deploying failure-of-proof rationales . . . In Parents Involved, the Court revealed the inherent
contradiction between compelling interest and narrow tailoring. In order for the state to engage such a
strategy, it must show that student racial diversity and race-conscious student assignment are
compelling state interests. However, once a racial classification passes this compelling-interest test, it
must then be narrowly tailored. Here lies the catch-22 of the Court's framework for affirmative action:
if a plan survives the compelling-interest test, then it must also be narrowly tailored it must be only
sparingly used, when absolutely necessary, as one factor among many-or as the ParentsInvolved Court
put it, "the way in which [the district has] employed individual racial classifications is necessar to
achieve [its] stated ends." But in Parents Invo/ved, Justice Roberts responded to the Seattle school
district's use of race-determinative student assignments, with the "gotcha" in his plurality opinion.
Roberts said, "[t]he minimal effect these classifications have on student assignments.... suggests that
other means would be effective."
Cho, supra note 16, at 1616-18 (citations omitted).
114

For a collection of slave cases, see HELEN T. CATTERALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AAiERII(AN

SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO (1936); RA(E AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 120-136 Juan

Perea et al. eds., 2007). Seegenera/j DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE A(;E OF REVOLUTION (1999);
MAR

TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAw OF SLAVNERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMLNITY AND INTEREST

(1981); Adrienne Davis, The 'SexualEconom9'ojfAmerican Slavey, in STILL BRAVTE: THE ENVOLUTION OF BLACK WOMEN'S
STUDIES (reprint) (S.M. James, F.S. Foster & B. Guy-Sheftall eds., 2009).
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litigation. They were property subject to ownership.' 55 For example, writing just before the American
Civil War, Thomas Cobb, widely regarded at the time as a luminary in slave law, crystallized the main
idea in his An Inquig7 into the Law of Negro Slavegy in the United States of America: only "Negros" could be
slaves.' 5 6 As Cobb explained, courts presumed that the human variety known as "Negro" first
promulgated by the early monegenists, and then furiously degraded by polygenists like Gobineau (writing
in 1853), really existed as a "race," and that it was possible to identify them in a way consistent with the
rule of law. It is in this way that slave law was predicated on the idea of race science without ostensibly
objective classifications of human varieties, slave law would have been unable to function. To put it
another way, if only members of the Negro race could be enslaved, how might the law have been
7
different if the idea of racial varieties had never been invented in the first place?'5

1- BELL, supra note 25, at 27.
B6 THOMAS COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAw OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF A MERICA

(1858). In the first chapter Cobb enunciates what might be called a cardinal rule of American slave law, though it stands
in contrast to popular opinion: (1) slaves were considered first as persons and second as property, (2) were Negro, and
(3) were subject to a virtually unlimited amount of control by their masters. This rule thus has three main parts, the first
and third of which are largely beyond the scope of this paper. Though many have argued that slaves were perceived in
absolute terms of property, writers like Cobb and jurists like Judge Ruffin of the North Carolina Supreme Court
emphasized that the enslaved were people, and as such, must have been subject to the strictest of disciplines. Suffice it to
say that the law of slavery, while not crystal clear on the extent to which the enslaved were viewed as simply propert3 or
things liminally placed between the worlds of humans and objects, explicitly barred the enslaved from the legal rights
enjoyed by white men.
117 For scholars like Gross, the answer may be negligible. As she argues, race was often recognized for its
performative elements, i.e. you knew a white person not necessarily by what he or she looked like, but by the
performances that white men and women were expected to play out. Discussing Biyan v. Walton, a Georgia Supreme
Court case looking at whether certain freed men were black or not, Gross explains, "Race was not only something
Joseph and James were, it was something they did." GROSS, supra note 26, at 53. "To be white was to act white: to
associate with whites, to dance gracefully, to vote." Blood may have been the signified, but the signifiers were social acts.
More than that, the signifiers of race were not only social and political but also prescriptive and legal. What did it mean
to be a white man? It meant to be a citizen, a civic being, someone who could do certain kinds of things. In addition to
the Walton case, Gross provides a number of courtroom examples highlighting the baseline for racial identity in
performative terms. Men who looked white and indulged the gestures and gesticulations of "white culture" like refined
and honorable gentlemanly activit would not, in the end, receive the legal imprimatur of whiteness if they did not have
a reputation for exercising white titiZenship: the legal stuff of rights and privileges that actually constituted whiteness. The
legal determination of race, in sum, was a combination of stereotypical ideas about physical characteristics, reliance on
high-brow quackery, far-reaching perspectives on the transfer of "black blood," and searches for approval of the racial
identity by the community . Notably, analysis of this fourth factor reveals an interesting circle between perceptions of
citizenship and perceptions of race: if the physical manifestation of race was in doubt, whiteness was to be found in the
performance of citizenship rights and the rites of citizenship. The infamous Dred Scott decision helped close the circle, by
tautologically concluding that blacks could not be citizens because they had never performed these rites, i.e. the rites of
white manhood. The question before the Court, and articulated by Justice Taney, was whether the descendant of an
African slave was a citizen of the United States, and thus capable of enjoying the rights and privileges associated with
this legal status. In making its determination, the Court looked to the laws passed both by federal and state governments
(including the Naturalization Act of 1790 which explicitly stated that only whites could be naturalized as citizens of the
United States) and found that nothing in the intent of the framers or their descendants ever established that the "negro
race" was meant to be a part of the political communit3 in the United States. The upshot of the rationale was that
"Negros" could not become citizens because they had never been allowed the rights of citizenship in the past, rights
which had been considered the exclusive domain of the American political community. The status of whiteness required
a capacit3 for citizenship, and the legal status of citizenship required whiteness. Id. See also Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993); Sally Ackerman, How the American Legal Sstem PerpetuatesRaism as Seen Through
the Lens of Propertf Law, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. POL'Y 137 (1999); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,and Choice, 29 HARIT. CR.-C.L. L. REI. 1 (1994).
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An early nineteenth century example is Pudgins v. Wright, decided by the Virginia Supreme Court
in 1806.158 Pudgins involved a claim by a girl seeking her freedom on the basis that she was descended
from an American Indian woman, and according to Virginia law, should presumptively be understood to
have been born free. If the claimant could successfully show that she was of American Indian heritage,
or "white," the burden of proof would have shifted to the slaveholder to show that the grandmother had
been American Indian, and enslaved during a brief window when the United States had been in the
business of legally enslaving Indians. As Judge Tucker explained, "All white persons are and have ever been
FREE in this country. If one evidently white, be notwithstanding claimed as a slave, the proof lies on the
159
party claiming to make the other his slave."'

Subsequently, the thrust of the trial turned on the girl's racial classification-Indian or whiteand in the course of figuring out this determinative question the Court substantially relied on the
"distinguishing characteristics of the different species of the human race .... ",160 Keeping in mind we are
in 1806, when Europe was beginning to see a polygenicist theory gaining ground, the Court followed
what was becoming a standard way of thinking about the varieties of human groupings. The question of
the girl's freedom therefore turned on the texture of her hair, width of her nose, and shape of her calf
muscles. Since Hannah had long straight hair, she was deemed Indian, and presumptively free.
Bloodlines were also increasingly important in figuring out the racial identity of a potential slave. 161 The
important point to keep in mind here, however, is that before the work of race science, this kind of
physiological evaluation would have made no sense.
Jumping ahead several decades, and just before the American Civil War and the emergence of
evolutionary theory, the Supreme Court decided Dred Scott v. Sandford.162 In this famous case Scott, a

1 8 Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va.134 (1806).
'

Id. at 139.

160Id. at 141.

Though the Hudgins Court did not get into it, other factors typically used in determining racial status
included scientific evidence, documentary evidence, and "reputation" evidence. Of course, in a society in which white
masters regularly impregnated their slaves, the "obvious" distinctions used in Hudgins were, at best, difficult. In the case
that the eyeball test proved unsatisfactor, the court would look to documentar evidence of relatives who may have had
more "easily understandable" racial histories. To this end, courts used the infamous "one-drop rule" or rule of
hypodescent. If a person had a black relative, no matter how remote, the staining power of the black blood made you
black as well. Another factor regarded the extent to which the relevant community, black or white, perceived the person
in question as belonging to their racial group. It may have been especially damning, for example, for a group of people,
clearly of the negro race, to claim that the person in question had always been regarded as one of their own. For
discussion, see Norman Redlich, Out, Damned Spot; Out, I Say. The Persistence of Race inAmerican La, 25 VT. L. REv.475
(2001); Christine Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Ratial Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95
(1997).
MICH.L. RVN. 1161
161

162 60 U.S. 393 (1856). It has often been pointed out how odd was the relationship that developed between
"race" and "citizenship" in the antebellum period. Though racial classifications had a scientific and biological gloss,
judicial opinions in the face of the physically ambiguous invariably turned on social performance. This collapse brought
with it a circularity as illustrated with the Dred Scott decision where whiteness was defined as citizenship and citizenship
identified for its whiteness. Unfortunately, the Civil War failed to fully clarify this problem, despite the language on
citizenship provided in the Fourteenth Amendment. This primarily came through with the fact that while all people born
or naturalized in the United States would be deemed citizens, the language failed to provide insight as to who could be
naturalized. Again, the key issue on this front turned on whether the applicant could make a legitimate claim to being
white. For a discussion on the legal mechanics of whiteness, see VALERIE BABB, WHITENESS VISIBLE: THE MEANING
OF WHITENESS IN AMERICAN LITERATURE (1998); Ldpez, supra note 4; RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANI(,

CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES (1997).
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slave taken by his owner from Missouri to Illinois for a time and brought back to Missouri for sale,
claimed to be a citizen of Missouri and whose residency in a free state nullified his status as a slave. In a
striking defense of the Racial Contract, the Court explained that the basic issue was whether "persons
only whose ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country . . ." could ever
be "citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United
States." Did racial identity preclude certain groups from enjoying the basic rights afforded by the
Constitution? The answer was yes. "We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not
intended to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution .... On the contrary, they were at
that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race .... *163 The answer was deducible directly from the fact of racial identity. It is hard to
imagine a cleaner use of a scientific rationale, embodied here in a set of background rules, for the Racial
Contract.
After the Civil War and the end of slavery, the Reconstruction Amendments set the stage for a
new round of legal thinking about racial classifications, 164 but a round of thinking just as committed to a
biologized set of background rules of race. To be sure, the arguments would differ from the likes found
in Hudgins and Dred Scott, but the important issue here is the common biological ground between preand post-Civil war thinking about race law. In relevant part, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
165
protection of the laws.
The Amendment does not mention the word "race," and taken at face value, could even be interpreted
as doing away with the whole idea of race altogether. If you are a "person," then you have certain
rights. 166 Instead of a race-less law of human rights, 167 the next phase was the Jim Crow era in which a
scientific idea of race played a hugely important part. After the brief experiments in reconstruction were
brought to a close,American race law hit its separate-but-equal stride, in step with the increasingly

163DredScott, 60

U.S. 393, 404-05.

164 See general, ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERI(CA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1988). Some instances
of the judiciary's early encounter with post Civil War legislation include The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1879); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Derrick Bell
has reported that "in the first seventy years of the Amendment, the Court struck down 232 state laws pursuant to its
commands; 179 of these cases were decided in favor of corporations-including 55 cases in favor of the burgeoning
railroad industr. BELL, supra note 25, at 47.
1',U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
166 For

discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment in historical context, see KENNETH STAMPP, THE ERA OF
RE(CONSTRU(CTION, 1865-1877 (1965); W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLAK RE(CONSTRU(CTION IN AMERICA (1964); LEON LITWACK,
BEEN IN THE STORM\ SO LONG: THE AFTER\JATH OF SLAVERY (1969); Derrick Bell, The RatialImperative in American Law,
in THE AtE OF SEGREGATION: RA(;E RELATIONS IN THE SOUTH, 1890-1945 (Robert Haws ed., 1978).
167Human

Rights Law, of course, would go on to have its own problems, and really could hardly be "raceless."

For critical discussion, see MAIAU MATUA,HUMLAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE (2002).
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popular work in eugenics discussed above, which also had as its aim the separation of the races. In 1896,
the Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson,'68 which assessed the constitutionality of a state law
providing for the separation of blacks and whites in their use of the rail system. The Court found no
problem with the law, because it merely recognized a fact of human nature: "A statute which implies
merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races-a distinction which is founded in the
color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the
other race by color-has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state
169
of involuntary servitude."'
Consequently, for some time questions about the natural differences of racial classifications were
built into the underbelly of the citizenship and equal protection clauses.'l 0 Given the period in which the
Courts were making these decisions, where race science was developing some of its most caustic views
about the hierarchy of the races, this attitude seems pretty sensible for the time. This sense in which
social evolutionary and eugenicist styles of thinking about racial classifications played into judicial
elaborations of the Fourteenth Amendment shifted, however, along with the same shift happening at the
same time as the concept of race started coming under attack in the first half of the twentieth century. In
other terms, this can be described as a shift from a classic liberal focus on strong background rules to a
modern liberal style that would de-emphasize the importance of background rules and assert a need for
government to protect racial identity from arbitrary discrimination.
B. The Modern Liberal Style: From Brown to Affirmative Action
Recall from above that even before WWII, scientists were mounting increasingly aggressive
attacks on the scientific basis of race, and that after the War and the exposure of Nazi treatment of the
Jews, eugenics fell out of favor altogether. Scholars like Huxley, Haddon, and Montagu argued that the
concept of race had been constructed and abused, and that much of the baggage associated with so-

168 163

U.S. 537 (1896). Like Dred Scott, Pessy has generated an enormous amount of commentar. One wellknown example is Cheryl Harris' article Whiteness as ProperCj. HARRIS, supra note 157, at 1750. ("Pless demonstrated the
Court's chronic refusal to dismantle the structure of white supremacy, which is maintained through the institutional
protection of relative benefits for whites at the expense of Blacks. In denying that any inferiority existed by reason of de
jure segregation, and in denying white status to Plessy, 'whiteness' was protected from intrusion and appropriate
boundaries around the property were maintained.")
169 163

U.S. at 543.

17()Another way in which the Racial Contract appeared to continue its performance, however, was in the
context of just how it was exactly that naturalization really worked. Ian Haney Lopez has chronicled the evolution of this
question through what he calls the "prerequisite cases" spanning from 1878 to 1952, when the requirement only
"whites" could be U.S. citizens was finally expunged from U.S. naturalization law. In re Ah flup, for example, was a case

decided in 1878 by a federal court wrangling with the question of whether a Chinese residing in the United States was
white. 1 F. Cas. 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878). After a great deal of thinking about the state of race science, the Court finally
concluded that Chinese were not white, and consequently barred from citizenship. Like most of these decisions, the
Court came to the incoherent conclusion that Yup was not white. This is not to say that Yup should have been found to
be white, but that the court was unable to offer any meaningful standard for its decision. Interestingly, courts were
apparently unable to use the arguments against Asians that they had used against blacks: Asians could not be American
citizens because they had never exercised the rights and rites of American citizenship. Presumably the logic of an earlier
moment, illuminated in the context of immigration, became too ridiculous even for federal judges. This determination
resembled the sorts of judicial analysis found in Hadgins, including physical determinations, and the identification of
certain kinds of documentar and scientific evidence as probative of racial status. For discussion on relevant aspects of
the Asian experience in American law, see Asia Americans in RACE AND RACES (Juan Perea & Richard Delgado eds.,
2000).
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called racial physiology was a sham. The critical point here, however, is that while race science was fast
becoming more progressive, the natural conception of race-background rules-was never abandoned,
but merely "cleaned up." Race was real and natural enough, it was simply that it had been wrong to make
too many assumptions about just what race really meant in social, economic, cultural, and intellectual
terms.
It is in the climate of this phase of race science that we can situate Chief Justice Stone's famous
footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products.171 Decided two years after Huxley and Haddon's We
Europeans, but still in the dense thicket of Jim Crow, the opinion set the stage for heightened judicial
scrutiny over legislation attempting to regulate on the basis of "suspect classifications." Interestingly, the
footnote's text did two things at once. On the one hand, it reinforced the idea that race was a natural,
human fact, just as much of progressive race science was doing. Stone's footnote suggested that statutes
seeking to regulate "discrete and insular minorities," including "racial minorities," should be analyzed by
the judiciary with strict scrutiny. 172 Stone's reasoning was based on the unfairness of arbitrarily
discriminating against racial groups since racial identity was a fact of one's humanity outside of their
control. Blackness, a minority racial status, was discrete, immutable, and most definitely natural and prepolitical, and discrimination on such bases seemed fundamentally unfair. On the other hand was
whiteness-soon to be vanquished in naturalization law by congressional action-which was not a
minority status, not intuitively susceptible to the strict scrutiny analysis, and largely transparent-legally,
racially, biologically, and socially. In short, whiteness was an abstract mess of a concept, as evidenced by
the prerequisite cases, while blackness had emerged as something not necessarily determined by the
173
absence of white privilege and citizenship, but inherently natural and real.

171304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). I do not mean to suggest here that Carolene Products is necessarily the place to begin
in an elaboration of race in the modern liberal style. The use of the opinion lies in its embrace of an attempt to depoliticize but retain a natural idea of racial identity-an attempt that would soon be consolidated after Brown. For
discussion of Carolene Products, see, e.g., Daniel A. Fricker & Philip P. Farber, Is Carolene Products Dead?: Reflections on
Ajfirmative Action and the Dj'namics of Civil Rights Legislation 79 CALIF. L. REV.686 (1991). In the main, my analysis follows
the kind of periodizing found in works like Howard Winant's The World is a Ghetto. WINANT, supra note 3. There, Winant
suggests that before World War II "the social fact of racial inequality and thoroughgoing racial difference was taken for
granted . . .In the ruling circles-the metropoles, the world's capitals both imperial and peripheral-it was taken for
granted as natural, ineluctable, an objective realit, that to be white (however that is defined) conferred a deserved
advantage on those so identified, while a dark skin proper signified inferiority. The name for this set of beliefs, this racial
ideology, is white supremacy." Id. at 1. In the context of law, I have been suggesting that white supremacy has been
traditionally performed in the style of classic liberalism. According to \Xinant, it was in the period after World War II
that the "ironic view emerged that we are now in a post-racial, color-blind world ...Race-talk today presents itself as
egalitarian, respectful of 'cultural difference,' and, above all, humane. The appearance and consolidation of such postracial sentiments is a recent phenomenon; it has reshaped contemporary understanding and debates over race." Id. at 12. In the context of law, I argue here that in the postwar period there are two dominant paradigms at work-modern
liberalism and neoliberalism. Both of these approaches reject the classic view of white supremacy, namely, that there
racial inequalit is inherent in racial identity. Where modern liberalism and neoliberalism part ways is in their differing
approaches to foreground rules, i.e. regulation.
172As Neil Gotanda has explained, strict scrutiny analysis developed in different directions. In the context of

"historical-race," strict scrutiny was used as a tool of anti- subordination, striking down the use of racial classifications
when they were in the classic liberal style. In the context of "formal-race," strict scrutiny isn't necessarily focused on
historical subordination, but is rather directed to the use of any racial classifications whatsoever. Gotanda suggests that
Brown and its immediate progeny are illustrations of strict scrutiny in the context of historical-race, and Metro Broadcasting
and Croson are examples of strict scrutiny in the context of formal-race. Gotanda, supranote 13, at 46-50.
173For discussion, see LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAw: THE LE(, L CONSTRU(CTION OF RA( E (2006). As Adrienne

Davis has explained, the mystification of white identity has resulted in a deep incongruit

between the conceptual utility
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As is well known, American anti-discrimination law as it emerged in the middle decades of the
twentieth century embraced this background view of race as a natural and scientifically verifiable
concept, but hoped to clean it out of its obviously pejorative connotations. 174 No other case stands as
much of a representative as Brown v. Board of Education.175 The issue of whether "separate but equal" was
tenable under the equal protection clause was handled by the Warren Court in splendid consistency with
the race science of the time. 176 Yes, the Court understood well enough that racial varieties did exist in the

of the terms "black" and "white." I routinely ask the students to define "Black culture." A variety of attributions pour
out: emotion and soul, instinct and intuition, violence and passion, drive and pride, spirituality and strength. Yet when I
ask for the cultural attributes or meaning of "white culture" the students are stumped, sometimes disturbed. I have yet to
have a student attach a meaning that is not a stand-in for a more specific class-based or ethnic culture rather than a more
broad-ranging racial culture of whiteness. After six seminars, whiteness (unmodified) has remained devoid of content in
my classroom.
174As critical race theorists have long argued, this has been a challenging task. In a seminal account, Allan

Freeman discussed how anti-discrimination law included two perspectives about racial justice, the victim perspective and
perpetrator perspective.
The perpetrator perspective sees racial discrimination not as conditions but as actions, or series of
actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator .... In its core concept of the "violation", antidiscrimination law is hopelessly embedded in the perpetrator perspective. Its central tenet, the "antidiscrimination principle", is the prohibition of race-dependent decisions that disadvantage members
of minoritx groups, and its principal task has been to select from the maze of human behaviors those
particular practices that violate the principle, outlaw the identified practices, and neutralize their
specific effects. Antidiscrimination law has thus been ultimately indifferent to the condition of the
victim ....
Alan David Freeman, LegitimiZing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1054 (1978). The literature that has followed is large. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Constitution
of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997); Reva Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How "Color Blindness" Discourse
Disrupts and Rationalizes SocialStrat i§cation, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77 (2000); Ian F. Haney Lopez, A Nation of Minorities: Race,
Ethnii, and Reactionary Colorblindness,59 STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007).
11 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Among the first, if not the first, critical reviews of Brown from the left was Derek Bell's
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV.L. RHv. 518 (1980). Instead of affirming the
conventional wisdom about a change in consciousness, Bell argued for a more systemic view of what Brown signaled in
the light of racial hierarchy. "I contend that the decision in Brown to break with the Court's long-held position on these
issues cannot be understood without some consideration of the decision's value to whites, not simply those concerned
about the immorality of racial inequality, but also those whites in policy-making positions able to see the economic and
political advances at home and abroad that would follow abandonment of segregation." Id. at 524. More recently, as part
of a symposium on Brown fifty years on, Richard Ford argued how a focus on Brown has often misled those seeking
progressive social change and directed them away from where the action really is-the focus on Brown has often
perpetuated a false distinction between official segregationist policy and natural preference:

What confronts us, then, is not an inevitabilit but a choice. If the defenders of neighborhood schools
and of multiculturalist policies wish to justify a decision to promote segregation, either as a good thing
in its own right or as an acceptable means to some other good end, let them do so. But let them not
claim a false necessity. Let them take responsibility for their preference rather than insist that it is
ordained by human nature or by the nature of our inherited social institutions and social divisions.
Richard Ford, Brown'k Ghost, 117 HARV.L. REV. 1305, 1308-09 (2004).
176As

is well known, the Court in Brown relied in part on the psychology studies of Kenneth and Mamie Clark.

The Clarks testified in Brown and prior cases regarding the psychological impact of segregation on children, with a
particular focus on how segregated education instilled a sense of inferiority in black children. Citing Clark's work, Chief
Justice Warren stated:
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natural world-the old classifications supporting the Racial Contract were valid enough. But what had
changed was a recognition that there was very little if anything that should be deduced about the
intellectual, cultural, or moral standing of a person on account of their racial identity. The doctrine of
separate but equal in the context of public education, the Court concluded, was inconsistent with this
177
recognition, now to be understood as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
After Brown, a great deal changed as the civil rights era hit its stride. Courts were instructed to
dismantle segregation with all deliberate speed, Congress adopted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its
attendant stash of new statutory rights, and the old idea that racial classifications could be used to
explicitly disadvantage racial minorities was entirely discredited. 178 This was the coming into high fashion
of a modern liberal style of race. For far too long had the relations between races been allowed to persist
on the idea that humans could be judged on the basis of their racial identity. In contrast, politicians and
judges agreed about the need to regulate race, disallowing preferential treatment that disadvantaged
certain people on the basis of biology. There was nothing about race, it turned out, that could actually
tell us anything about how to arrange social relationships. Thus, while the biological nature of race was
retained, it was simply that instead of understanding biology to be a warrant of hierarchy, the modern
liberal style understood biology to mean that racial discrimination was unjust. The creation of new rules
would therefore be necessary to ensure that discrimination would be punished, and these were
foreground rules-rules understood to regulate a pre-legal concept of race, and not rules that actually
constituted race as a legal concept.
C. The Neoliberal Style: The Road to ParentsInvolved
As one might guess, the fashionable sense of Brown in the modern liberal style was sure to wane.
The famous case of Regents of Universiyof California v. Bakke179 is illustrative of a new trend that would

Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects
the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to
(retard) the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of
the benefits they would receive in a racial(ly) integrated school system. Whatever may have been the
extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported
by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
347 U.S. at 494-495.
177For a discussion of the debate over Brown in Parents Involved, see Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the

ColorblindConstitution, 94 CORNELL

L. RIV . 203 (2008).

178Id.

179435 U.S. 265 (1978). Cheryl Harris has said of the Bakke decision:

[c]ontempora5 understandings of equalit owe a great deal to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke-an
opinion remarkable for its enduring presence, prescience and at least for some decades, its influence.
It is also remarkable for its schizophrenic treatment of group identitx-for both seeing and not seeing
race. While Powell recognized and affirmed the significance and importance of considering race in
admitting a diverse class, the remainder of his opinion functioned to repudiate the legitimacy and
efficacy of substantive interventions by the state to remedy the unequal distribution of power under
the current racial status quo because of the incoherence of racial identity.
Cheryl Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction oJnequa/t', 69 FoRDHAM L. REV\. 1753, 1768 (2001). See also Bridgette
Baldwin, ColorblindDiversit,: The Changing Signiicance ofRace ini
the Post-Bakke Era, 72 ALB. L. RVN. 863 (2009).
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sow the seeds for the Supreme Court's current post-racialism-the turn away from a distinct political
interest in protecting racial minorities and towards a neutral equal protection concerned with the use of
racial classifications.'~8 The case involved a special admissions program initiated at the University of
California at Davis medical school, wherein applicants with particular "disadvantages"-in relevant part
applicants belonging to racial minorities-were given preferences in the admissions process. Bakke was a
white male whosued the University after it had twice rejected him, claiming that he had been rejected on
the basis of his racial identity in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Writing for a plurality of the Justices, Justice Powell made two pivotal moves setting in motion
the Court's current post-racial project. First, Powell treated the concept of race as a natural mark of
human identity, and not as a social or political force. This is evident in his decision to view the
prohibitions of the Civil Rights Act as applicable to all human beings living in the United States, and not
as regulations meant to undermine the terms of the Racial Contract-terms that were highly relevant in
the subordination of one class of people at the expense of another. "The special admissions program is
undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background. To the extent that there existed a pool
of at least minimally qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special admissions seats, white applicants
could compete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants.
Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic
status." 181
What is important to keep in mind here is that if race was not understood biologically (and
therefore neutrally), but rather politically, Powell's argument wouldn't make any sense. Creating a special
admissions program to help undermine racial disparities, in light of the Racial Contract and an
understanding of the history of the term "race," does not draw a line on the basis of race. In fact it does
something like the opposite. To think that racial classifications necessariy have something to do with
individuals being regulated on the basis of biological characteristics is also to think that racial identity can
function as a neutral, natural descriptor of social life.
When Powell stated, "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to
one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color," he was right only if race is
understood in its biological sense. If it is understood in its political sense, meaning, "race" is not a facet
of human ancestry but is rather a political term referencing a deeply embedded scheme of dominationsubordination, Powell was wrong: the guarantee of equal protection would in this sense actually require
an affirmative action law that treated the races differently. If we think of race as a verb-a tool with
which to justify the superiority of Whites over non-Whites-then Powell's vision of equal protection
jurisprudence was incoherent. When race is seen as a kind of political action, and not as a kind of natural
82
description of human beings, the notion of "reverse discrimination" becomes a logical impossibility.
The second important move was to eliminate attempts by state actors to redress general trends
in racial oppression through the sorts of special programs U.C. Davis had implemented. The only form

18o RiCHARD

FORD, RA(1AL

CULTURE

(2006).

181

Bakke, 435 U.S. at 289.

182

Id. at 289-90. For an overall treatment of the affirmative action debate, see generally CHARLES LAWRENCE

III & MARI MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MA-NING THE CASE FOR AFFIRNLNTI E ACTION (1997). For an argument
regarding the plausibility of reverse racial discrimination, see John Hart Ely, The Constitutionalitj of Reverse Racial
Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REv.723 (1974).
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of discrimination that could warrant such action was an explicit instance of constitutional violation. 83
The only justification for using racial preferences, Justice Powell explained, was the interest an institution
had in maintaining a diverse student body. The Court's preference for a paradigm of racial diversity over
racial justice would prove critical to the future of this jurisprudence. What was lost was the view
supporting the concurring opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun:
Against this background, claims that law must be "color-blind" or that the datum of race
is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as
description of reality. This is not to denigrate aspiration; for reality rebukes us that race
has too often been used by those who would stigmatize and oppress minorities. Yet we
cannot-and, as we shall demonstrate, need not under our Constitution or Title VI,
which merely extends the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment to private parties
who receive federal funds-let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality
that many "created equal" have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the
1 84
law and by their fellow citizens.
In one of the most anticipated decisions in the recent history of American race law, Grutter v.
Bolinger185 brought the Supreme Court in 2003 to the edge of abolishing affirmative action. The issue in
that case involved the admissions policy at the University of Michigan Law School, and the claim by a
"white" Michigan resident (3.8 GPA, 161 LSAT)who had applied to the school and had been rejected.
Her claim was that she had been rejected on the basis of her race, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and Section 1981.186 Following its established precedent,
the Court asked whether the Law School's interest in promoting "diversity" was a compelling interest
that could justify a narrowly tailored policy of using racial identity as a factor in its admissions

183 Bakke,

435 U.S. at 301.

Id. at 327. A great deal happened in the interim between Bakke and Grutter,including decisions in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding that a school board's policy of extending preferential
184

protection against layoffs to some employees because of their minority race violated the Fourteenth Amendment); City

of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding a city's plan requiring prime contractors awarded city construction
contracts to subcontract at least 30%

of the dollar amount of each contract to one or more "Minority Business

Enterprises" was violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because the city failed to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest justifying the plan and the plan was not narrowly tailored to remedy effects of prior
discrimination); Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding FCC order awarding enhancement for
minority ownership in proceedings for new licenses and a minority "distress sale" program permitting certain existing
radio and television stations to be transferred only to minority controlled firms was not violation of Fifth Amendment
because the policies did not violate equal protection principles, were substantially related to achievement of legitimate
government interest in broadcasting diversity; and did not impose impermissible burdens on nonminorities); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state,
or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by reviewing court under strict scrutiny, overruling Metro Broadcasting; in
this case a subcontractor who was awarded guardrail portion of federal highway project under federal program designed
to provide highway contracts to disadvantaged business enterprises had standing to seek forward-looking declaratory and
injunctive relief and case remanded to determine whether program satisfied strict scrutiny).
"1 539 U.S. 306 (2003). For sample discussions of the case, see generally Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of
Grutter,21 CONST. COMMENT. 221 (2004); Bryan Fair, Taking EducationalCaste Setiou/j': W1hy Grutter Will Hep Veg' Little,
78 TUL. L. REV\. 1843 (2004); Andre Douglas Pond Cummings, Grutter v Bollinger, Clarence Thomas, Afimative Action and the
Treacheg oJOrzginalism: 'The Sun Don't Shine Here in this Part oJTown,"21 HARVT.BLAcKLETTER L.J. 1 (2005); Ian Ayres &
Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don'tAsk:Narrow TailoringAfterGrutterand Grat 85 TEX. L. RE\. 517, 583 (2007).
186 539

U.S.at 322.

RACE AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

Vol. 2:1

decisions. 187
With Justice O'Connor writing the majority opinion, the answer was yes. Despite a trend in
Supreme Court decisions since Bakke implying that the only compelling interest a state actor might have
in using racial classifications for affirmative action was to combat explicit instances of past
discrimination, O'Connor argued for the compelling interest in achieving diversity in public higher
education. 8 8 The appropriate sort of diversity, however, was not the racial kind. If the Law School's
admissions policy had intended to guarantee that a specific portion of the student body was non-white,
this "would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional."' 1 9 "Rather, the Law
School's concept of critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce."' 19° And not racial diversity, but a kind of cultural diversity much more broadly
conceived. 191 Further, Justice O'Connor determined that the policy had been narrowly tailored since it
used race only as a "plus" in a very "flexible" decisional matrix-the policy avoided mechanical racial
192
quotas.
There is no doubt that the Court continued to abide by a background rule instructing the jurist
to see racial identity as a natural and immutable characteristic of human beings. After all the class
certified by the District Court included those that had applied in the relevant period, and "were members
of those racial or ethnic groups, including Caucasian, that Defendants treated less favorably... '193 If the
Court did not have a fixed and predictable concept of race in mind, there would have been a question
about whether the claimant was actually white. If the law school had decided to challenge her standing,
for example, and argue that she had not been injured by the policy because she had failed to prove she
was "Caucasian," what forms of proof would have satisfied the Court? "Cultural performance"? As long
as these sorts of standing questions are left in abeyance, decisions like Grutter are able to proceed.
Despite the valorization of diversity here, it wasn't at all clear that Grutter was a victory for
affirmative action advocates. The opinion was not intended as an intervention in race relations at all. To
the contrary, the Court's allowance of a broadly conceived idea of "diversity" as a justifiable ground for
Michigan's admissions policy was seriously hedged. "We are mindful, however, that 'a core purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on
race."1

94

187 Id.

188Id. at 328.
189 Id. at

330.

190Id.
191 For

a more optimistic view of the Grutter Court's view of racial diversity, see Michelle Adams, Stif/ing the

Potentialof Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved inCommunity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REv. 937 (2008).
Adams suggested, however, that much of Crutter's "expansive and unfettered possibilit" was stifled, though not
destroyed, by ParentsInvolved. Id. at 940-41.
192

539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003).

193

Id. at 316.

194 Id. at 341 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).). Constitutional jurisprudence is distinctly
individualistic in its orientation, as Justice O'Connor made clear in Grutten. "Because the Fourteenth Amendment

'protect[s] persons, not groups,' all 'government action based on race-a group classification long recognized as in most
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Consequently, the Court believed, all forms of race-conscious affirmative action "are potentially
so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a
permanent justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection
principle."'1 95 "We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
196
necessary to further the interest approved today."'
If the portents were ominous in Grutter,we can see the wheels beginning to come off the bus in
the Supreme Court's 2007 voluntary integration decision, 197 ParentsInvolved in Communio Schools198-a case
in which, as Derrick Bell has charged, "[T]he Supreme Court declared unconstitutional race-conscious
admission and transfer plans that for the past five decades had been vital to eradicating segregation,
facilitating integration, and preventing resegregation."' 199 Similarly, Charles Lawrence, III has said of the
case:

circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited-should be subjected to detailed judicial inquir to ensure that the
personalright to equal protection has not been infringed."' Id. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995). See also Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA
L. Rev. 99 (2007).
19 539 U.S. at 342.
196

Id. at 343.

197 Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that Parents Involved might actually signal a coming overruling of Gruttets

more permissive tone:
More generally, the Court's decision signals that it may only be a matter of a short time before the
Court reconsiders and overrules Grutter v. Bo//inger. In that decision, four years ago, the Supreme Court
held that colleges and universities have a compelling interest in having a diverse student body and may
use race as one factor in admissions decisions to achieve diversity. Grulter was a 5-4 decision, with
Justice O'Connor writing a majority opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Chief Justice Roberts' plurality opinion in Parents Involved emphatically espouses the view that the
government must be colorblind in its decisions. The opinion leaves no doubt where he and Justice
Alito will be when Grutter is reconsidered. Moreover, from a doctrinal perspective, Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in Grutter said that the government did not have to prove that no race neutral
alternative could achieve diversity, whereas all five Justices in the majority in Parents Involved said that
this is the government's burden.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharphy to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 428-29 (2007).
198 551 U.S. 701 (2007). The most recent case pushing the ball forward in this terrain is RicN v. DeStefano, 129 S.
Ct. 2658 (2009) (holding that the city's refusal to certify results of a promotional examination for firefighters, based on
belief that its use of results could have disparate impact on minority firefighters, was a violation of Title VII's disparatetreatment prohibition absent some valid defense; before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for
asserted purpose of avoiding unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have strong basis in evidence to believe
it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take race-conscious action. In this case city officials lacked
strong basis in evidence to believe that examinations were not job-related and consistent with business necessity or that
there existed equally valid, less-discriminato5 alternative to use of examinations that served city's needs but that city
refused to adopt).
199 BELL, supra note 25, at 73. From a different angle, James Ryan suggested that the problem with Parents

Involved was more symbolic than anything else.
On the one hand, this decision does not change much on the ground. The truth is that racial
integration is not on the agenda of most school districts and has not been for over twentv years.
Modern education reform efforts might still share the goal of equalizing educational opportunities for
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I'd sat in my office and listened to the oral argument. I could hear the Court majority's
commitment to white supremacy, as much in their voices as in the content of their
questions. I could have written Chief Justice Roberts's opinion that very day-the rape of
Brown v. Board of Education and the claim that she had consented, the assault on her
already badly beaten body, and the defamation of her principles and of those who had
labored for her birth. I could see it coming like a tidal wave, like the torches of the Klan
2° °
riding in the night.
In this much-maligned case, the Court adjudicated the constitutionality of plans regarding racial diversity
in the assignment of slots of various high schools in particular school districts in Seattle, Washington,
and Louisville, Kentucky. 2°1 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts repeated the constitutional
mantra: whenever a public actor administers a racial classification, it will be viewed with strict scrutiny,

minority students, which the Court in Brown embraced. But integration is not generally the means of
choice to achieve that goal, nor is the Supreme Court the key arena. Advocates and reformers have
turned their attention elsewhere, and today battles are waged in legislatures and in state courts over
school funding, school choice, standards and testing, and access to preschool. The dominant question,
moreover, is which of these reforms will improve academic achievement as measured primarily, if not
exclusively, by standardized test scores. The idea that schools should also teach students from diverse
backgrounds how to cooperate in preparation for citizenship, like the idea of integration, has been
pushed into the background.
James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Vo/untag' Integration, 121 HART .L. RENT. 131, 132 (2007). Ryan then shifted gears:
Yet many who believe in the goal of integration, including myself, cannot help but feel a sense of loss
and betrayal. In part this is a reaction to the plurality's astonishing attempt to rewrite the history of
desegregation and to use Brown as a justification for blocking efforts to integrate schools. But it goes
deeper than that. The Court certainly has not done all it could to encourage integration in practice, but
in the past it seemed to support the goal of integration. At the very least, it was not hostile. In Parents
Involved, however, the Court seems to have changed its mind. Instead of encouraging the pursuit of a
worthwhile goal, four Justices make the goal itself seem dastardly, while Justice Kennedy accepts the
goal but voices intense distaste over the most straightforward means of achieving it.
Id. at 133. In a subsequent commentary, J. Harvie Wilkinson III provided a far more approving view:
In an important sense, the holding in Parents Involved is in fact liberating. While the ruling restricts
the use of race in public decisions, it ironically frees Americans to think about people and their
problems in less rancorous ways. We are freer now to look at education, job training, health care, and
the rest as human needs to be addressed wherever any child of any race is receiving substandard
schooling, and wherever any elderly American of any ethnic background is without the shelter,
nourishment, or medical attention necessar to live in basic dignity. Race and religion are the great
potential dividers in America-just as the Establishment Clause inhibits governmental preferences
based on religion, the Fourteenth Amendment inhibits governmental preferences based on race.
Parents Involved helps in a small way to fortifN the basic social compact: that the suffering of each is a
challenge for all, and that the walls and fences often built by governmental actions based on race must
yield, however haltingly, to a nation of shared purpose and ecumenical heart.
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Seattle and Louisville School Cases: There Is No Other WIJaj, 121 HAR\. L. RiV. 158, 164 (2007).
200

Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Rflections on the Impact and Origins of 'The Id, the Ego, and

EqualProtection",40 CONN.

L. RENT. 931, 934-35 (2008).

201 For background on desegregation in schools, see generally Jonathan Fischbach, \Will Rhee & Robert Cacace,

Race at the Pivot Point: The Future of Race-Based Policies to Remedy De Jure Segregation After Parents Involved in Communit Schools,
43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RENT. 491(2008).
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and survive constitutional review only when it serves a strong social need and it has been articulated in
the narrowest of ways. 202 More particularly, the conclusion that Justice Kennedy and the four justices in
the Roberts plurality (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito) agreed upon was that governmental action must be
reviewed with strict scrutiny, even when the purpose is to achieve school desegregation-a conclusion
that Roberts claimed was supported by the decision in Brown itself.2 3 The rationale behind what Justice
Thomas coined the equivalence doctrine is as follows: all government acts that take race into account
should be regarded with heavy suspicion, regardless of whether they are meant to help or harm minority
groups, because racial identity is an immoral basis upon which to make a judgment about the worth of a
person. 2°4 Or as the Court put it in Rice v. Cayetano, "One of the principal reasons race is treated as a
forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry
instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities." 2°5 As Sumi Cho has stated with regard to this
new breed of post-racial colorblindness, "The Supreme Court's racial jurisprudence would lead one to
believe that racial classifications are so toxic that, like chemotherapy, they should be utilized only when

202 Justice Kennedy provided the fifth, swing vote, lending some ambiguity to the forcefulness of the Roberts
opinion. A sample of Justice Kennedy's thinking is here:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races
through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs;
recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race. These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based
on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of
them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.
Parents Involed, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007). For Kennedy, the key factor is less a matter of governmental "race
consciousness" or racial classifications, but more about whether a governmental intent to achieve some kind of
integration or affirmative action actually harms white people. Skeptical about the likelihood of a happy ending here,
Derrick Bell wrote, "Schools attempting to follow the nebulous standards set by the Kennedy concurrence face a
daunting challenge. They must tread a tightrope of achieving integration without appearing conscious of the race of their
students. Instead, schools will look to proxies for race, even where such proxies have proved impractical or ineffective in
the past." BELL, supra note 25, at 81. For more discussion of Kennedy's concurrence, see Siegel, supra note 21; Heather
K. Gerken, Justice Kenned and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV.L. REv. 104 (2007). In their dissent, Justices
Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg argued that strict scrutiny only made sense when government action was directed
at the separation of the races, and not at their integration.
203 Pamela Karlan has suggested that Roberts' use of Brown is mistaken at best. Discussing an early critique of
Brown, Herbert Wechsler's Toward Aeutral Principles, Karlan argues that Roberts appears to be invoking a rather bizarre
defense of Brown in light of Wechsler's original critique of Brown. The problem here is not only that Wechsler's critique has
long been completely discredited-the effort by the Court doesn't make any sense. See Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown
Do For You?: Neutra/Printip/esand the Struggle Over the EqualProtectionClause, 58 DukE L.J. 1049 (2009); Pamela S. Karlan,
The Law oyfSmall Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes fom the First
Full Term ojthe Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. RiI. 1369, 1385-91 (2008).
204 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000). See also Chemerinsky, supra note 191, at 429. ("There is an irony in seeing the
conservative majority interpret the equal protection clause as requiring colorblind government decision-making. These
are the Justices who profess the need to follow the original intent behind constitutional provisions. But if anything is
clear about the Congress that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment it is that it did not believe in colorblindness as a
constitutional principle. It created numerous programs, such as the Freedmen's Bureau, to provide benefits based on
race and it voted to segregate the District of Columbia public schools.").
20_ 528 U.S. at 517.
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absolutely necessary and, even then, must be used as sparingly as possible." 2° 6
Despite the "pernicious" character of using racial identity as a regulatory device, Roberts
explained that racial categories are still legitimate when they serve particular social interests. 2° 7 Following
Grutter, there are two that pass muster: the interest in remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination, and the interest in supporting diversity in higher education. As for the former, Roberts
explained that there are no instances of intentional discrimination in either context to justify regulations
cognizant of racial identity. Seattle never had a segregated system that it now had a duty to fix, and while
Louisville had been segregated in the past, this was a problem that had already been solved. The
allotment plans could therefore not be understood as remedying a very specific instance of prior
discrimination.
As for racial diversity, Roberts relied heavily on Justice O'Connor's discussion in Grutter,arguing
that racial diversity is appreciated only as one part of the broad array of considerations that go into what
may be determined to be a diverse student body. As Roberts explained, the Grutter Court emphasized
that a university's use of racial classifications would be "patently unconstitutional" if its purpose was
merely to achieve "racial balance." 2 °8 Instead, racial classifications are legitimate only to the extent they
are part of a much broader scheme that seeks to achieve "exposure to widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas, and viewpoints. '20 9 With regard to the two plans at bar, there had been no attempt whatsoever to
embed racial diversity in a larger scheme of diverse interests. Instead, there was a simple desire for a
more equal number of white and non-white students at each of the high schools. Since racial balancing is
"illegitimate," Roberts concluded that there was nothing to save the validity of the programs. His
rationale for denying the use of racial balancing (or racial diversity) was straight- forward: "Allowing racial
balancing as a compelling end in itself would 'effectively assur[e] that race will always be relevant in
American life, and that the 'ultimate goal' of 'eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking
21°
such irrelevant factors as a human being's race' will never be achieved."

206

Cho, supra note 16, at 1616.

See also Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CmL. L. RiAv. 277, 282 (2007) (discussing the two types of social
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Like Grutter, Parents involved operates on a biological conception that decenters the political
content of race in such a way that discourse about cultural diversity becomes possible. 211 There is no
reference in the opinion, nor has there been in any Supreme Court opinion, 212 to the sort of language
found in OrtiZ v. Bank ofAmerica: "I begin with the fact most widely agreed upon by modern biologists,
anthropologists, and other students of human diversity. The notion of race is a taxonomic device and, as
2 13
with all such constructs, it exists in the human mind not as a division in the objective universe."
Though Roberts hardly is explicit about the racial question (as very few court decisions are), the Parents
analytical framework clearly presumes that the kind of thinking about race in Ofliz was wrong-headed.
School boards in Seattle and Louisville sought to better integrate certain high schools, presumably on the
belief that there is something valuable about the idea of racially integrated schools. That value might
consist in all sorts of things, ranging from anti-racist attacks on the Racial Contract, to utilitarian
arguments in favor of everyone being better off when more kinds of people are in contact with one
another, to the desires to do justice with regard to a social system that systematically privileges certain
people at the expense of others, to the desire of more powerful actors to neutralize potential threats
through the use of relatively benign political strategies. Whatever value might have been in the minds of
the regulators, however, Roberts very clearly believed that "racial balance" had nothing to do with power
and domination, but was instead a question about the allocation of seats based on ancestry and heredity.
Following Grutter, Roberts was able to easily condemn the plan, suggesting that a willingness to
find a desire to engage in racial balancing would assure the continued relevance of race in our minds-a
relevance that we should all be determined to eliminate. Cheerfully looking to a post-racial moment
where race might be legally irrelevant, the perspective in Parentsis distinguished from Justice O'Conner's
214
hope in Grutterthat the law of affirmative action would have run its course in twenty-five years.
This racial project's bottom line is that we are already at or on the way towards a post-racial state
of race relations, and that in this post-racial state there will be little place for a law of affirmative action
that uses the natural ancestry of particular varieties of human beings as a regulatory device. Postracialism in the Court's sense therefore trades heavily on the continued salience of race as a biological
concept, though it is a post-racial framework that ultimately has little need for a legal regime specifically
tailored to the problem of racism. This is a view of the world from the egalitarianism of the Social
Contract, where racial identity is real enough but does not actually have any place. The problem, of
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course, is whether it is the Social Contract, or the Racial one, that actually better describes our world. As
should hopefully be very clear from the discussion above regarding the origins of race science, it is the
Racial Contract that provides the decisive answer.
D. Neoliberalism and Neoracism
As should be obvious, the Supreme Court's post-racial project is not post-racial because it has
positioned itself as a reaction to the demise of race science. There has not been any widespread
realization that race was a giant hoax, and that as a consequence we now should all get along with the
business of social progress. Instead, it is a project that constructs its vision of race in light of particular
social trends that seek to transform, for different reasons, the Brown-era civil rights explosion. This is a
post-racialism (1) predicated on a biological conception of race (background rules), (2) motivated by a
belief that racism is, or already has, transformed into a social phenomenon no longer warranting legal
regulation (foreground rules), and (3) that it is cultural diversity, and not race, that should be given legal
attention, if need be. That is, beyond the egalitarian measures of equal protection, American law should
see itself as on the way towards being entirely free of racial classifications.
In contrast is a different kind of post-racial project. 215 It goes by different names, but for ease of
use I will follow Etienne Balibar, 216 and more recently Thomas McCarthy, 217 in their descriptions of a
contemporary phase of "neoracism." In the classic sense, racism entailed the domination of Europeans
over non-Europeans on the basis of identity via arguments about ancestry and physiognomy. 218 This is
the racism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, until the end of Jim Crow and the postwar
"break." This is also the racism that the Supreme Court's post-racialism has in mind.
So what is it that is new, demanding a call for a "neoracism"? It is clear enough that the old
rationales coming from science have been discredited, and we no longer tolerate laws that are facially
discriminatory. Perhaps instead of a neoracist phase, American society has instead simply progressed
from harsher to more mild times?
In 1988, Balibar argued that racism had actually taken on "a new and lasting articulation of social
practices and collective representations, academic doctrines and political movements." 219 This was a
racism anchored no longer in biological heredity but in the supposed insurmountability of cultural
differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples
in relation to others but 'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles
and traditions." 22° One consequence of this shift from biology to culture was a weakening of the
conventional modes of anti-racist strategy. From the outset, the new racism disarmed the critic who
argued for the unfairness of discrimination on the basis of one's ancestry-this was already
acknowledged in the neoracist position. 221 Similarly, the new racism understood that it was unacceptable
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to make judgments about individuals, in terms of their intellectual capacity, on the basis of genetics.
Genetics had nothing to do with it.
Where the racist part came in was with the notion that it is appropriate to make discriminatory
judgments on the basis of cultural difference.222 This was also a reversal of the conventional approach of the
classic anti-racist, who had always attacked scientific racism from a multicultural perspective, arguing for
the plurality and equality of cultures. Through assertions about the ineluctable and unavoidable
differences in culture, however, what became immediately clear was how biology had not been the only
way to naturalize human proclivities: in the effort to essentialize culture, the neoracist mimicked the
classic effort to naturalize race.
The deployment of a cultural racism had another novel effect. Since it began with a presumption
about the unavoidability of cultural difference, the neoracist position was able to rationally advocate for
the isolation of cultural entities-to insist on mixing them was to insist on fomenting ethnic conflict,
balkanization, and the threat of civil war. As Balibar cleverly put it, "by an astonishing volte-face, we here
see [neo-racist] doctrines themselves proposing to explain racism."'223 It therefore turns out that among the
most formidable proponents of neoracism are social scientists themselves, arguing for the necessity of
respecting "the psychological and sociological laws of population movements; you have to respect the
'tolerance thresholds,' maintain cultural distances' or, in other words, in accordance with the postulate
224
that individuals are the exclusive heirs and bearers of a single culture, segregate collectivities."
225
Neoracists are not the mystical Gobineaus of the past, but the Huntingtons of the present.
Balibar was writing more than twenty years ago. Today, the sociological construction of race, and
the shift from biology-based racisms to culture-based racisms are a commonplace in critical race theory.
In fact, as Michael Omi and Howard Winant have suggested,
The social construction of race, which we have labeled the racialformation process, is
widely recognized today, so much so that it is often now conservatives who argue that
race is an illusion. The main task facing racial theory today, in fact, is no longer to
critique the seemingly 'natural' or 'common sense' concept of race-although that effort
has not been completed by any means. Rather the central task is to.. .argue against the
recent discovery of the illusory nature of race; against the supposed contemporary
transcendence of race; against the widely reported death of the concept of race .... 226

222

Id. at 22. See also Winant, Ghetto, supra note 3, at 2; Steinberg, supra note 18, at 265 ("The discrediting of

scientific racism is unquestionably one of the great triumphs of liberal social science. However, subsequent theorists
developed a social- scientific variant of scientific racism that essentially substituted culture for genes. Now it was held
that groups that occupy the lowest strata of society are saddled by cultural systems that prevent them from climbing the
social ladder. As before, failure is explained not in terms of social structures, but in terms endemic to the groups
themselves.").
223

Balibar, supra note 20, at 22.

224

Id. at 22-23.

22_

See, e.g., SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE: THE

226

Michael Omi & Howard Winant, The TheoreticalStatus of the Concept of Race, in So IkL THEORY: ROOTS AND

CHALLENGES TO AMLERI(A's NATIONAL IDENTITY

(2004).

BRAN( HES 365 (Peter

Kivisto ed., 2003).

RACE AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

Vol. 2:1

In a neoracist context, and following Omi and Winant's call, a legally situated racial project should focus
on two things at once. First, it must grapple with the fact that race is a social fact, and that it has never
been a biological one. As we have seen, this is a demanding task of the jurist who has been under a
biological spell for centuries. It also continues to be a meaningful task, since the biologism of race seems
incredibly difficult to dispel. 227 Second, it must translate the social reality of race into a jurisprudence that
resists the urge to abolish race as a legal concept altogether. This post-racial project set on resisting
neoracism must therefore push "race" away from its biological foundations without at the same time
leaving a court in the lurch where it has no choice but to abandon the concept of race as impossibly
incoherent. The emphasis on race as lacking biological foundations serves a purpose-it highlights the
social character of race. 228 It should not go further and be taken to argue that race actually has no
existence at all. e. christi cunningham's work is a good example of this, where she powerfully argues for
the elimination of race as a mark of individual identity, but advocates for the use of race as an anti-racist
legal strategy.229 Paul Gilroy's attack on race sounds a similar tune: "to renounce race for analytical
purposes is not to judge all appeals to it in the profane world of political cultures as formally
23
equivalent." 0
One approach that has accompanied the "end of race" story has been to follow the likes of
Huxley and Haddon, and substitute "ethnicity" or "culture" for race.231 Alex M. Johnson, Jr., for
example, has argued for years regarding the fictitious nature of race and the need to destabilize racial
categories. With an aim of using multiracial categories in an effort to create a sort of "shade confusion"
that will "eventually destroy the black/white dichotomy that currently exists, ultimately reducing race to
a meaningless category, as it should be," 2 3 2 Johnson's argument is that racial classifications should
eventually give way to the term "ethnicity." Unlike race, Johnson sees ethnicity as "a positive category
which offers empowering benefits to the classified group with little or no corresponding costs." 233 For
Johnson, ethnicity includes the cultural values of a particular community, and unlike the ostensibly
immutable character of race, "ethnic identification can be shed and transformed when necessary. Ethnic
identification is learned and not visual. '234 Initially, however, "one is born into an ethnic group and can
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only change that membership with difficulty. '235 Consequently, "the use of ethnicity, rather than race,
has the potential to destabilize fixed racial classifications with the goal of ultimately eliminating racial
classifications in American society." 236 Johnson's effort to use ethnicity as a more socially robust legal
category is hoped to undo the "reification of race in American society and the resultant costs of that
reification-the continued existence of racialism.

237

This seems attractive so long as it avoids mimicking the biological essentialism that we have
hopefully left behind, 238 and which is what was described above as one of the basic moves in the

neoracist position. As Charles Mills has argued, this is dangerous territory. Shifting towards ethnicity or
cultural diversity and away from race threatens to undermine anti-racist strategies by eliminating the

proper orientation towards racial oppression. "The defining feature of racism, at least in its classic form,
is not just the failure to recognize the equal worth of the culture of the racialized group but, more
239
ominously, the failure to recognize their very humanity."
Richard Ford has made this point in Racial Culture, emphasizing how problematic the
substitution of culture for race can really be. In his discussion of Bakke, Ford put his finger on how
Justice Powell's identification of diversity as the primary justification for affirmative action helped to
crystallize the legal system's fatigue in fighting racism. Powell explained how the use of racial
classifications were only legitimate when a state actor was combating specific instances of racial
discrimination, not general social trends, and when those classifications were intended to further ethnic
diversity. As we have seen, this dramatic shift in the jurisprudence away from a focus on racism and
towards a focus on ethnic or cultural diversity was picked up and hammered home in Grutter and Parents
Involved.240 The problem has been that where we still have urgent needs in repairing the social effects of
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possessed distinctive cultures. Third, racial domination lay defeated in the past, and no permanent
dominant or subordinate groups remained. Fourth, conflicts over interests and cultures produced and
explained relative group success. Fifth, antidiscrimination law dispreferred and even victimized
"white" ethnic minorities.
Id. at 1028. L6pez points out how in Bakke, Powell relied on an idea of the United States as a "nation of minorities"
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Powell used etinicitx to rewrite the American histor of race in the twentieth centur. He
disaggregated the white 'majority into 'various minority groups' who 'struggle' against 'prejudice,'
while converting racial minorities into groups that shared an identical American experience with white
ethnics. The color-line erased, the United States now progressed harmoniously as a 'Nation filled with
the stock of many lands,' and the Constitution gave equal concern to 'all ethnic groups seeking
protection from official discrimination.' 'Ethnic groups' in Powell's usage constituted no casual
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neoracism, courts have taught themselves to gaze elsewhere: into the hazy shade of a diverse and
politically safe multicultural landscape. As Ford has said, by describing racial subordination as in fact a
problem of cultural difference, anti-racist strategies are transformed by multiculturalism from "what
should be an indictment of social practices of exclusion and subordination into a plea for 'tolerance' of a
'diversity.' 2 4 1 He adds, "In this light it would appear that a central function of 'diversity' is to finesse, if
242
not obscure the salience of contemporary racism."
From Ford's critique of cultural diversity as a proxy for racial justice we are but a short step away
from a different but equally as important critique: even if it were possible to see multiculturalism as an
anti-racist strategy, we are still assuming that racial cultures actually have determinate content. After all, if
the claim is that the Seattle School Board needed to have a greater interest in promoting diversity instead
of fighting racism, there is obviously an assumption there about what essentially constitutes these
different cultural groups. A long-standing view from cultural anthropology has it, as one would expect,
that this assumption is fraught. Annelise Riles has commented that just as it is typical to think of
conflicts between cultures, conflicts within the cultures themselves are just as common: "Cultures are
hybrid, overlapping, and creole: forces from trade to education to migration to popular culture and
transnational law ensure that all persons participate in multiple cultures at once. Cultural elements
circulate globally, and they are always changing. From this point of view, 'culture' is more of a constant
243
act of translation and re-creation or representation than it is a fixed and common thing."
The upshot of all this appears grim. Anti-racist litigation strategies seem hemmed in from all
sides. First, the jurist needs to understand that the biological foundation of race law is fictitious. This is
important to emphasize not only because American race law appears to be continually under the spell of
science, but because the biological argument is intrinsically connected to the use of race as a rationale for
racial oppression. This is apparent in the way that the biological gloss on race enables the Supreme Court
to consistently de-center its discussions of racial justice: since race is a natural mark, it should not be
regulated. Second, the jurist needs to understand how calls for racial diversity have persistently obscured
calls for racial justice. The shift from race to culture or ethnicity more often than not yields a shift away
from the concerns about the Racial Contract and towards the desires for pluralism. Third, the jurist

synonym for race, but instead a heavily laden term signifying a conception of group dynamics in the
United States in which racial hierarchy had ceased to operate.
Id. This argument led Powell to the crucial move which would ultimately supply later Courts with a resort to
"reactionar colorblindness":
Powell deployed ethnicit to locate all groups in the same position, that of temporary minorities
similarly engaged in pluralist politics and facing the same levels of societal hostilitx
dand all
deserving an identical level of judicial protection. Because the United States contained not dominant
and subordinate races but a welter of "ethnically fungible" groups, to paraphrase Alan Freeman's
critique, the Constitution could make no distinction among the beneficiaries or victims of racial
classification.
Id. at 1037.
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needs to understand that while cultures are certainly real in the sociological sense, just as races are real,
244
they are incredibly complex and impossible to analyze as a "totalizing explanatory device."
Obviously, this seems like seriously tricky business. So where to go from here? The next Part
offers some suggestions.

V.

TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF RACE AS A LEGAL CONCEPT: TWO IDEAS FROM
CONFLICT OF LAWS

In looking for a way beyond the Court's preoccupation with a neoliberal post-racialism, this Part
reimagines the Court's plurality decision in ParentsInvolved In order to do so, we need to know how the
present approach not only contrasts with Justice Roberts' decision, but the dissenting opinions as well.
As opposed to the neoliberalism animating the plurality opinion, Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsberg dissented in a clear articulation of the modern liberal style.
Did the Constitution prohibit school boards in Seattle and Louisville from adopting raceconscious criteria to better integrate their school systems? Of course not. 245 Writing for the dissenting
Justices, Breyer found it easy to sustain the principle that the governmental use of racial classifications is
permissible when it is intended to improve race relations, even when a municipality is under no
obligation to do so. "That principle has been accepted by every branch of government and is rooted in
the history of the Equal Protection Clause itself. Thus, Congress has enacted numerous race-conscious
statutes that illustrate that principle or rely upon its validity. . . . [This] view understands the basic
objective of those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices that lead to racial
exclusion. The Amendment sought to bring into American society as full members those whom the
'246
Nation had previously held in slavery.
As should be clear at this point, however, modern liberalism is just as committed to the use of a
biological background rule as is neoliberalism. In moving from a welcoming posture towards regulation
to the application of the standard, Justice Breyer noted the importance of being skeptical about the use
of racial classifications. Racial classifications still exist in relation to a natural idea about race, wherein the
appropriateness of racial regulation is necessarily juxtaposed against the importance of allowing racial
groups to be free of such regulations. Thus, Breyer's choice for a more lenient form of scrutiny of the
programs "would not imply abandonment of judicial efforts carefully to determine the need for raceconscious criteria and the criteria's tailoring in light of the need .... In doing so, a reviewing judge must
'247
be fully aware of the potential dangers and pitfalls that Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy mention.
And what are these dangers? According to Thomas, "Most of the dissent's criticisms of today's
result can be traced to its rejection of the color blind Constitution" 24 a rejection that Thomas suggests
was pivotal in Brown itself. As for Justice Kennedy, his concerns are telling. In describing one approach

244 Id.
241

ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701, 823-24 (2007). See also Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122

HARV. L. REv.4, 13 (2008) (discussing the Breyer dissent).
246 ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 828-29.
247Id. at 836.
248

Id. at 772.

RACE AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

Vol. 2:1

to the problem of segregated schooling, Kennedy described the view that sought the selection of raceconscious criteria as the direct solution to the problem of racial stratification. The problem with the raceconscious approach, Kennedy explained, is that it presents dangers that can be avoided when segregation
is dealt with "more indirect means. '249 And why can't a school board approach the problem directly?
What are the dangers?
When the government classifies an individual by race, it must first define what it means
to be of a race. Who exactly is white and who is nonwhite? To be forced to live under a
state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society.
And it is a label that an individual is powerless to change. Governmental classifications
that command people to march in different directions based on racial typologies can
cause a new divisiveness. The practice can lead to corrosive discourse, where race serves
not as an element of our diverse heritage but instead as a bargaining chip in the political
process. On the other hand race-conscious measures that do not rely on differential
treatment based on individual classifications present these problems to a lesser degree...
Under our Constitution the individual, child or adult, can find his own identity, can
define her own persona, without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race
25°
or the color of her skin.
This passage is at once deeply puzzling and wonderfully indicative of a neoliberal conception of race. It
is puzzling because Kennedy seemed to be suggesting that "race-conscious measures" that do not rely on
race are much better than "race- conscious measures" that do. What this means is a mystery, but the
reason for making the distinction is not. In Kennedy's vision, individuals have a race that is naturally
given, but they have the sovereign choice to define their own persona, "without state intervention that
classifies on the basis of his race or the color of her skin."'251 Kennedy clearly believes that people have
racial identities, but it is up to the people themselves, and not the state, to make of those identities what
they will-the last thing we need, Kennedy counsels, is for the state to get into the business of saying
who is white or nonwhite. The best thing is to go beyond race altogether, to go post-racial. Kennedy
therefore believes that there are races out there, but that racial classifications should be as limited as
possible so as not to degrade the dignity of individual human beings.
Coming back to Breyer, he clearly believed the ambit of race-conscious regulation to be broader
than what was articulated in the opinions of Roberts, Thomas or Kennedy. Yet in keeping with the
modern liberal style, he still characterized the appropriateness of such regulations in relation to the
operative background rules-rules that tell us that our legal conceptions of race are always founded on a
natural presumption of biological differentiation. Thus, for different reasons and in different ways, the
plurality, dissenting, and concurring opinions all understood the question of whether the Constitution
permitted the use of state- sanctioned race-conscious criteria in a voluntary integration plan as existing
against a naturalized background of legal assumptions about human ancestry.
In the subsequent discussion, I seek to draw a distinction between the background rules of race
that are shared in the classic, modern, and neoliberal conceptions. Why is this distinction so important?
The background rules of race as a legal concept, present in each of the liberal styles, provide an
incredibly powerful obstacle in the way of serious efforts at social change. The reason, as has been
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explained above, is that these background rules present race as a natural characteristic of human identity
that exists independently of legal regulation-race precedes law. It is only with this assumption about the
naturalness of race that we are able to understand Roberts and Kennedy as making any kind of sense,
and once that assumption is removed, colorblindness becomes a completely incoherent concept.
Color-race-is legally constructed.
Pushing the argument further, once we establish that race is a legal concept, we can shift into the
familiar territory of asking what social purpose that concept is expected to serve. Historically, race had
the purpose of justifying the domination of certain human populations as a natural inevitability. While
that purpose is no longer as prevalent, there is no logical reason to forestall a recovery of that approach.
Rather, it can be joined with a more progressive interest in social change and racial justice.
The discussion below provides two very different suggestions about how to go about doing so,
both of which offer a re-thinking of Parents Involved in light of Conflict of Laws. In Section A, race is
maintained as an operative term where the hypothetical judge asks what function race is meant to serve
in the context of the dispute, and consequently interprets relevant regulations in light of that function.
That is, just as a term like "jurisdiction" was transformed in the encounter with early twentieth-century
Legal Realism, this Section contemplates a similar encounter in the context of "race" as a legal concept.
In Section B, the discussion looks at the facts of ParentsInvolved as literally a Conflict of Laws problem,
and not analogously as it does in Section A. While the result is largely indeterminate, it is simultaneously
252
quite useful.
A. A Functionalist Rendering of ParentsInvolved
1.

The Realist Critique of Formalism and the Rise of Functionalism

One legal strategy for attacking a neoracist Racial Contract might be hiding in a place we'd be
unlikely to look: the standard history of American legal thought itself. As is well known, American jurists
went through a bit of an existential crisis in the early years of the twentieth century. 253 In field after field,
254
academics and judges united in critiques over the natural foundations of categories of private law.
Despite the breadth of the attack, a basic insight was consistently applied: it was no longer acceptable to
believe in the veracity of so-called "natural" principles of law that might be discovered solely through the
use of reason. 255 There was no natural law of contract, property, tort, and so on. As it turned out, the
manner in which a judge might decide a dispute with reference to a natural or objectively correct
conception of law was soon believed to have just been a big mistake. There was no concept of property

do not mean to suggest that I am in favor of one of these approaches over another. While there is
something more politically satisfying about the former, at least in the way that I have portrayed a functional view of race
in the present discussion, there can be no doubt about the overwhelming amount of valid critique that functionalist
jurisprudence has suffered over the last third of the 20th century. For discussion, see, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Three
GlobalijZations in Law and Legal Thought, in THE NEW LxW AND Ec/NOMIC DE VELOPMENT 19 (Alvaro Santos ed., 2006).
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or contract "out there" that "legal science" 256 might rigorously apply to the world of human conflict. The
objective conception of legal analysis was, and had always been, a mirage.
A common example of this shift from a kind of formalism to functionalism is the field of
conflict of laws. 257 Chief among the jurists who launched the critique of formalism in this area was
Walter Wheeler Cook, taking aim at statements like this one from A.C. Dicey: 'fundamental principles
of private international law can be ascertained by study and reflection, and that the soundness of the
rules maintained, say in England, as to the extraterritorial recognition of rights, can be tested by their
conformity to, or deviation from, such general principles.' ' 258 Cook elaborated, "It follows that 'the
object of a writer on the conflict of laws is to discover the principles' of the subject, and 'starting with
some one principle ... to show how in accordance with the fundamental principle assumed by the writer
as the basis of his system, the specific rules for the decision of concrete cases are or should be reached
by all countries. '259 More specifically, Cook understood leaders in the field like Joseph Beale to have
articulated a way of thinking about conflicts law that presupposed a series of beliefs in the nature of
jurisdiction.
At its base, the field of conflicts is hoped to provide answers to the question of what to do when
a dispute has material connections to multiple sites of authority-which authority should hear the case
(this is the "jurisdiction" question), and what law should govern the dispute (this is the "choice of law"
question). 26°' For Beale, the problem of conflicting sources of authority could always be solved with a
single, correct answer. Starting from a positivist position, Beale believed that laws never preexisted the
sovereign-that all law could only be law once it had been delivered by a properly constituted political
authority. 261 Once a law had been articulated by the sovereign, however, something like a legal physics
would begin. When a particular instance would take place, trigger the creation of a right under a
sovereign's law, that right became a fact for the entire world. The right was a fact like a chair is a fact; it
demanded recognition as a natural thing in the world. Consequently, because that right had "vested"
there, there was no choice but for other jurisdiction to respect that right; a decision that failed to do so
262
would be wrong.
A famous example of this view is Alabama Great Southern KR. Co. v. Carroll,263 in which the
employee of a railroad company, Carroll, was injured in the course of his work. Carroll was a resident of
Alabama, as was the employer. The negligence, which was on the part of Carroll's fellow laborers, who
were responsible for Carroll's injury, took place while the train was in Alabama, but the injury itself

2_6 1 JOSEPH BEALE, SELECTIONS FROM BEALE'S TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
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happened in Mississippi. Mississippi law exempted the railroad company from any liability when the
harm was the result of a fellow worker and not management, but in Alabama the company would have
been liable for damages. Following Beale's logic, the state high court had no problem finding that
Carroll's right to compensation had vested in Mississippi-the location where the injury had occurredand as a consequence, the Alabama Supreme Court was compelled to apply Mississippi law. That was the
26 4
end of the story; there was literally nothing the Alabama Supreme Court could have done.
For critics like Cook, this whole scenario was plain crazy. If decisions like the one in Carrollwere
intended to mean that the Alabama court was obligated to apply Mississippi law because it followed what
it believed were the advantages of vested rights theory, Cook had no quarrel. 265 But, to the extent courts
actually meant to say that choice of law or jurisdictional questions are apriorianswered, and that the state
of Alabama could not principally apply its own law because the right vested in another jurisdiction, was
simply ridiculous. 266 The actual state of affairs, Cook argued, was one in which courts applied their own
laws to situations in which rights had supposedly vested elsewhere, all the time. 26 7 If one looked at the
reality of judicial decision making it would quickly become apparent that these sorts of "fundamental
principles" were subject to all kinds of varying interpretations. In Carroll, why was it that the injury itself
had vested the right? What about the negligence? And was this even a tort case? Perhaps it was actually a
contract case, in which the law of the place where the employment contract had been made would have
controlled, in that case, Alabama. Or instead, might this dispute not be better seen as a matter of
procedural rules, given that the field of conflicts is usually understood as procedural law? In that case,
Alabama law would apply. But maybe the best answer would be to really apply the whole of Mississippi
law, including its own conflicts rules, since that decided whether the right apparently vested. What then if
Mississippi conflicts law punted back to Alabama, only to get caught up in Alabama's conflicts law that
268
would send it right back again?
The courts that frequently used these "escape" devices were familiar with their application.
However, Cook raised the bar. Even in the ordinary case of a court "following" vested rights theorylike the Alabama Supreme Court in Carroll the fundamental principles were still not in play in the way
that legal science would have instructed. When a court attempts to apply "foreign law," like the Alabama
court tried to apply Mississippi law, it never actually applies "foreign law" at all. In fact, applying foreign
law is impossible. 26 9 Even if the foreign law really existed as a unitary and coherent thing in the foreign
place, the local court can never do anything but recreate the "foreign" in the context of its own
articulation. To be clear, Cook was not exactly postmodern; his argument was simply that vested rights
theory was impossible on its own terms. Alabama applied what it understood to be the law of
Mississippi, in that a Mississippi court would have applied it to a dispute between two Mississippi
residents. But in fact, the Alabama Supreme Court was dealing with a dispute between two Alabama
residents, and this collision of jurisdictional competence is the whole point of conflicts jurisprudencetrying to figure out what to do when competing authorities are implicated in a legal dispute. By
pretending that Carroll and his employer were Mississippi residents, the court at once missed the whole
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point of conflicts law and ultimately rendered a decision on the basis of an imaginary dispute between
Mississippi residents who never existed.
So what happened to conflict of laws after the decline of vested rights theory and the natural
conception of jurisdictional relations? After some decades of turmoil, courts across the country
encountered what came to be known as the "judicial revolution." 270 Judges and academics agreed there
were no natural rules that could guide us in the attempt to reconcile competing claims from equal
sovereigns regarding which law should apply.271 The conventional move forward involved an "interest"
analysis, in which a court would ask what purposes choosing the law of one jurisdiction over another
would serve. 27 2 Adjudicating a conflicts question became much as it is today: an approach that expressly
recognized the political and contestable aspects of its project, while simultaneously embracing highly
2 73
technical legal strategies to generate an outcome to the dispute.
2.

What is the Function of Race as a Legal Concept?

As we might think of what is happening to race as a legal concept today, a century ago, fields like
conflict of laws transitioned from a moment in which foundational concepts were believed to be natural,
objective, and the proper subjects of a "legal science," to another moment in which they were instead
understood to be best interpreted in light of the shifting grounds of contemporary social needs. 274 That
is, the "discovery" that property, contract, corporations, or jurisdiction lacked objective foundations in
the natural world did not usher in a call for the abolition of property and contract. We might also say
that the "discovery" that race lacks scientifically objective foundations need not usher in a call for the
end of race. Instead, conflict of laws jurists at the time asked: What purposes do these concepts serve?
How should they be interpreted in light of those purposes? What is their function?
Is there any life to the possible analogy between the denaturalization of private law in the early
twentieth century and the potential denaturalization of race law in the present?27 5 One obvious problem

27oThe case most famously associated with the revolution is Babcock v. Johnson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
271The Babcock court mentioned the widespread "dissatisfaction with the mechanical formulae of the conflicts
of law," and how "the vested rights doctrine has long since been discredited because it fails to take account of
underlying policy considerations ....The vice of the vested rights theor . . .is that it affects to decide concrete cases
upon generalities which do not state the practical considerations involved." Id. at 281-82.
2
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with the analogy is the legal system's long-time friend, the public-private distinction. 276 The enforcement
of civil rights claims and the use of racial classifications are matters of public law, though since the
establishment of the Civil Rights Act and the allowance of claims against private parties, courts and
Congress expanded the scope beyond state action. But the judicial act of reconceiving concepts like
jurisdiction seems quite different than the judicial reconception of race. Whereas the former strikes us
now as obviously artificial, the latter still feels organic, and as a consequence, less susceptible to this kind
of reconception. But this is the whole point: thlere is nothing organic about race at all.
277
Interestingly, a kind of interest- oriented functionalism is already built into constitutional law.
After all, the Court's standard approach is to evaluate the use of racial classifications in light of particular
social interests, and in the present, those interests have been essentially limited to our desires for cultural
diversity in higher education. While this functionalism is built-in, it is also different than the
functionalism in private law that followed legal realism. Private law functionalism formally did away with
the notion of natural reason and rule, whereas our contemporary constitutionalism balances its
commitment to a natural conception of race against its allowance of certain state acts that regulate that
natural conception.

(i) Step One: Choose an Interpretive Method
The first step in the analysis would emphasize the wholesale absence of any formal or literal
constitutional limitations on the school districts' allotment plans. Of course, one does not require a leap
of faith to highlight this-as has already been pointed out, the Court has never interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment as completely prohibiting racial classifications. It only prohibits such
classifications that are without the appropriate sort of justification. Whether the plans are valid will turn
entirely on the Court's interpretive methods. In this case, the Court will choose what could be called a
2 78
1930's style functionalism.
(ii) Step Two: Foreground Neoracism and the Racial Contract
The second step would involve a historical examination of the global process of racial
oppression. The opinion would highlight how, over the course of several centuries, experts from various
disciplines had helped elaborate a racial ideology that rationalized the Racial Contract. The Court would
explain that, while racial oppression had suffered a major blow in the middle of the twentieth century,
racism continued to flourish in other subtle ways. The need for a comprehensive assault on racism is no
less necessary today than it was a hundred years ago. The effects of racial discrimination are rampant and
systemic, and every bit of the legal system's power must be leveraged in service of dismantling that
system.

276 For discussions of the public-private distinction, see Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theo 0 : A Casenote 01
F/agg Brothers P. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982); Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal ReJbrm, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
277
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(iii) Step Three: Identify the Function of Race
The third step would handle the term "race" in the following way. It is time to eliminate the oldfashioned and archaic idea that there are human races born into the world, and to embrace the view that
races are nevertheless real as a matter of our social reality. Consequently, the thrust must involve a
functionalist interpretation of race that asks not what race is, but rather, what purpose does the
articulation of race serve? What is the interest in using the idea of race as legal category? What is its
function? The Court would then clearly reiterate what its purpose has been in the past: the purpose of
race had been to justify a state of oppression. Following this, the Court would announce a reversal: the
function of race today should be to do exactly the opposite, undermining that state of oppression.
Whether we are in the context of constitutional law, the Civil Rights Act, or any other legal regime, any
relevant texts will be interpreted in light of this function.
(iv) Step Four: Decide
The fourth and final step would ask whether the school allotment plans are using the social
concept of race as a tool for undermining the Racial Contract, instead of supporting it. Keep in mind
here, this question would focus on whether the schools' use of race was in tension with the Racial
Contract, and not the egalitarianism of the classic liberal Social Contract that the current Supreme Court
believes to be endangered by the schools' plans. Also keep in mind that this step may hardly feel "legal"
in the sense that a particular rule is applied to a set of facts in a consistent, uniform, and general fashion.
But functionalist conceptions of law are never any of these things anyway, and if one buys into the realist
critiques that paved the way for functionalism in the first place, then one also knows that rules are rarely
applied consistently or uniformly, regardless of our selected interpretive method.
B.

Conflict of Laws as "Cultural Conflict"

Despite the fact that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence here actually does employ a kind of
functionalism, though admittedly not of the private law variety that this Article has described, this
rendering of a functionalist interpretation of race might feel like it is just too much. If we have done
away with biology, then who has standing to bring these claims? How will arguments over standing be
resolved? What is the legal definition of "racial oppression"? What counts as "properly" redressing that
kind of oppression? Is it legitimate for Michigan Law School to decide in a given year that no "White"
people will be admitted? These are obviously hard questions, and many more would be asked. Of course,
our contemporary situation is also subject to a host of really hard questions. It is far from clear why the
one set is accepted as just part of how the world works, and the other set of questions is taken as
damning evidence.
In any case, the aim of the Article is not to argue for what I have brazenly termed a functionalist
perspective on race law. Instead, it is to highlight the connection between the invention of a natural idea
about humanity called "race" and the use of that idea as a justification for oppression, and in tandem, the
manner in which the American legal system has relied on that same idea, even at its most progressive
moments. In the previous section, the discussion suggested one possibility of how an affirmative action
case might have been decided if it was made in light of the Racial Contract and the progressivism of early
twentieth-century American legal thought. Despite the radical feel of that hypothetical rendering, there is
nothing in it that does violence to the Court's own canonical tools.
In these final sections, the discussion will set up a second way of rethinking ParentsInvolved, but
from a quite different angle, or to borrow language from Professors Karen IKnop, Ralf IMichaels, and
Annelise Riles, it will be imagined "sideways." Instead of making an analogy between conflict of laws and
race law, here race is imagined as a problem of conflict of laws.
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Why Conflict of Laws?

In their recent article, After Multiculturalism: Feminism, Culture, and the Surprising Attraction of a
Conflict of Laws Approach,279 Knop, Michaels, and Riles pose a novel approach to the "bogged-down"
relation between feminism and culture. They ask: how do we resolve questions about veiling, polygamy,
and clitoridectomy-practices understood to be oppressive to women in some cultures but liberating in
others without getting stuck in interminable debates about universalism, relativism, and cultural
essentialism? 2 0 Must a commitment to gender equality always be posed in contrast to commitments to

cultural diversity? And what do we do about disagreements over what is actually fundamental to a culture
in the first place? Can we be sure that polygamy is ever essential in a particular community? Is there
anything essential for sure?
These are thorny questions, highlighting how in some ways feminist thinking about law has
gotten stuck in the essentialist debates about cultural content. So how could a field like conflicts possibly

be of any assistance? "The path we propose draws on what, at first glance, would seem an unpromising
legal paradigm-conflict of laws, the highly technical field famously described as a 'dismal swamp' ...
more often associated with out-of-state car accidents . . .the field that time forgot." 281 At first blush,

using conflict of laws to analyze the feminism-culture problem (or race, for that matter) might strike
some as a kind of parlor trick.

Despite appearances, however, Knop, Michaels, and Riles seem to be on to something. Conflicts
jurisprudence has a style quite different than what we are used to in the typical domain of civil rights
law. 282 Traditional public law litigation, especially in the enforcement of constitutional rights, begins with
an encounter with a huge moral question about personal freedom and a theory of justice. 283 The
constitutional tactic is to deal with this moral problem by stripping it of its political dimensions-the
question is weighed and balanced and answered in what is pronounced as a decision that is somehow
"correct." 284 But conflicts jurisprudence works in something like the reverse. The initial question is
usually posed in technical, apolitical terms. This question is then pushed through a series of maneuvers
that every judge already knows to be highly indeterminate. 285 Perhaps unlike some other fields, jurists

279Knop, Michaels, & Riles, supra note 41. The step-by-step approach articulated in the following sections
might be seen as doing violence to the actual approach described by Knop, Michaels, and Riles. In their piece, they don't
set anything out like the kind of mechanical operation I am suggesting in the context of Parents Involved, and this appears
intentional on their part. Nevertheless, my hope in harnessing their approach and pressing it into the service of race law
is to only provide one sort of concrete illustration of how their approach might be applied. It certainly shouldn't be
understood as only being available in the way that I describe it here. Thanks to Ralf Michaels for this helpful
clarification.
28u
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[W]hereas the debate in constitutional law or international human rights law, that is, public law,
starts with liberal values, conflict of laws begins with the acceptance of the other jurisdiction's
potentially illiberal laws. Both processes of analysis get to [a point of ethical decision] . . .[b]ut
conflicts gets there through a series of technicalities, and these technicalities bring an immediate
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working in conflict of laws typically know their history pretty well (described above), and reconciled
286
themselves to the impossibility of "right" answers some time ago.
To be sure, conflicts experts often seem rather frustrated that we still haven't figured out how to
make this thing work, 287 but one of the key insights in the work of KInop, Michaels, and Riles is that the
awareness of this deep-seated indeterminacy is actually what makes conflict of laws such an unusually
capable field. Unlike the public law style that faces off with a major question about human rights, and
then pretends to channel that question through a balancing mechanism that produces a correct result,
the style of conflict of laws understands the mechanism itself-the techniques of reasoning-to be an
ethical framework of decision making. It does not separate out the ethical question from a depoliticized
judicial test. It does not seek "the perfectly calibrated balance between opposing interests; to split the
baby precisely in two; to find the sweet spot at which all sides give up precisely the appropriate amounts
in favor of the common good. '288 Conflicts jurisprudence treats the entire process as politically
contestable, while at the very same time negotiating that process in highly technical terms. The
intellectual style of conflict of laws is therefore at once far more humble and more realistic than the
bombastic and "black-letter" feel of decisions like ParentsInvolved.
This idea that the conflicts style is able to take highly political questions and funnel them into
apparently apolitical techniques without actually depoliticizing them is illustrated in the manner in which
courts gather information on the laws of foreign jurisdictions. In the garden-variety conflicts case, the
parties must prove the relevant foreign law, whether that be the law of Alabama or Afghanistan. The
judge knows that the "proof" of that law will be highly contingent on the interests of those parties
making out their claims about what Alabama or Afghanistan's laws require in the given context. That is,
just as proof of other domestic law doctrines is dependent-whether there actually was an offer or
consideration or negligence or whatever will turn on the talents of those making the arguments-actual
proof of foreign law is just as impossible. Thus, conflicts judges engage in a tried and true judicial move:
while it may be obvious that they are not dealing with an objective assessment of foreign law, if such a
thing were even available, they act as if it was an objective assessment. The proof of foreign law is
289

constructie.

2.

Thinking Sideways about Race and Culture

This takes us to the question of how Parents involved might be re-situated in the style of conflict
of laws. Admittedly, the example worked out by Knop, Michaels, and Riles appears to be an easier fit

complexity and detail that constitutional theor or human rights theor must generate from first
principles-and seldom arrives at.
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than the affirmative action problem here. In their analysis, Knop, Michaels, and Riles looked at a
hypothetical corporate law dispute between a father and daughter, where the former was a citizen and
resident of Japan, and the daughter was a resident of California. Though the dispute upon which the
hypo was based was not a conflicts case, it was easy enough to see how a conflicts analysis could initially
develop: there were two cultures in play, with apparently conflicting conceptions about the relevant laws
29°
regulating the dispute.
Nevertheless, there appears to be room to think about racial identity in the conflicts style, as
Knop, Michaels, and Riles have imagined it. Though this Article does not attempt the level of detail they
produce in their analysis of gender and culture, the discussion should be plentiful enough to suggest clear
points of departure for further elaborations of a conflicts style of race law.
(i) Step One: Identify the Jurisdictional (Cultural) Conflict
The first step in reorienting ParentsInvolved in the conflicts style requires the judge to identify the
cultural conflict in play. In an earlier piece, Riles argued that a more realistic understanding of
jurisdictional conflict suggests that what is really in conflict in even the most pedestrian of cases, like
the Carroll case discussed above-are cultural norms. 291 After all, the whole notion of a conflict of
competing jurisdictions is a metaphor-a jurisdiction is not literally in conflict with anything. What is at
stake, Riles suggested, is a choice between values. The idea here is that, even though cultures are
incredibly complex, the fact is that conflicts cases are at bottom about conflicts of values, "that is, a
problem of how to make sense of something foreign to one's own world, to understand, to
accommodate, to empathize with, or to choose to refuse to do so." 2 92 "The problem at the heart of
conflicts, then, is not just what is the source of the authority for our laws and our judicial decisions, but
whose rules or values should prevail, and what are those rules and values anyway?" 293 Though it may be
nearly impossible to truly know what those rules and values might be, this does not preclude the
necessity of trying to figure out what they are, and ultimately producing "constructive cultures."
Therefore, just as judges are accustomed to using the constructive law of a foreign jurisdiction, so too
can judges think constructively about cultural norms. Consequently, just as there would be an initial
mapping of the two competing jurisdictions in Carroll Mississippi and Alabama-here the judge would
294
look for the competing cultures or "normative communities."
If we arbitrarily choose to focus on Seattle rather than Louisville, the dispute was over the
Seattle School Board's attempt to redress the effects of racially concentrated housing patterns in the
Seattle metropolitan area. The Board's plan allowed any student to select from any of the ten
comprehensive high schools in Seattle, regardless of whether the student was applying to a
neighborhood school. In the event that particular schools were oversubscribed, the Board used a "racial
tiebreaker" in order to undermine the City's racial disparities. 295 Seattle itself is historically segregated. As
of a few years ago, sixty-six percent of all white students lived north of downtown Seattle while eighty-
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four percent of African-American students, seventy-four percent of Asian students, and sixty-five
percent of Hispanic students lived south of downtown. As one school board member testified, "Where
currently are and have always been invisible lines in Seattle's residential areas, defining where people of
color are welcome." 296 With respect to the high schools themselves, the most prestigious schools were
unavailable to students living in southern Seattle, and because of the city's segregated housing patterns,
this meant the prestigious schools were dominated by whites, while the less advanced schools were
dominated by "non-Whites."
With respect to the particular claim in Parents Involved, the plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation
comprised of parents of students whose children were or were potentially denied placement in the high
school of their choice. These claimants were recognized as "White" in the dispute, and individual
members of the defendant School Board were comprised of different racial categories.
Insofar as our hypothetical judge needs to determine the "normative communities" with material
connections to the dispute, Seattle has several: "White," "African American," "Asian American," and
"Hispanic." Of course, this has a very different feel than having identified Alabama and Mississippi, or
California and Japan, as the competing cultural entities. In a judicial context, Alabama, Mississippi,
California, and Japan are all "jurisdictions," and conflicts jurisprudence is a field concerned with
jurisdictional questions. "White" is not a jurisdiction, right? But if these are our thoughts, we have
already gone off the rails. The very point of this exercise is precisely to think of Alabama, Mississippi,
California, and Japan as cultures and not as abstract "jurisdictions." And if the judicial task is to use a legal
29
technique which searches out culture, African American or Hispanic or Asian are as good as any other. 7
But, what about White culture? What does that involve? Without entering the large literature on
Whiteness, 298 suffice it to say that Whiteness does not function on the same analytical plane as
something like "Hispanic." By way of example, consider e. christi cunningham's articulation of "the race
paradigm" in American law and its five basic premises. 299 These are: (1) all humans are assigned a racial
identity, (2) race is the preeminent aspect of an individual's total identity, (3) races are property interests,
where Whiteness in particular is a legally cognizable property interest, (4) racial categories are defined in
contrast to Whiteness, and (5) Whiteness is the "supreme" racial identity. 3° °(' These emphases on
Whiteness in the critical race theory literature are meant to foreground the lopsided quality of "race
relations;" to be sure, all races are socially and legally constructed, but the manner in which "non-White"
racial categories are understood is always as a matter of juxtaposition against Whiteness. Courts define
Whiteness as a set of powers, privileges, and dominance. 3°1 Consequently, those people that are born

Brief of Appellees at 6, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir.
2002) (No. 01-35450), 2001 VL 34090888, at *5.
296

297 But, maybe not: as Stephen Steinberg has pointed out, some research has suggested that few Latinos actually
identifv with these designations as accurate descriptors of their own cultural identities, preferring instead to associate

with particular countries of origin. STEPHEN STEINBERG, RACE RELATIONS: A CRITIQUE 126 (2007).
298 For an interesting mapping of various theories of Whiteness, see Vron Ware, The Parametersof

White Critique,

in A COMPANION TO RACIAL AND ETHNIC STUDIES 105 (David Theo Goldberg & John Solomos eds., 2002).
299 Cunningham, supranote 72, at 762-63.
300 Id.

301 Gallagher, supra note 49, at 9.
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with the "right" physical attributes that have been socialized as "racial," such as skin color, hair, and
3 2
other facial features, automatically partake of those legally bestowed powers, privileges, and interests. '
Whiteness is a kind of power structure or ideology of domination. Blackness, or Hispanic, or
Asian, is not, and hence the categorical mismatch in thinking about "cultural conflicts." There are Black,
Hispanic, and Asian cultures, however disaggregated they might be, in ways that there is not a White
culture. 3' 3 Though all races are socio-legal constructions, Whiteness is the controlling, animating
structure. In cultural terms, Whiteness is the nadir, if not a negation.
Given our conflict of laws framework, and the judicial task of identifying the relevant cultures to
the dispute, Whiteness should be regarded as both a culture and an ideology of racial oppression. Yes,
the discussion has now taken us from (1) jurisdiction, down to (2) culture, and now down to (3)
ideology, but this string of moves is both justifiable and desirable. It is justifiable because for whatever
we know Whiteness to realy be, it is still true that Whiteness performs as a socially constructed racial and
cultural identity. If we are looking for the cultures in play here, Whiteness has to be counted among
them, since people generally speak and act as if there was a White culture. 304 Further, it is desirable to
understand Whiteness in this way because it serves as an antidote to our worries that the move from race
to culture brings with it a lack of focus on the real problem of racism. As long as Whiteness is in the mix,
and Whiteness is understood both as a culture and an ideology of racial subordination, the conflicts style
of cultural analysis is prevented from descending into the post-racial diversity project of the Supreme
Court. By definition, a cultural conflict in which Whiteness is a part will force the conflicts judge to
squarely face racism.

302

As David Roediger has written, "It is not merely ...

that whiteness is nothing but oppressive and false....

It

is the empty and therefore terrifying attempt to build an idenit based on what one isn't and on whom one can hold
back." White Without End?, in RcE STRUGGLES 98, 103 (Theodore Koditschek, Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua & Helen Neville
eds., 2009). See genera/l', WHITE LOGI, WHITE METHODS (Tukufu Zuberi & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., 2008);
Gallagher, supra note 49; IAN HANEY LoPEz, WHITE By LAW: THE LEG AL CONSTRUCTION OF RA( E (2006); CRITICAL
WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING( BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997); Camille Gear Rich,

Marginal Whitenes; 98 CAL. L. REv. 1497, 1593 (2010); Harris, supra note 157; BARBARA FLAG( & DAAID ROEDIGER,
WAGES OF WHITENESS (1991); Audrey G. McFarlane, Operativrely White?: Exploring the Signficance of Race and Class Through
the Paradox of Black Middle-Classness, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 163 (2009).
303 In this context, the website devoted to the "stuff
LIKE, http://stuffwhitepeoplelike.com/
content, see Ian Haney Lopez:

white people like" is interesting. STUFF WHITE PEOPLE

(last visited Feb. 6, 2012). In contrast to the idea that whiteness has positive

In a setting in which White identity exists as the superior opposite to the identity of non-Whites,
elaborating a positive White racial identity seems at best redundant, and at worst dangerous.
Whiteness is already defined almost exclusively in terms of positive attributes. Whites already exist as
innocent, industrious, temperate, judicious, and so on .... Further, advocating the development of a
positive White racial identity disregards the extent to which White attributes rest on the negative traits
that supposedly define minorities ....
Because White identity is a hierarchical fantasy that requires
inferior minorit3 identities, Whiteness as it currently exists should be dismantled. The systems of
meaning that define races revolve primarily around Whites, not non-Whites.
LOPEZ, supra note 302, at 22.
304 Id. See also Danielle Dirks & Jennifer Mueller, Ratism andPopularCulture, in HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY
OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS, supra note 49, at 115, 116 ("In the United States popular culture has assisted in the
maintenance of a white supremacist racial hierarchy since its American inception.").
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(ii) Step Two: Characterization of the Claim
Once the judge has established the identity of the competing (known but undefined) cultures,
the next step will be to characterize the dispute. Though the parties typically have the burden of arguing
a theory of the case, judges in conflicts cases have long re-characterized a dispute when it seemed worth
doing in the judge's view. 305 In this respect, one of the oldest critiques of Carroll was how the judge
might have just as easily regarded Carroll's employment contract as at least as relevant to his claim
against the railroad as the tort theory that ultimately persuaded the Alabama Supreme Court.3 6' Thus,
looking at the terrain our hypothetical judge will ask, what is going on here in Seattle? What are the
alternative theories of the case?
Even with the very few facts already canvassed, several kinds of claims quickly emerge to the
surface. First, this looks like a question of local government law. 3° 7 Second, while it has the appearance
of a dispute about school assignments, perhaps it is more effectively analyzed as a problem in housing
law. 3°' Third, the suggestion that the School Board owed an affirmative duty to people like Jill Kurfirst
of Parents Involved in Community Schools, and that this duty was breached resulting in an injury,
positions this is a tort claim. 3° 9 Fourth, and following a substantial strain of thinking in critical race
theory, claimants like Kurfirst could argue that the Board's decision robbed her of a property right
without due compensation. 31° Fifth, of course, the claim could be situated in the way it was in the actual
case. Surely, other claims could be developed as well.
The point here, however, is not that our hypothetical judge might conclude that one of these
avenues is "correct" or that the Supreme Court really got it wrong in thinking in constitutional rather
than property terms. The point is that in the conflicts style the judge is forced to operate with an
awareness about the contingency and elasticity of the whole process of characterization. "The

M,Among the most famous examples of this tactic are found in W. Union Tel. Co. v. Chilton, 140 S.W. 26
(Ark. 1911) and W. Union Tel. Co. v. Flannagan, 167 S.W. 701 (Ark. 1914).
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See SYMEONIDES, supra note 260, at 42-43.

See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (Court dismissed suit by an
unincorporated town challenging the applicability of local city ordinances despite their lack of participation in the
political process); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Court found that a multiple district school desegregation plan
was inappropriate where only one district participated in dejjure discrimination unless there is a finding that the other
districts participated in the discrimination or that the districts were created to create discrimination); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Court held no due process violation in a state school financing scheme that
based school funding on local property taxes); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (state supreme court held
that a state constitutional right to substantially equal educational opportunities obliged the state to address defacto and de
jure discrimination).
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See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (Court found

plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden to prove that there was racial motivation in zoning); S. Burlington Cntx. NAACP v.
Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 718 (N.J. 1975) (holding that zoning laws that rendered it impossible to create low to
moderate income housing in a municipality were invalid).
309See, e.g., Wassell v. Adams, 865 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1989) (jury's apportionment of negligence upheld).

Wilk v. \Wilk, 795 A.2d 1191 (Vt. 2002) (allowing due compensation for a portion of a parcel of land);
Ragland v. Walter, 411 So. 106 (Ala. 1982) (allowing public sale of contested property instead of equitable distribution);
Black v. Stimpson, 602 So.2d 368 (Ala. 1992) (upholding a public sale and proportional distribution of profits to
owners). Professor Craig-Taylor also cites Fike v. Shearer, 571 P.2d 1252 (Or. 1977) (ordering public sale of contested
land instead of private sale).
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sedimenting of critiques in the conflicts tradition has meant that when we characterize, we do so
knowing in some sense that there is not one single 'right answer' to the characterization question. '311 Or,
from another viewpoint, "[C]haracterization is not a truth claim; it is a provisional technique for
resolving a very real clash of values. ' 312 Consequently, the cash value of foregrounding the process of
claim characterization lies in the judge's ability to avoid legal conceptions that may have greater
tendencies to bog the claim down in questions about the "actual" politics of the judge that are "really"
driving the decision. If we are in the process of characterizing in the conflicts style, we alreay know this is
simply the judge's choice, and nothing more, since there is no apriorireason to characterize the claim in
one way or another.
(iii) Step Three: Identify the Rules
Just as the Alabama Supreme Court asked in Carrollhow tort rules differed in the jurisdictions of
Alabama and Mississippi, so here the third step in the analysis is to ask how the rules differ in the White
and non-White cultural communities. This step proceeds in light of a double recognition produced
through encounters with legal realism and cultural anthropology: objective assessments of both (1) rules,
and (2) culture are always unavailable. Thus, both the cultures themselves and the rules we associate with
those cultures will be constructive-they will be constructed as if they were objectively attainable. As
Knop, Michaels, and Riles explain, "we suggest that the adversarial process can be understood as
encoding the post-essentialist idea that the Truth of foreign law is contestable and what is established is a
313
product of competing testimony by foreign law experts and the judge's perspective on the testimony.
Playing the law game tells us that there really is a foreign law "out there," but the techniques themselves
314
demonstrate "recognition that this is not possible and ultimately it will be a best approximation."
Consequently, conclusions about the rules derived from the White and non-White communities are
simultaneously formalistic and realistic.
With regard to each of the alternative characterizations mentioned above, each of these fields
has been subjected over time to racial critique and attendant descriptions of relevant "communities of
interest." 315 The basic critique in each case is the same: there is a view that a field of law can be divided

311 Kn op, Michaels, & Riles, supra note 41, at 46.
312 Id.
313

Id. at 43.

314 Id.

31, For scholarship on raced local government lav, see, e.g., Michelle \Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race,
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SchoolDistrctBoundaj Problem, 42 URB. LAw. 495 (2010).
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in terms of several competing points of view. One view, which is generally espoused by the court and is
the subject of criticism, is accused of reinforcing racial subordination in one way or another. Such a view
may therefore be termed a "White" view, precisely because of the manner in which Whiteness is an
ideology 316 of domination, as described above.
In terms of generating the rules associated with non-White normative communities, the conflicts
judge would survey those sets of rules suggestive of Black or Hispanic or Asian interests, defined in
logical opposition to the White interests. This part of the analysis need not be as treacherous as it might
sound: once a particular rule has been determined as rooted in a White cultural norm, such as "cultural
diversity" for example, the judge could seek out counter-rules that appeared to have Black, Hispanic, or
Asian content. The determination of such content would turn on the peculiar manner in which the

L.J. 2265 (1997); Daniel R. Mandelker, Ratial Discrimination and Excusionao Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heihts, 55
TEX. L. REv. 1217, 1218 (1977); John A. Powell, Marguerite L. Spencer, Giing Them the Old "One-Two": Gentrijication and
the KO.of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 How. L.J. 433 (2003); Henr A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight
Exclusionao Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 3 (2001); Lisa Young, Breaking the Color Line: Zoning and Opportunity in
America's MetropolitanAreas, 8J. GENDER RA( E & JUST. 667 (2005).
For scholarship on raced tort law, see, e.g., JODY ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND RE ASONABLE RACISM: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLAcK IN AWMEa( A 84-89 (1997); FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE (David
Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009); Taunya Lovell Banks, Teaching Law with Flaws: Adopting a PluralisticApproach to
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Law: Ijut, Race, Gender, and EqualProtection, 63 ME. L. RE'I. 263, 264 (2010); Jennifer Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value
of Injuo, 1900-1949, 49 How. L.J. 99 (2005).
For scholarship on raced property law, see, e.g., Sally Ackerman, The White Supremacist Status Quo: How the
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316 Barbara Fields highlighted the ideological nature of race. The underpinning here was ideological. "When

virtually the whole of society . . .commits itself to belief in propositions that collapse into absurdit upon the slightest
examination, the reason is not hallucination or delusion or even simple hypocrisy; rather it is ideology." Fields, supra note
47, at 100. And what is "ideology"? Fields defined it as the working vernacular oppressors used in their day-to-day lives
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counter-rule disposed of the White rule. Once again, the purpose here is not to choose between the
various sets of rules that the exercise would uncover, but only to uncover them.
(iv) Step Four: Identify the Interests
The fourth step is what is commonly known as interest analysis, though of a quite different sort
than what was on display in Parents Involved In the actual opinion, Justice Roberts followed the
conventional line of balancing the School Board's allotment plan against the weight of the Board's
interest in its implementation. Roberts explained that only if the Board had very particular interests in
317
mind, and only if those interests were articulated in a very particular way, could the plan survive.
Interest analysis in the conflicts style works differently. Here, our judge would attempt to trace the social
interests underlying the conflicting rules in question, and at least at this stage, make no attempt to favor
or impugn any them. The purpose instead is to just get the interests out there, and then determine how
precisely these interests actually conflict.
In many cases, judges will find "false conflicts" in conflict of laws disputes, where it is
determined that what had at first appeared to be a conflict turned out to be a misnomer. For example,
one could imagine the Carrollcase as representing a false conflict. On the one side was the decision of
Alabama's legislature to put employers on the hook for tort damages through the adoption of an
employer liability statute. This statute could therefore be imagined as representing Alabama's interest in
giving Carroll a remedy, since both he and the Railroad company were Alabama residents. On the other
hand, Mississippi had no statute of this kind, and relied instead on an old common law rule. For some,
this might be understood as Mississippi simply not having an interest in regulating a conflict between
two Alabamans, where the negligence happened in Alabama, and the Alabama legislature has explicitly
regulated the issue where Mississippi had not. Thus, this was not really a "conflict" at all, and Alabama's
law should have prevailed.
Thus, instead of framing one or two interests as "compelling" in light of the judge's own moral
compass, the conflicts judge makes no assumptions about the moral value of the interests and first looks
to relate them before evaluating them. There is not adequate space here to outline the sorts of varying
interests we might impute to particular cultures in the contexts of local government, housing, tort,
property, and constitutional law disputes. What is clear enough, however, is that in certain cases cultural
interests would likely align in surprising ways, while in others the interests would clash. This
differentiation would serve as one gauge for the judge's orientation towards the case: the choice to
characterize a dispute in a given way, and the attendant likelihood of attaching particular conflicts or
confluences of interests to those characterizations, would provide a powerful signal with regard to how
the judge might be prepared to decide.
(v) Step Five: Decide
The fifth step involves the judge's decision. This could be framed as a conclusion that logically
follows from the preceding arguments, but the better decision will refrain from doing so, instead
highlighting the various avenues that the question may have taken. At the moment of decision, the
conflicts style offers a final escape hatch known as the public policy exception. 318 Here, the judge may
find it necessary to make a claim about the cultural norms of a particular party as somehow beyond the
pale. The judge's own morality enters the decision, but it enters in a brutally explicit way. Thus, even if

317 ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. 701, 702 (2007).
3" Loucks v. Standard Oil, 224 N.Y. 99 (N.Y. 1918).

RACE AS A LEGAL CONCEPT

Vol. 2:1

the prior arguments had been constructed to lead to one solution, the conflicts style might reverse at the
very end in the name of an overriding morality.
Bearing witness to this degree of flexibility, some might doubt whether this is really a better way
of dealing with such dramatic problems with race and culture. Consider how Knop, Michaels, and Riles
ultimately defend their position. In their view, the conflicts style of decision has several advantages over
conventional public law litigation, chief among them that a concrete dispute can be resolved without
getting blocked by meta-ethical questions at the outset.319 Beyond this is another set of strengths largely
understood as advances beyond the multiculturalism framework. That is, where the Supreme Court's
racial project of cultural diversity is loosely predicated on cross-cultural dialogue, tolerance of others, and
compromises between competing norms, a racial project articulated in the conflicts style is predicated on
32°
none of these.
Another way to see this difference lies in a comparison between the manner in which "interest
analysis" is conducted in ParentsInvolved, and the way in which it would have been done in the conflicts
style. Following Bakke and Grutter, Justice Roberts pulled a White interest out of the sky-cultural
diversity-and held that particular norms could only be applied if they were in the service of that one,
single, paramount interest. In other words, the dispute was decided solely in terms of that single interest
in the desirability of achieving tolerance and compromise in a world of intractable difference. In the
conflicts situation, the Court doesn't apply a pre-existing interest in tolerance or diversity to a cultural
dispute. As Knop, Michaels, and Riles put it, the conflicts style does not see itself as being authorized to
define a middle ground. 321 Instead, the Court seeks out the interests immanent in the cultures
themselves, and then decides in favor of one set of norms over another without compromising anything.
Perhaps we will see the judge as having decided in favor of the wrong norms, but at the least the
conflicts judge cannot be accused of hiding the ball.
In this case, it is hard to imagine how the decision might go given the many alternate routes the
judge may have taken along the way. After having identified the cultural conflict at the root of the
dispute between the parents of a White high school student and the Seattle School Board, the judge
would have chosen one of many different characterizations of the claim. Characterization is a huge
multi-pronged fork in the road in which the claim might look quite differently depending on whether it is
analyzed as a housing, education, or tort law dispute. Then, upon each of these five or more splits in the
road we could see the judge taking each of those routes and splitting them again into two or more paths.
Thus, there could be fifteen or twenty different ways of reaching the next step of the analysis: identifying
the actual interests of the relevant cultures in having their "own" rules applied to the particular dispute
between the parents and the Board. After asking whether these interests line up or collide, the judge
might finally insert herself into the foreground of the analysis, and suggest that something about the
public policy of the state of Washington, or the nation, dismisses one group of norms from
consideration.

319

Knop, Michaels, & Riles, supra note 41.

320Id.
321

Id. at 76.

2012

VI.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW

CONCLUSION

Thinking about race in the style of Conflict of Laws is a helpful way of reiterating the dualpurpose of this Article, which is to (1) emphasize the legal character of racial identity, and (2) launch an
emancipatory manipulation of civil rights law that only becomes available after we have confronted the
full meaning of race as a legal concept. To sum up, I will restate both the nature of this sort of
emancipation, as well as its connection to the legal conception of race.
The first thing, when contemplating the prerequisites of an effective anti-racist strategy situated
in a neoliberal/neoracist situation, is a recognition that race is itself a dirty word. It was invented as a way
of rationalizing a Racial Contract that set the terms of domination and exploitation between various
populations. In particular, it was invented in the language of objectivity and naturalness-an arena of
science in which the creation of human races could justify the exploitation of human beings. In order for
racism to happen, humans had to be raced.
Second, jurists in the United States then created race as a legal concept in light of race as a
biological concept. This understanding of race was pivotal not only in the elaboration of slave law and
segregation, but in the post-Brown era of civil rights law as well. Though the biological foundations of
race are now understood to be illusory, it nevertheless continues as a background rule for contemporary
anti- discrimination law, including recent cases like ParentsInvolved.
Third, Parents Involved indicates a neoliberal trajectory in civil rights law that is both bizzare and
disturbing. A neoliberal conception of race is weird because it at once borrows the whitewashed biology
of modern liberalism (it accepts as a background rule that race is biological, but forbids any assumptions
about human value to be drawn out of biology), but also rejects the modern affiliation with foreground
rules (i.e. anti- discrimination law). The neoliberal conception is disturbing because it fails to inhabit the
neoracist world-our actual world-and instead aspires to a colorblind world, a fantasyland in which
human beings are naturally raced and in which the role of law should be to leave races, like markets, free
to regulate themselves.
If an anti-racist jurist is to effectively grapple with a post-racial, neoliberal concept of race, she
will have to be crafty. She will have to fight racism without a biological concept of race, which means
thinking about how to characterize claims that are cognizable even when the plaintiffs identity is
understood as socially constructed and not naturally immutable. She will have to fight racism without
collapsing race into culture in such a way that her efforts avoid being sucked into a whirlpool of
competing cultural pluralisms that are totally blind to the Racial Contract. She will have to fight racism
without making the mistake of thinking that while the social reality of race and culture is real enough,
that these realities will give her a handle on being able to prove before a judge what a given culture
actually is and what it actually desires. In sum, she has to cancel the terms of the Racial Contract through
the use of a concept of race that isn't actually there (i.e., biology), or through a concept of race that really
is there (sociology), but is admittedly so fragmented and shifting (cultural anthropology) that the only
way to talk about it is in constructive (legal) terms.
So just what is emancipatory about any of this? The basic claim of the Article, and the claim of
so much critical legal theory over the past several decades, is that law is constitutive of society, even
while society simultaneously constitutes law. What that means here is that racial identity is composed of
legal rules, and that those rules have deeply political stakes. The upshot is that the legal structure that
generates the idea of race is not a matter of biology-it is a matter of law-and that the legal structure is
not neutral or natural-it is a matter of contingency and history. Thus, when we confront the full
meaning of race as a legal concept, we encounter a critical relation between the legal and the political.
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The encounter can and should be deeply empowering. Race is not a naturally occurring force in
the world over which we have no control, but is instead a constellation of legal rules over which we have
total control. Further, these rules are the crystallization of particular political desires that wax and wane
over time. Consequently, when we think about race as a legal concept-a legal concept that retains and
rejects certain elements as various political agents emerge and recede-race emerges as a de-reified legal
argument. If race can be de-reified and seen as a kind of argument, instead of seen as a thing, one has
attained a tremendous amount of power over the concept of race. This seems like a good thing, so long
as it is either we that have received the power, or those with which we agree.

